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Introduction: Courting 
Catastrophe? Can Humanitarian 
Actions Contribute to Climate 
Change Adaptation?
Siri Eriksen,1 Lars Otto Naess,2 Ruth Haug,3 
Lutgart Lenaerts4 and Aditi Bhonagiri5
Abstract Climate change introduces new challenges for humanitarian aid 
through changing hazard patterns. The linkages between climate change 
and humanitarian aid are complex. While humanitarian organisations 
deal directly with vulnerable populations, interventions and actions also 
form part of global politics and development pathways that are currently 
generating climate change, inequities and vulnerability. This IDS Bulletin 
represents a call for increasing engagement between humanitarian 
aid and adaptation interventions to support deliberate transformation 
of development pathways. Based on studies carried out as part of the 
‘Courting Catastrophe’ project, we argue that humanitarian interventions 
offer several entry points and opportunities for a common agenda to drive 
transformational adaptation. Changes in political and financial frameworks 
are needed to facilitate longer-term actions; additionally, transformational 
adaptation demands moving from a mode of delivering expert advice and 
solutions to vulnerable populations, to taking up multiple vulnerability 
knowledges and making space for contestation of current development.
Keywords: humanitarian policy and practice, climate change, 
adaptation, transformation.
1 Introduction
Humanitarian crises appear dramatic, overwhelming and sudden. 
Aid is required immediately to save lives. On the face of  it, linkages 
to longer‑term climate change and adaptation appear far‑fetched. 
However, the causes for humanitarian crises – such as the current food 
shortages in Ethiopia and on the Horn of  Africa – are rarely sudden. 
Rather, they are the result of  a multitude of  factors and processes that 
cause and compound people’s vulnerabilities, built up over time. In 
many cases, academic researchers, humanitarian and development 
organisations have been warning about the risks – and increasing 
likelihood – of  crises for months or even years before they take place. 
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Drought or flood-related crises, like most other humanitarian and 
refugee crises, have fundamental social, political and economic drivers.
This IDS Bulletin examines the link between such short‑term crises 
– and the humanitarian responses that follow – and adaptation to 
climate change. The articles form part of  research carried out under 
the project ‘Courting Catastrophe? Humanitarian Policy and Practice 
in a Changing Climate’, funded by the Norwegian Research Council.6 
The research has been the result of  joint thinking between academic 
and humanitarian organisations across the global North and South. 
Together, we have studied the practical ways in which humanitarian 
responses are affecting the prospects for adaptation to climate change in 
different geographic and policy contexts. Various types of  humanitarian 
interventions – and the institutional and policy context in which they 
have taken place – were studied in seven countries across Asia and 
Africa (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Pakistan, Malawi, Nepal and 
Zambia). The two main overarching questions that framed the case 
studies were: What is the level of  convergence between humanitarian 
interventions and efforts to support adaptation to climate change? And, 
what lessons can we draw from current experience on the prospects 
for reducing the risk of  climate change causing increased burdens on 
humanitarian interventions in the future?
We start from the premise that vulnerability to climate change is driven 
by multiple and diverse social processes, such as dispossession of  land, 
conflict, and loss or lack of  employment opportunities. At its core, 
vulnerability can be considered a failure of  entitlements (Ziervogel 
et al. 2017; Eriksen, Brown and Kelly 2005; Chambers 1989), linked 
to fundamental rights and access to resources. To adapt to climate 
change, there is increasing realisation that it is therefore not enough 
to focus on small, incremental changes that simply tinker with current 
processes and systems. While such action may give short‑term respite, 
it will do little or nothing to remove the causes for vulnerability, and is 
ultimately insufficient to address the challenges we are facing (Ribot 
2014), ultimately reproducing or even increasing the problem (O’Brien 
et al. 2015; Pelling, O’Brien and Matyas 2015). Thus, it is increasingly 
clear that deeper, more fundamental and transformative changes in 
the structures and processes that drive vulnerability are also needed 
(O’Brien 2012; Bassett and Fogelman 2013).
Transformation has become a prominent term in climate change 
discourse over recent years, but used in many different ways (Feola 
2014). Following O’Brien (2012) and Nelson, Adger and Brown (2007), 
we here distinguish between two major types: ‘outcome transformation’ 
and ‘deliberate transformation’. ‘Outcome transformation’ refers to 
how current development trajectories and greenhouse gas emissions are 
causing systemic change, often over short time periods, which in turn 
influences the ability or inability of  people to cope with climate-related 
risks. Forced resettlement by governments, or migration due to sea‑level 
rise, exemplifies such outcome transformation.
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‘Deliberate transformation’ is about contesting rather than 
accommodating structural change, by striving to deliberately alter 
development pathways away from those that are fossil‑fuel intensive, 
amassing wealth in the hands of  the few, while producing inequity, 
poverty, disempowerment and environmental degradation (O’Brien 
et al. 2015). This IDS Bulletin calls for deliberate transformation as an 
approach to making humanitarian action and adaptation more closely 
aligned in tackling short‑ and long‑term challenges brought about by a 
changing climate. This means going beyond current humanitarian efforts 
to strengthen coping or protect livelihoods, while focusing adaptation 
attention on addressing underlying root causes of  vulnerability.
Our focus places us at the centre of  a long‑standing debate over 
reform of  the humanitarian sector, and specifically on whether or not 
humanitarian aid should remain focused on its core mandate – saving 
lives in the time of  crises – or also engage in longer‑term concerns, 
including climate change (Bennett, Foley and Pantuliano 2016). 
Concerns have been raised that a widening remit for humanitarian aid 
may entail humanitarian organisations risking over‑stretching funding 
and capacity, thereby diluting and weakening their core mandate. Others 
are pointing to the fact that unless broader concerns are addressed, 
humanitarian organisations will fail in their core mandate. The latter 
view is reinforced by substantial evidence of  how humanitarian responses 
may be part of  the problem, reinforcing or increasing vulnerability to 
climate‑related and other hazards (Wisner 2001; OCHA 2009; Red 
Cross 2009). Over recent years, a number of  humanitarian organisations 
have been shifting into longer‑term activities, notably through extensive 
(if  underfunded) work on disaster risk reduction (DRR), and more 
recently, a growing focus on strengthening resilience to climate change as 
a cross‑cutting goal among various humanitarian actors (OCHA 2009; 
Red Cross 2009; Sphere Project 2011). While there is an increasing 
acknowledgement of  the need to make such linkages, it is also clear 
that there are cultural, institutional and financial obstacles for making 
this work in practice. Our argument here is thus that there is a need to 
reinforce current efforts, while also going one step further. A focus on 
deliberate transformation is necessary because the ‘perfect storm’ of  
climate change and other large‑scale changes means an increasing risk of  
being trapped in a disaster response mode and of  being held ‘hostage’ to 
outcome transformations.
Adaptation policy and practice has a lot to learn from humanitarian 
practice. Humanitarian actors have decades of  experience working 
directly with vulnerable populations in complex settings, which forms 
a good entry point for a deep understanding of  the types of  changes 
in social and political relations that deliberate transformation would 
require. At the same time, humanitarian aid, like any aid, inherently 
forms part of  development pathways generating (or reducing) 
vulnerability. Critical here is that the form of  transformation we 
envisage is about tacit political dimensions of  empowerment, giving 
space to the voices of  the most vulnerable. It is not about using crises 
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to push through top‑down decision‑making such as resettlement, land 
privatisation or decisions that forcibly shift people out of  particular 
livelihoods. What is required is increased understanding of  the 
way that humanitarian actions form part of  development agendas, 
and in turn the opportunities for fundamental shifts to address root 
causes of  vulnerability. Generating such transformative change is no 
small task. The articles in this IDS Bulletin intend to contribute to a 
better understanding of  the challenges and opportunities of  linking 
humanitarian aid with and supporting change towards sustainable and 
transformative pathways. Taken together, the articles show that the 
linkages between climate change adaptation and humanitarian aid are 
complex, context-specific and challenging.
The remainder of  this introduction is structured as follows. Section 2 
unpacks the intersections between climate change and humanitarian 
assistance, and the ways in which they overlap or differ in their 
responses to these twin challenges. Section 3 follows with a discussion of  
the types of  transformations that may be needed, linked to experiences 
from case study countries. Section 4 concludes by highlighting the 
potential for, and elements of, a common agenda for change.
2 Articulating linkages between humanitarian assistance and 
adaptation to climate change
What are the connections between climate change adaptation 
and humanitarian assistance? While humanitarian assistance is 
intuitively focused on the short term, the definition offered by Good 
Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) also refers to the longer‑term aspects 
of  strengthening preparedness for disasters: the aid and action designed 
to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity 
during and in the aftermath of  man‑made crises and natural disasters, 
as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence 
of  such situations (GHD 2003). Humanitarian assistance in this way 
overlaps with adaptation, which is commonly defined as ‘the process 
of  adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects’ (Agard and 
Schipper 2014: 1758).
Adaptation similarly has a short‑ and long‑term aspect. While ultimately 
focusing on the long term, adaptation processes typically start with 
identifying current vulnerabilities and ways of  reducing those, increasing 
the options and flexibility for responding to new and changing climate 
patterns. Managing climate risk, including changes in variability as well 
as longer‑term shifts in climatic conditions, has been argued to be a 
necessary part of  climate change adaptation (IPCC 2012). In particular, 
it is increasingly argued that adaptation is a process of  managing 
interacting climatic and non‑climatic stressors and changes, and that 
adaptation must target the social, political and economic conditions 
and processes that drive vulnerability (O’Brien et al. 2007). Often 
vulnerability to climate change is manifested in suffering and loss of  
livelihoods when faced with climate variability and events.
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The first key intersection between humanitarian assistance and climate 
change adaptation is thus grounded in the fact that many disasters 
are climate‑related. Climate change will act as a ‘risk multiplier’. For 
example, there is concern that climate change will lead to an increase in 
humanitarian crises linked to extreme events such as cyclones, droughts 
and floods (Challinor et al. 2016). There are particular concerns around 
migration, although the exact linkages are contested. Nevertheless, this 
intersection highlights that changes in variability and changes in extreme 
events will expose more people to hazards, leading to increased need for 
humanitarian aid. Any such aid must ensure that short‑term measures do 
not undermine longer‑term vulnerability reduction to climatic events.
Second, people are not only affected by disasters, but also how the 
disasters are responded to. How a disaster is handled is critical for 
how vulnerable a community may be to future climatic events. As 
pointed out by Wisner (2001), a climatic event that comes on top of  
or after a disaster, such as an earthquake or conflict, often intensifies 
a humanitarian crisis. For example, the earthquake in Nepal in 2015 
killed around 9,000 people and destroyed several hundred thousand 
buildings (Reuters 2015). According to the Red Cross, 4 million people 
were still living in sub‑standard temporary shelters a year after the 
disaster, making them very vulnerable to climatic events (IFRC 2016).
Third, climate change may contribute to social changes such as 
patterns of  poverty that influence the nature of  humanitarian crises. 
The fifth IPCC assessment report described how climate change, 
through undermining livelihoods and destroying physical and social 
infrastructure, may reinforce poverty traps and send transient poor 
groups into chronic poverty, as well as create new vulnerable groups, also 
in non‑poor countries (Olsson et al. 2014). Such poverty and inequity 
often increases social vulnerability to any type of  disaster, whether 
climate‑related or not. This implies that humanitarian aid will often have 
to operate in an altered vulnerability landscape, such as in terms of  new 
poverty and migration patterns in part driven by climate change.
Fourth, there is increasing recognition that climate change is a 
fundamental development problem because it is generated by 
development pathways that simultaneously produce greenhouse 
gas emissions, inequity and vulnerability. These same development 
pathways also drive humanitarian crises. Many argue that what is 
required is to move towards more climate‑resilient development 
pathways, or development trajectories that combine mitigation of  
emissions, equitable development and reduced vulnerability (O’Brien 
et al. 2015; Pelling et al. 2015). There is a need to turn the policy 
focus to the underlying causes of  vulnerability and risk, but also the 
development pathways themselves that create these risks. This highlights 
in turn that humanitarian aid is shaped by particular development 
paradigms, but also that actions contribute to particular development 
pathways, either reinforcing particular developments or supporting 
climate‑resilient pathways.
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While humanitarian actions often have the short‑term saving of  
lives as a goal, and are intended to be ‘politically neutral’ in nature, 
not favouring any party, they inherently contribute to particular 
development trajectories by reinforcing or altering practices, social 
structures and norms. For example, the way that a humanitarian action 
such as food aid or DRR is implemented may either support local elite 
power relations or create alternatives through empowering marginalised 
groups in decision-making. Efforts to build resilient livelihoods may, 
for example, promote particular agricultural practices and support the 
sedentarisation of  pastoralists, or it may create alternatives to such a 
development trajectory through supporting livestock and livelihood 
recovery. This has implications both for the social vulnerability of  a 
population and for emissions in the longer term.
These issues have implications for how individual actions are carried 
out, but they also raise questions about whether changes are required 
to the way in which the humanitarian system operates. The normative 
principles of  sustainable adaptation (Eriksen et al. 2011; Eriksen 
and Marin 2015) formed a backdrop for the various case studies 
described in this issue and their assessment of  the extent to which the 
investigated actions and approaches contributed towards longer‑term 
vulnerability reduction and more sustainable development pathways. 
These principles include: (1) recognise the context for vulnerability, 
including multiple stressors; (2) acknowledge that differing values and 
interests affect adaptation outcomes; (3) integrate local knowledge into 
adaptation responses; (4) consider potential feedback between local 
and global processes; and (5) empower the most vulnerable groups 
in development decision-making. Each of  the studies used different 
methods relevant to the particular context and intervention that they 
were following, however. Together, they inform our understanding of  
the potential for humanitarian actions to contribute to adaptation that is 
transformational rather than incremental.
3 What transformations are required, and where
To draw out the challenges and identify areas for more joined‑up 
thinking around humanitarian aid and adaptation to climate change, 
we consider here the implications of  recent changes in the humanitarian 
system. Over recent years, the humanitarian sector has been subject 
to wide‑ranging debates over fundamental changes and reforms 
(Bennett et al. 2016). Marin and Naess (this IDS Bulletin) describe 
some of  the shifts that have happened of  relevance to adaptation, 
including an increased focus on building resilient livelihoods, DRR 
and early warning. Such shifts are taking place within a global context 
of  multiple and increasingly complex uncertainties around climate 
change, social inequality, political instability, migration and refugees as 
well as a general disillusion with globalisation. Recent increases in the 
need for humanitarian assistance, with funding unable to keep pace 
with demand, have contributed towards renewed attention both on the 
question of  efficiency of  humanitarian interventions and of  the future 
of  the humanitarian system as a whole.
(Endnotes)
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From the above, the question is whether these shifts ensure that 
humanitarian actions contribute to reducing, rather than exacerbating, 
longer‑term social vulnerability and open up space for more sustainable 
development pathways. Talbot and Barder (2016) discuss to what 
degree the humanitarian system is not only ‘broke’ but also ‘broken’. 
If  the problem is that the system is broken, as opposed to just ‘broke’, 
there is a need for a fundamental reform. Evidence for the latter is 
in the fact that while humanitarian organisations are good at saving 
lives, there are persistent challenges in saving livelihoods. According 
to Talbot and Barder (2016), most of  the humanitarian aid is spent on 
long‑lasting, protracted crises rather than short‑term emergencies, and 
humanitarian aid is not successful in having people graduate from being 
aid receivers to moving on to safer and more productive lives. Similarly, 
Marin and Naess (this IDS Bulletin) find that, among others, inertia of  
organisational cultures and financial models hamper humanitarian 
efforts in achieving their full climate change adaptation potential.
Thus, it is increasingly clear that adaptation to climate change requires 
a rethink, where adaptation is not treated as a benign exercise that can 
benefit all, or simply an extension of  the humanitarian principles of  
non‑partisanship (Marin and Naess, this IDS Bulletin), but as a process 
that benefits different people very differently, creating winners and 
losers in the process (Eriksen et al. 2011). There are many suggestions 
for how humanitarian policy and practice may be altered in ways 
that would coincide with the need for transformational adaptation. 
Clarke and Dercon (2016) recommend pre-agreed, pre-financed, 
rules‑based emergency preparedness plans that are implemented 
immediately after a disaster. According to their view, such a standby 
financing model could be quicker, less expensive, better coordinated and 
probably contribute more towards longer‑term resilience. This kind of  
pre-financed preparedness plan is not a new concept, but the timing and 
context, given climate change and other challenges, might now be more 
conducive for scaling up the idea of  upfront preparedness planning 
accompanied by funding commitments. Costella et al. (this IDS Bulletin) 
describe how a forecast-based financing mechanism, which triggers 
pre-defined actions when an extreme event is likely to happen, enables 
anticipatory capacity at the scale of  national strategies and planning.
Another potentially important measure in humanitarian interventions 
is social protection, which has been increasingly linked to adaptation 
and resilience (Béné 2011; Davies et al. 2009, 2013). Social protection 
programmes include a whole range of  different activities such as cash 
transfers, food relief, public works programmes, input subsidies, food 
subsidies, school‑feeding programmes, crop and livestock insurance and 
grain reserves (HLPE 2012). A study by the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) of  200 social protection programmes found that cash 
transfers in general give good results on many livelihood security 
indicators (Bastagli et al. 2016). Haug and Wold (this IDS Bulletin) argue 
that to reduce the future need for humanitarian assistance in Malawi, 
lessons learned from their social protection programme in the form of  
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input subsidies can prove useful in relation to multiple efforts towards 
achieving sustainable climate change adaptation.
Worldwide, better emergency preparedness is another topic of  huge and 
increasing interest. The UN‑negotiated Sendai Framework for DRR 
(2015–2030) provides a guide as to how countries can address disaster 
risk, emergency preparedness and recovery. This framework emphasises 
the need to understand disaster risk, the need to strengthen disaster 
governance, the need for investing in DRR for resilience and the need 
for enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and recovery 
(UNISDR 2015). Creativity and action are needed in relation to ensuring 
that the humanitarian system has the capacity and capability to perform 
well in accordance with its mandate area. According to Talbot and Barder 
(2016), in the humanitarian field, there is little rigorous evidence about 
what works, few independent assessments and little information about 
what happened to the money as compared to long‑term development 
assistance. Multiple institutions and organisations, with their related 
policies, strategies and action plans, often have different vulnerability 
understandings and priorities, as described in Pakistan (Nyborg and 
Nawab, this IDS Bulletin). It is often unclear how government institutions 
and policies prioritise their short‑ and long‑term focus and how they 
coordinate with humanitarian and development organisations, and what 
the outcomes are for vulnerability reduction.
Hence, we can see that the humanitarian sector includes a diversity of  
approaches that can contribute to longer‑term vulnerability reduction, 
but there is less understanding about how they may contribute to 
deliberate transformative adaptation. The studies in this issue highlight 
that there is a need for not only integrating longer‑term approaches such 
as preparedness, resilience building and social protection, but that there 
is also a need to alter the way that any measure is carried out, with a 
clear view of  their differential effects on groups and their contribution to 
transformative change. The studies in this IDS Bulletin illustrate that spaces 
exist within current humanitarian operations to increase consciousness of  
the effects of  these operations on vulnerability contexts and development 
pathways. Widening the scope of  existing vulnerability assessments is one 
such opportunity. There is rich knowledge of  the drivers of  vulnerability 
at the local level, but this information is not systematically incorporated 
into the decision‑making processes of  government, humanitarian and 
development organisations when designing adaptation activities. Most 
responses to disaster focus on the physical risk and pay little attention to 
the social drivers of  vulnerability (Nyborg and Nawab, this IDS Bulletin).
It is critical that space is given, within each action and programme, 
for identifying the assumptions about what is good development that 
underlie an action (and which alternative views of  development are 
ruled out). An important part of  such reflection is questioning how 
‘vulnerable groups’ are identified, including the assumptions about the 
most important factors that make people vulnerable in that specific 
context. Several studies in this issue suggest that distinguishing whose 
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authority is legitimised and which power relations are reinforced 
or challenged through an intervention is important in designing 
humanitarian actions. Mosberg et al. (this IDS Bulletin) question whether 
increased funding and focus on climate at county level in Kenya will 
necessarily help support adaptation; while humanitarian approaches 
in Isiolo County are changing in part due to climate change concerns, 
there is a lack of  emphasis on differential vulnerability.
Benefiting from humanitarian and adaptation interventions is dependent 
on having access to networks of  actors operating within both formal 
and informal channels of  authority. Nagoda (this IDS Bulletin) similarly 
observed for the case of  Nepal that food aid and accompanying 
development programmes tended to legitimise unequal power relations 
at the village level and dependence of  the food insecure households 
on the wealthier households. Both Mosberg et al. and Nagoda (this 
IDS Bulletin) highlight that there is an urgent need, in adaptation 
and humanitarian actions alike, for a deeper understanding of  the 
socio‑political context in which these actions are deployed, else they risk 
entrenching power structures and the processes creating vulnerability in 
the first place. Practical ways to enhance such understanding is to give 
space within planning and implementation for multiple vulnerability 
knowledges and understandings of  the problem to emerge. Furthermore, 
the influence of  vulnerable groups in decision-making processes can 
be strengthened, such as ensuring participation at the village level of  
people of  diverse social, economic and ethnic backgrounds, such as in 
committees administering food aid, in local DRR groups and in the 
governing of  preparedness and anticipatory actions.
4 Towards a common agenda for deliberate transformation?
We have seen that the humanitarian sector shares many concerns 
and challenges with the adaptation and development communities in 
tackling climate‑related hazards and risks: namely, a lack of  attention 
to social drivers of  vulnerability and multiple vulnerability knowledges; 
little (albeit growing) consideration of  the socio‑political context in 
which they are implemented; and a lack of  explicit thinking about 
how interventions affect – and are affected by – power relations and 
development trajectories. It is clear from the project case studies that 
lasting solutions to humanitarian crises require that the root causes of  
vulnerability are identified and addressed, and that power relations – 
such as along gender, caste, and ethnicity dimensions – are vital drivers 
of  vulnerability, and shape policy processes and outcomes. The studies 
also reiterate that without considering climate change, humanitarian 
interventions risk enhancing vulnerability rather than reducing it 
(Nagoda et al., this IDS Bulletin).
The question is then, where are the opportunities for humanitarian 
action to contribute to deliberate transformation in order to support 
adaptation? Transformation means that in addition to change in 
practices, changes must take place to the way that decisions are made, 
and in world views, beliefs and understanding of  the challenges that 
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drive decisions. Hence, identifying the opportunities for transformation 
demands reflexivity about ‘the natural order of  things’ and the 
questioning of  assumptions. For example, how do humanitarian actions 
reinforce or challenge ideas about who is considered ‘vulnerable’ or 
‘capable’ in a society, and what is considered ‘good development’? How 
can humanitarian actions contribute to or support the authority and 
legitimacy of  the interests of  particular actors while ignoring others? 
Are ‘vulnerable populations’ seen as helpless recipients of  outside help 
and expertise, or do their understandings of  the causes of  vulnerability 
form the basis of  humanitarian actions and real involvement in 
development decision‑making?
We have argued that shifts within the humanitarian sector give new 
opportunities for long‑term, joined‑up approaches to support climate 
change adaptation. However, a change is needed in the political and 
financial frameworks within which humanitarian actors work, so that 
longer‑term actions are possible. Rigid funding mechanisms tend to 
reinforce sector‑wide approaches to vulnerability reduction. Donors 
often focus on measurable results from certain sectors, each with their 
own priorities and reporting requirements. The focus on measurable 
results also tends to favour technology‑type and short‑term ‘measurable’ 
actions rather than longer‑term vulnerability reduction.
Beyond such a shift, however, a shift in thinking within organisations 
involved in both humanitarian and adaptation actions is required, from 
viewing adaptation as merely being ‘longer‑term’, and to recognise 
vulnerability reduction measures – whether short‑term or long‑term 
in nature – as contested, political and with highly differentiated effects. 
Critical here is a recognition in the design and implementation of  all 
actions that local vulnerability is highly socially differentiated, as are the 
causes of  that vulnerability. There are no blueprint solutions as to how 
to ‘do humanitarian aid’ to support climate change adaptation. We need 
to go beyond thinking about a particular practical action – to thinking 
about the process behind that particular action; in particular, whose 
values, ideas, knowledge and decision‑making power contributed to that 
action. Humanitarian interventions land in a context of  what is politically 
possible, in terms of  prevailing ideas of  who is vulnerable and why, and 
what constitutes ‘good and desirable development’. The actions are also 
shaped by conflicting ideas, priorities and interests of  government, donor 
and civil society organisations with which they interact.
Transformative adaptation demands moving from a mode of  delivering 
expert advice and solutions to vulnerable populations, to taking up 
multiple vulnerability knowledges and making space for contestation 
of  current development. The case studies presented in this issue 
illustrate some ways in which humanitarian actions can do this. If  
successful in instituting such changes, the humanitarian system could 
be a driving force in creating transformative adaptation, showcasing 
to the development and climate change communities what adaptation 
that lets vulnerable groups participate actively in defining more 
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sustainable futures looks like, i.e. an emancipatory process as proposed 
by Manuel‑Navarrete (2010) and Tschakert et al. (2016). The alternative 
to such proactive and deliberative vulnerability reduction is the risk that 
local adaptation is reduced to reactive measures to changing climatic 
conditions driven by rising emissions among wealthier populations.
Nevertheless, humanitarian action – even if  effective in local 
vulnerability reduction – does not on its own constitute adaptation. 
It is only one of  several types of  actions in many spheres of  societal 
development that make up adaptation. It is not our argument that 
humanitarian aid could or should ‘take over’ responsibility for climate 
change adaptation, but rather that humanitarian interventions inevitably 
contribute to affecting the prospects for transformational change, 
whether intentional or not. Actions either support or undermine 
climate‑resilient development pathways. This does not mean that 
humanitarian aid necessarily has to be part of  formal adaptation 
programmes, although that may be appropriate in some contexts. In 
many cases, in particular in sensitive conflict settings, humanitarian aid 
must remain politically neutral and distinct from government actions. 
There is also a danger that a focus on humanitarian actions and their 
interaction with adaptation places responsibility for responding to 
climate change on the most vulnerable groups. A delinking of  adaptation 
from mitigation and the way that high emission and inequitable 
development pathways emerge both locally and globally easily leads to a 
bolstering – rather than a transformation – of  the existing development 
pathways that can contribute to vulnerability and climate change. It 
is by illustrating alternative pathways locally and practical ways to 
support such alternatives, and the critical debates around them, that 
humanitarian actions can most usefully contribute to transformation.
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Climate Change Adaptation 
Through Humanitarian Aid? 
Promises, Perils and Potentials of 
the ‘New Humanitarianism’
Andrei Marin1 and Lars Otto Naess2
Abstract A major reform of the humanitarian sector is currently under 
way, focusing increasingly on the prevention of crises rather than on 
providing relief once crises have occurred. This article examines whether 
and how this new humanitarian approach can also improve people’s ability 
to adapt to climate change. We identify three approaches central to this 
‘new humanitarianism’, namely resilience, disaster risk reduction and early 
warning systems, and discuss them in relation to broad principles for 
adaptation to climate change. We find that, despite encouraging potential 
and a lot of common ground, key barriers and hindrances still exist, such as 
inertia of organisational cultures and existing financial models. We suggest 
that realising this potential will require acknowledging and addressing the 
multitude of local social, historical and political inequities that drive both 
humanitarian crises and vulnerability to climate change.
Keywords: ‘new humanitarianism’, resilience, disaster risk reduction, 
early warning systems, inequality, climate change, climate change 
adaptation.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, international humanitarian aid has undergone 
major structural reform, aimed at responding more effectively to 
changing, and steadily more complex, humanitarian crises (Bennett, 
Foley and Pantuliano 2016; UNOCHA 2011). Climate change 
represents one of the key factors that has challenged traditional 
humanitarian aid, in that it is changing the nature and severity of 
humanitarian emergencies. There is increasing recognition among 
humanitarian actors of the importance of adaptation to climate change, 
and in particular resilience. Resilience features prominently across all 
major post-2015 frameworks, including the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(Sendai Framework), the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and the 
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World Humanitarian Summit framework (WHS) (Peters et al. 2016). In 
response, humanitarian actors – government, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental – are increasingly integrating support to adaptation 
and resilience in their policies and programmes (e.g. UNOCHA 2011).
The background for this change is an increasing acknowledgement that 
traditional, response-driven actions are no longer appropriate; on the 
contrary, they may reinforce or increase vulnerabilities to climate-related 
hazards (Anderson and Woodrow 1998; Wisner 2001). Examples may 
be rebuilding houses in areas exposed to increasing climate-related 
risks, or providing seeds that are inappropriate to future climate change. 
However, we know less so far about whether and how these approaches 
are contributing to long-term adaptation goals. This article examines 
some common approaches to adaptation among humanitarian actors 
and their implications for adaptation.
Our inquiry comes at a time when the long-standing separation between 
the traditional province of  humanitarian work (post-disaster response), 
and the normal purview of  development interventions (poverty 
reduction, in the context of  vulnerability and risk) is gradually being 
removed. Our guiding research question is whether and how this new 
humanitarian approach may contribute to climate change adaptation, 
and what implications this may have for research as well as policy.
The article investigates this question by examining whether current 
interventions (by humanitarian agencies and governments) match 
criteria usually identified as essential in facilitating climate change 
adaptation. We look at adaptation as ultimately being about addressing 
the social, economic and political root causes of  vulnerability to climate 
variability and change. To do this, we use written (published and ‘grey’) 
sources from humanitarian agencies on approaches, programmes and 
practices, and compare these with recent academic literature on climate 
change adaptation.
2 The ‘new humanitarianism’: its roots and present form
Weather-related events are increasingly seen by humanitarian actors 
as occurring against a background of  other debilitating circumstances 
(GHAR 2013). An estimated two thirds of  current disasters are related 
to climate hazards (ibid.). Climate-related hazards were, for example, 
responsible for 98 per cent of  all displacements caused by disasters in 
2012, and 93 per cent in 2011 (ibid.). Monsoon floods in India and rainy 
season floods in Nigeria displaced 7 million people in 2012.
The recognition of  deeper social, political and economic factors acting as 
drivers of  vulnerability and causing disasters has a long history (O’Keefe, 
Wisner and Westgate 1976; Hewitt 1983; Blaikie et al. 1994), yet for the 
humanitarian sector this acknowledgement is relatively recent. In the late 
1980s, the term ‘complex emergencies’ was coined in humanitarian and 
development circles in order to signal the appearance of  a new kind of  
complex humanitarian crisis, characterised by unprecedented levels of  
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poverty, political insecurity, internal conflict, state disintegration and internal 
population displacement (Duffield 1994). It became increasingly obvious 
at the time that in order to address such complex issues, a normative and 
theoretical reform was necessary, one that would account for the political 
decisions connected to humanitarian interventions (or lack thereof).
The changes in the humanitarian agenda and mandate should also be 
seen in the context of  an increasing number of  humanitarian crises that 
require radically increased and extended interventions. This situation 
has had an impact on humanitarian policies and strategies over recent 
decades (Borton 1993; Duffield 1994; Macrae 2002; Nan 2010; Taylor 
et al. 2012; Bennett et al. 2016). Humanitarian actors have come to look 
at themselves in a different context, as perhaps more important actors 
than previously, with the ability to prevent such crises if  involved over a 
longer period of  time in a given location.
The present impetus to abandon linear, non-systemic approaches 
to humanitarian emergencies (Ramalingam 2014) takes the insights 
of  the 1990s further and builds on some key elements increasingly 
acknowledged in humanitarian practice, namely that (1) more 
preventive action is needed, moving from reaction to prevention and 
preparedness; (2) there is a need for improved collaboration with 
development aid, to help address underlying vulnerabilities and prevent 
crises from escalating into acute situations of  need; and (3) multi-year 
humanitarian funding cycles as well as new programming ideas, such as 
cash transfers at scale in times of  crisis, are necessary (GHAR 2013).
This type of  thinking has already been implemented in some concrete 
ways. For example, the so-called ‘Nairobi Strategy’ identified the 2011 
crisis in the Horn of  Africa as having been ‘partly determined by a 
prolonged under-investment in drought-prone areas’ and the solution to 
similar crises to be the building of  resilience to economic and climatic 
shocks’ by combining relief, recovery, reconstruction, innovation, and 
long-term sustainable development (TNS 2011: 3).
A series of  key humanitarian actors have already followed the general 
strategy laid out in Nairobi within their own specific efforts. For 
example, OXFAM supports longer-term development programmes 
and responses to forecasts (GHAR 2013), the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) focuses on 
early warning and resilience-building projects (including cash transfer 
programming), while the EU has launched its ‘Supporting the Horn of  
Africa’s Resilience (SHARE)’3 in response to the delayed response to 
the 2011 crisis, and in the UK, the Humanitarian Emergency Response 
Review (HERR) was a key policy document (HERR 2011).
These concrete efforts are a direct effect of  the Humanitarian Reform 
Process begun in 2005 by the UN Emergency Relief  Coordinator and the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The reform aimed to improve 
the response capacity, accountability, predictability and partnership of  
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the humanitarian system. It is against this background (and a few major 
‘failures’ of  the humanitarian system in fresh memory: the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, and the Pakistan floods the same year, as well as the Horn 
of  Africa drought in 2011) that the so-called ‘Transformative Agenda’ 
(TA) was developed in December 2011 and the ‘Transformative Agenda 
Protocols’ in December 2012. The TA was developed by the IASC as a set 
of  concrete actions aimed at changing the way in which the humanitarian 
community responds to emergencies, by improving the strategic planning, 
timeliness and effectiveness of  the collective response, more effective 
coordination and improved accountability to affected people.
This new thinking acknowledged that future large-scale emergencies 
will also be connected to climate change. At the same time, it underlined 
that the impacts of  these emergencies (and indeed their emergence) 
are to a large extent also affected by violent conflicts, communicable 
diseases and pandemics (e.g. HIV/AIDS), and a general increase in 
vulnerability due to poverty, hunger, unemployment, displacement and 
migration (IASC 2011).
In Section 3, we discuss how the general principles of  the integrative, 
preventive humanitarianism is practised and envisioned in relation to 
broad principles for adaptation to climate change. We illustrate this with 
a range of  humanitarian conceptualisations of  humanitarian work that 
hold potential synergies with climate change adaptation.
3 Approaches used by humanitarian actors relevant to climate change 
adaptation
3.1 The resilience approach
Resilience is an increasingly popular term among humanitarian actors, 
central to the reform agenda and present humanitarian thinking. 
Resilience originates from ecological systems work (Holling 1973), 
but its use has over recent decades been extended to social-ecological 
systems, defined as ‘the capacity of  a system to absorb disturbance and 
reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the 
same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks’ (Walker et al. 2004: 5). 
Over the past 10–15 years, resilience has become increasingly dominant 
as the policy goal for work on adaptation to climate change, albeit 
with a wide variety of  definitions (Brown 2015; Bahadur, Ibrahim and 
Tanner 2010). Similarly, resilience has a wide range of  definitions and 
understandings across the humanitarian landscape. One definition, 
used by UNOCHA, refers to resilience as the ability of  communities 
and households to endure stresses and shocks. Resilience, in this 
understanding, is an end state that implies that vulnerable communities 
and households have (1) the capacity to maintain basic functions and 
structures during stresses and shocks; (2) access to a range of  skills 
and resources that allow them to adapt to changing circumstances; 
and (3) the ability to anticipate, prevent, prepare for and respond to 
stresses and shocks without compromising their long-term prospects 
(UNOCHA 2011).
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Nevertheless, programmatic activities that aim to build resilience of  
vulnerable communities and households are not new. They may include 
activities that fall into one or several of  the categories of: disaster risk 
reduction and emergency preparedness, livelihood support, or social 
protection, including the provision of  basic services (ibid.).
Despite continued critical theoretical evaluations of  the term and 
its political implications for humanitarian actions (e.g. Levine 2014), 
resilience is already being applied practically in humanitarian work. 
The government of  Australia started an ambitious reform of  their 
humanitarian efforts in 2009. This is illustrated for example in their 
DRR policy for Australian aid programmes (GHAR 2013). The stated 
goal of  the policy is to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience of  
countries and communities to disasters, and Australia’s Pacific Risk 
Resilience Programme aims to reduce the Pacific Islands’ climate 
change-related risk and improve their resilience.
The EU has embraced a similar approach in its resilience policy (EC 
2012) and its follow-up Action Plan for 2013–20 (EC 2013), identifying 
resilience as a necessary connection between development and 
humanitarian assistance, and an analytical linchpin to both emergency 
and development support. Japan is also important in agenda-setting for 
resilience. Its earlier leading role on DRR within the work of  the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is now being focused on 
connecting DRR to resilience. This is also reflected in Japan hosting the 
Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015,4 which 
aimed to establish resilience as a key element of  the post-Millennium 
Development Goals framework. The German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) also has resilience as 
a central guiding principle enabling the integration of  humanitarian aid 
and development cooperation into medium-term programming (up to 
four years) (Levine and Mosel 2014). Finally, Britain’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) also uses resilience thinking in testing 
different approaches for longer-term (also up to four years) humanitarian 
programming in protracted crises (for example in Ethiopia, Yemen, 
Democratic Republic of  the Congo or Sudan) (DFID 2015).
There are also more specific efforts of  long-term engagement in 
humanitarian assistance thinking, with or without clear connections 
to resilience. For example, the UN launched in 2012, for the first 
time, a three-year Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for Somalia, 
aimed at allowing humanitarian agencies to invest more in relatively 
longer-term planning and preventive measures. The Somalia CAP 
has a planning horizon of  three years (2013–15), allowing for more 
predictable financing against chronic crises and resilience building. 
Usually, such CAPs are annual, and although they may also reflect 
the new rhetoric and focus on resilience (e.g. FAO 2013), they do not 
have the same possibility to plan for ‘long-term’ resilience building or 
vulnerability reduction. Nevertheless, we should also observe that a 
three-year programme may be too short to significantly improve the 
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long-term resilience of  vulnerable groups, even if  it can significantly 
affect the pathways that are chosen and the possibility for meaningful 
adaptation. Such longer-term CAPs have surely added some leeway to 
humanitarian programmes in relation to major events, but since the end 
of  2013 have also been discontinued and replaced instead with appeals 
through the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC), which is an 
explicit part of  the Transformative Agenda. The HPC approach is still 
new, so it is not clear to what extent it can actually facilitate longer-term 
funding for protracted crises. There is at least some evidence that the 
‘needs assessment’ element of  the HPC is not yet being implemented by 
some major humanitarian organisations (Olin and von Schreeb 2014). 
Table 1 Important differences and signs of convergence of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation
Differences
Signs of convergence
DRR Adaptation
All hazard types Climate and weather-related hazards DRR integrating climate change impacts 
on hazard frequency and magnitude 
and on vulnerability and planning 
interventions
Practice of DRR strongly influenced by 
post-disaster humanitarian assistance
Origin in natural science/international 
climate policy process
Mainstreaming into development sectors 
and increasing number of specialists 
working on both adaptation and DRR
Present and near future: existing 
risks based on assessment of local 
experience and history
Short-, medium- and long-term future 
– uncertainty and new risks from the
impacts of climate change
DRR increasingly forward-looking and 
CCA increasingly using existing climate 
variability as the entry point
Traditional and local knowledge is the 
basis for community-based DRR and 
resilience building
Traditional and local knowledge 
insufficient? Climate change introduces 
new/changed risks
Growing number of examples where 
local knowledge and meteorological/ 
climatological knowledge being 
considered side-by-side to inform DRR 
interventions
Risk a function of hazard, vulnerability, 
exposure and capacity
Vulnerability often used 
interchangeably with physical exposure
IPCC SREX* special report on managing 
the risks of extreme events and disasters 
for advancing adaptation (2012)
Full range of established and 
developing tools
Range of tools under development Significant progress made in integrating 
learning from DRR into adaptation tool 
development
Incremental development, moderate 
political interest
New, emerging agenda, high political 
interest
Disasters more often seen as linked 
to climate change, and actors 
recognising the need to consider both 
simultaneously
Funding streams often ad hoc, 
unpredictable and insufficient
Funding streams increasing, though 
problems of delivery 
DRR community demonstrating signs 
of being increasingly savvy in engaging 
in climate change adaptation funding 
mechanisms
Note SREX stands for Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation. 
Source Mitchell, van Aalst and Silva Villanueva (2010).
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Still, even if  the needs assessment is going to be implemented at large 
scale, there is little encouragement to believe that funding horizons for 
protracted crises can easily extend beyond a few years (perhaps three, as 
in the case of  CAPs).
3.2 Disaster risk reduction
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is another important and long-standing 
approach in humanitarian interventions. Disasters are seen herein as 
the outcome of  continuously present conditions of  risk, while disaster 
risk comprises different types of  potential losses, of  lives, health status, 
livelihoods, assets and services (UNISDR 2009). Disaster risk reduction 
is seen as reducing disaster risks through managing the causal factors 
of  disasters, for example by reduced exposure to hazards, lessened 
vulnerability of  people and property, and improved preparedness for 
adverse events (ibid.).
Some examples of  current humanitarian approaches are illustrative of  
the approach. The governments of  Netherlands and Sweden specifically 
mention DRR as a priority in their humanitarian policies. The Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), for instance, 
considers reducing risk as a key component of  humanitarian work to 
be achieved by linking relief, recovery and development interventions. 
Resilience for SIDA (Örnéus and Magnusson 2012) is to be based on 
this linking at both field and policy level. The connection between DRR 
and the resilience approaches are also illustrated in DFID’s approach 
(DFID 2005). Their scaling up of  aid in Pakistan, for example, included 
a US$50 million project called ‘Resilience Support to Pakistan’, aimed at 
supporting a better response to natural disasters by building resilience (ibid.).
Nevertheless, integration may be difficult due to significant differences 
between DRR and climate change adaptation. Some of  the identified 
difficulties include their focus on different spatial and temporal 
scales, their knowledge bases and their norm systems (Birkmann and 
von Teichman 2010). Other challenges are incentives, institutional 
and funding structures that operate differently in humanitarian aid 
and development planning (ibid.). Further challenges include wrong 
assumptions about the capacity of  development programmes to reduce 
risk, as well as inadequate exposure to, and information about, disasters 
among development workers (DFID 2005; Mitchell et al. 2010). Table 1 
summarises some important differences and convergences between the 
two approaches.
Some have argued that post-disaster humanitarian assistance can in 
fact increase vulnerability in the long term (Anderson and Woodrow 
1998; Wisner 2001). This can happen if  there are conflicts of  interest 
between the will to prevent and reduce risk on the one hand, and the 
political and economic incentives of  national governments to pursue 
development strategies that expose some categories of  people to risks 
on the other. We know from studies of  climate change adaptation that 
this is a challenging overlap, as climate change adaptation is often 
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mainstreamed into the current model of  development, rather than 
challenging intrinsic forms of  structural inequity and vulnerability 
(Eriksen and Marin 2014).
Still, there are encouraging developments in the humanitarian sector. 
The potential for addressing both humanitarian crises and climate 
change adaptation, through the DRR approach, is clearly recognised 
by some major humanitarian actors (e.g. IFRC 2014), who propose a 
mainstreaming of  these concerns into policies and planning of  their 
National Societies. One remaining challenge may be to match these 
concerns with national development strategies and priorities.
3.3 Early warning systems
Early warning systems are another commonly used approach among 
humanitarian actors, and an integral part of  the Transformative 
Agenda. They comprise a range of  forecasting initiatives used to identify 
the likelihood of  specific threatening events or conditions to occur in 
specific locations in the near future. Much of  the early warning focus has 
traditionally been placed on forecasting climate-related and other ‘natural’ 
disasters, with more recent attention being given to humanitarian crises 
such as ethnic conflicts, political violence or forced migration. Despite 
obvious differences between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ phenomena to be forecast, 
there is a significant overlap between the approaches used to forecast both 
types of  phenomena (Schmeidl and Jenkins 1998). The early warning 
systems first came to prominence during the 1980s, with increased efforts 
from the late 1990s in the wake of  more variable and extreme weather, 
notably related to El Niño events. Among the early warning initiatives 
relevant to the Transformative Agenda are the United Nations IASC’s 
Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS), the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of  the United Nations’ (FAO) Global Information and 
Early Warning System (GIEWS), the Forum on Early Warning and Early 
Response (FEWER), and the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS).
All these initiatives bring together academics and policy analysts involved 
in humanitarian relief  to develop early warning signals and information. 
These systems and initiatives are reflected in the work of  most major 
humanitarian actors, at least in some of  their programmes and specific 
units. Briefly, the approach is that ‘forewarned is forearmed’, meaning 
that UN agencies have invested in early warning systems that can give 
them the information they need, delivered in the best possible way.
Preparedness buys the humanitarian community valuable time, allowing 
them to respond swiftly and effectively to save lives, crops, property, 
important infrastructure (e.g. in education and health care), thus 
stopping a bad situation from becoming worse (Standley 2011).
In practice, the strategy can be to have supplies stocked in key points of  
a region, accessible to all partners, as the quickest way to get emergency 
relief  to a disaster zone. For instance, the UN has established a 
Humanitarian Response Depot for Latin America and the Caribbean in 
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Panama City, as well as the International Federation of  Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the Spanish Cooperation also has 
a depot in the city. Among others, this strategy has enabled more rapid 
delivery of  relief  supplies such as food, medical help and infant formula 
immediately after the earthquake that hit Haiti in January 2010 (ibid.).
In other cases, this type of  preparedness takes the form of  bilateral or 
multilateral government agreements for contingency/emergency plans. 
UNOCHA collaborated with the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), establishing a regional inter-agency response plan 
which was used when several SADC members (Mozambique, Malawi, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia) were hit by severe floods in 2008 (Standley 
2011). Others have shown that early warning systems for disease 
outbreaks or impacts of  heatwaves can be developed based on weather 
indicators such as seas’ surface temperatures and rainfall (Patz et al. 2005).
It is clear, however, that while they play an important role in averting 
humanitarian crises, early warning systems are far from sufficient. 
Evidence from the 2001 famine in the Horn of  Africa is rather telling 
with respect to the functioning of  early warning systems. While these 
systems seemed to have provided actionable high-quality information 
many months in advance, there was a lack of  incentives to act upon them 
due to a combination of  factors that included decision-makers’ discomfort 
with the probabilistic nature of  the warning, the Al Shabaab presence 
in the area, and US anti-terrorist legislation (Hillbruner and Moloney 
2012). Importantly, there were also significant failures in the adequacy 
of  information provided by some early warning systems: in some cases, 
because they did not provide sufficiently analysed or interpreted data 
(only ‘raw’ data); in other cases, because they were not timely enough or 
not sufficiently integrated across the region (Ververs 2012).
The above examples illustrate two shortcomings of  the potential of  
early warning systems to support adaptation to climate change. On 
the one hand, a dichotomy seems to persist between forecasting for 
‘natural’ disasters relief  and forecasting humanitarian crises (Schmeidl 
and Jenkins 1998; de Leeuw, Vis and Jonkman 2012). There is still an 
assumption that ‘natural’ disasters are easier and more straightforward 
to both predict and respond to effectively. If  climate change adaptation 
is treated as reacting to natural, objective events, it is likely to encourage 
a type of  early warning that treats hazards as natural phenomena that 
are equally distributed among geographical units of  different sizes, or 
among different categories of  local inhabitants. We know today that this 
is not the case, and that neither disasters nor adaptation are in any way 
‘natural’, benign or equally distributed.
4 Filling two needs with one deed? Humanitarian approaches and 
climate change adaptation
Complex humanitarian crises have now for three decades exposed 
the fact that traditional relief  packages and staff-intensive single 
interventions are inadequate in themselves. This has led to calls for new 
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approaches that instead of  re-supplying disaster-struck areas to ‘get back 
to normal’, aim at long-term support, while at the same time accepting 
some state of  lasting turbulence and acknowledging the culture, history 
and fast-moving politics inherent in the crises (Slim 1995). The author 
called this approach ‘development relief ’ (ibid.: 121).
The conceptual affiliation between such new humanitarianism 
and recent approaches to both development and adaptation is 
also underscored by the centrality of  ‘resilience’ across both areas. 
Moreover, ‘resilience’ thinking has also become an important element 
of  thinking around climate change adaptation. Resilience is often 
specifically presented as a potential bridging concept between climate 
change adaptation and sustainable development (IPCC 2012; Denton 
et al. 2014; USAID 2014). With the emergence of  the so-called third 
generation of  adaptation studies, which consider climate change 
adaptation as robust decision-making under uncertainty (WRI 2011), 
climate change adaptation and development have started to become 
more integrated particularly through the idea of  resilience.5 Resilience 
can be understood narrowly as the ability of  a system to maintain its 
structures and functions in the face of  shocks and stressors, or more 
broadly, as is increasingly the case also in humanitarian policy and 
practice, in terms of  the ability of  people, communities and systems to 
transform in the face of  shocks and stressors (Béné et al. 2012; Peters 
et al. 2016). While resilience is a contested concept, one of  its strengths 
is arguably as a ‘boundary object’ in its ability to communicate across 
the DRR and adaptation communities, with numerous efforts towards 
a better integration between the two (Baggio, Brown and Hellebrandt 
2015; Harris and Bahadur 2011; Schipper and Pelling 2006).
The increasing popularity of  resilience may also be seen as a 
recognition of  the necessity of  integrating the short- and long-term 
perspectives, the systemic and the local. Underpinning the everyday use 
of  resilience are useful theoretical reflections that point to resilience as 
relying on both fast and slow variables and adaptive cycles (e.g. Walker et 
al. 2012; Holling and Gunderson 2002). This is also reminiscent of  what 
Ramalingam identified as a pressing need for humanitarianism to move 
away from ‘short-term, linear, and “non-systemic” thinking’ (2014: 20).
Others have also pointed to the need for integrating the current three 
most important global processes for development-related topics: (1) the 
redesigning of  the framework for disaster risk reduction; (2) the drafting 
of  the SDGs; and (3) the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) attempt to draft a legally binding 
treaty for dealing with climate change (Kelman 2015). It is perhaps 
this convergence of  interests and the timeliness of  such efforts to 
interrogate and reform current development pathways that hold the 
greatest promise and potential for re-orienting humanitarian aid at this 
particular socio-historical juncture. Yet, for this to happen, there are 
some substantial discussions that are needed, but which do not as yet 
figure prominently, at least publicly, on the humanitarian agenda.
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Some of  these discussions will have to interrogate fundamental principles 
that have always guided humanitarian work. Other discussions will 
have to address structural reforms. From the first category, one obvious 
element is the principle of  impartiality and the focus on ‘communities’. 
This is potentially problematic in that it obscures varied and complex 
inequities between a range of  actors who are differently exposed to 
proximate causes of  disasters (droughts, floods), as well as variously 
constrained by the structural, root causes of  vulnerability.
Although impartiality as a principle is moderated with assessments 
of  needs, there are potential pitfalls there too. The main technical 
approach to deliver aid based on differentiated needs, is the Needs 
Assessment Framework and Matrix (NAFM). One limitation of  the 
NAFM is that needs may be assessed in relation to a particular ‘disaster’, 
and it may therefore be difficult to use the NAFM preventively. 
This is sometimes recognised by aid agencies and funders, which 
acknowledge that the NAFM has a sectoral view, based on indicators 
that may not provide an accurate enough picture of  the dynamics in 
the communities: ‘[P]ockets of  need are identified which support a 
specific project proposal, but the overall picture of  relative need across 
a crisis is very patchy’ (Willitts-King 2006: 27). Other technical tools 
for assessing needs are Rapid Assessment Format, and Capacities and 
Vulnerabilities Assessments (CVAs). While the former is rather reactive 
and geared towards relief, CVAs have the potential to address structural 
vulnerabilities by investing in supporting longer-term development 
programmes, as suggested in more recent approaches (e.g. UNOCHA 
2007: ix). Still, in order to achieve this, an elaborate assessment of  the 
social context is required, and therefore funding and programming 
models have to allow for these kind of  analyses that perhaps entail 
closer collaboration with social scientists.
If  humanitarian interventions (or indeed, adaptation interventions) 
focus on building the resilience of  a ‘system’, there is a risk that 
interventions may overlook the socially differentiated nature of  
vulnerability and reinforce entrenched inequities and other root causes 
of  vulnerability, even though the resilience of  the overall system may 
be increased. After all, resilience does not tell us much about any 
normative principles underlying the interventions. Addressing this 
conundrum may also run counter to the humanitarian principle of  
operational independence, i.e. that humanitarian actions must be 
autonomous from the political, economic or military objectives of  other 
actors. We propose that long-term humanitarian engagement is more 
likely to succeed by engaging with larger-scale development strategies 
and structures, including challenging structural constraints such as 
government development policies and programmes.
The second category of  discussions that are needed are those concerned 
with the operation of  funding and programming. Part of  this discussion 
is the time-horizon that is needed for engaging meaningfully with 
resilience building, livelihood security, or climate change adaptation 
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goals of  humanitarian interventions. The way we perceive the situation 
today is that, despite intentions to be involved in the long term, many 
humanitarian actors are still constrained by the funding mechanisms of  
project-based interventions that run for a few years only.
5 Conclusion
This article has examined whether and how recent changes in 
humanitarian approaches, from responsive to increasingly preventive 
modes and ways of  working, can contribute to climate change adaptation.
Our review suggests that the ‘new humanitarianism’ emerging 
over recent decades holds important potential for contributing to 
climate change adaptation due to a close conceptual match between 
humanitarian principles that focus on vulnerable groups, and adaptation 
approaches that address underlying vulnerabilities. At the same time, 
realisation of  this potential is limited by the operation of  humanitarian 
organisations within their current negotiated spaces at national and 
international levels, and by power struggles over influence and resources.
We argue that humanitarian approaches emerging from the UN-led 
Transformative Agenda make it necessary to address local social, 
historical and political contexts in new and different ways from 
previous one-time efforts aimed at ‘restoring order’. Such involvements 
engender power negotiations and struggles over the meaning of  what 
is desirable both in terms of  development pathways and of  climate 
change adaptation. These meanings will inescapably have different 
arrays of  supporters and varying degrees of  implementation. The 
boundaries between such categories as vulnerable, resilient or adapted 
should therefore be understood as permeable, shifting and open 
to contestation. Such processes of  contestation are also influenced 
by national and international dynamics. This, we propose, begets 
difficulties for humanitarian interventions that often ignore the root 
causes of  humanitarian crises, or of  vulnerability to climate change.
In addition, we propose that for humanitarian interventions to play a role in 
climate change adaptation, they need to reflect critically on their influence 
on domestic development pathways. Humanitarianism cannot be assumed 
as removed from everyday political struggles and insulated from them due 
to its principles of  non-partisanship and operational independence.
The humanitarian reform of  the last decade contains the theoretical 
possibilities, practical leverage power, and knowledge for progressive 
change located at the interface between humanitarian aid, development 
aid and climate change adaptation. The current challenge is to include 
in this reform some difficult discussions regarding the political nature of  
humanitarianism.
Notes
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3 A €270 million joint humanitarian-development programme aimed 
at building resilience through recovery from drought and building 
resilience against acute and lasting emergencies.
4 www.wcdrr.org.
5 First generation adaptation studies focused on discrete adaptation to 
specific climatic change, while second generation studies focused on 
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Build Anticipatory Capacity into 
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Abstract Climate shocks contribute to a significant share of the humanitarian 
burden, and are a key factor in increasing poverty and food insecurity. Social 
protection is increasingly recognised as an instrument to help build resilience 
to climate risks through long-term, large-scale national systems. However, 
most experiences to date have focused on social protection’s role for chronic 
needs, or at best, shock-response, rather than on anticipation and prevention. 
This article argues that social protection can support more effective resilience 
building at scale by integrating early action and preparedness. We propose a 
concrete solution, namely linking a Forecast-based Financing mechanism to 
a social protection system to enable anticipatory actions based on forecast 
triggers and guaranteed funding ahead of a shock. Such a system may 
enhance scalability, timeliness, predictability and adequacy of social protection 
benefits. Key considerations for success of this emerging approach include 
sound analysis of forecast, risks, cost and benefits, and ring-fenced funding.
Keywords: social protection, Forecast-based Financing, early warning, 
early action, anticipatory capacity, climate risk management, resilience.
1 Introduction and rationale
Climate shocks represent a significant part of  the humanitarian burden 
and are a key factor in increasing poverty and food insecurity. Current 
trends in climate change could contribute to doubling humanitarian 
needs and some estimate that it could force more than 100 million 
people into extreme poverty by 2030 (UN 2016; Hallegatte et al. 2016).
Social protection is becoming increasingly recognised as a tool to help 
households and communities prevent, cope with and adapt to the impacts 
of  climate shocks through longer-term, more sustainable systems (Davies et 
al. 2008; Kuriakose et al. 2012; OPM 2016). The Sustainable Development 
Goals and the World Humanitarian Summit identify social protection as a 
key, nationally-owned instrument for building climate resilience.
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While much of  the research and operationalisation of  ‘climate-smart’ 
social protection has focused on the ability of  these programmes to 
support shock-response, there have been limited experiences and 
learning on the role it can play to anticipate and adapt to climate risks. 
Building climate resilience will require a stronger focus on anticipatory 
and preventative actions that can mitigate the impacts of  shocks before 
they happen. The benefits of  early action, including cost-effectiveness, 
are well recognised. In addition, our capacity to anticipate many extreme 
weather events is increasing, while innovations in the humanitarian 
system, such as forecast-based action, are being tested to find ways to 
reach more people, faster. Social protection can support anticipatory 
action as part of  long-term, sustainable, country-owned systems.
This article argues that scalable social protection systems can 
support climate risk management by focusing on risk mitigation and 
preparedness measures that increase the capacity of  the system to 
anticipate shocks. The article proposes a mechanism linked to a social 
protection system that (1) enables actions at a large scale in advance of  a 
weather-related shock, and (2) guarantees funds for those actions, enhancing 
scalability, timeliness, predictability and adequacy of  social protection 
benefits, ultimately protecting development gains and contributing to 
increased resilience of  vulnerable households and communities.
The article focuses on Forecast-based Financing (FbF), an innovative 
instrument currently being piloted as part of  humanitarian operations 
to support improved anticipation and mitigation of  climate shocks. The 
article aims to contribute to a nascent area of  work and to serve as one 
of  the first, non-exhaustive explorations of  the potential for integrating 
forecast-based action mechanisms into social protection. We draw from 
lessons learned from ongoing FbF pilots implemented by the Red Cross 
Red Crescent and its partners.
Section 2 provides an overview of  the ways in which social protection 
can help build climate resilience, with a focus on shock anticipation 
at scale. Section 3 details FbF mechanisms, including lessons from 
current implementation. Section 4 proposes ways to link FbF and 
social protection systems, and explores potential synergies as well as 
key considerations for such integration. Finally, Section 5 provides 
conclusions and a way forward.
2 The role of social protection in building resilience to climate risks at scale
Social protection consists of  a system of  policies and programmes that 
aims to reduce poverty, deprivation and vulnerability by providing support 
to individuals throughout their life cycle (World Bank 2001).7 The last two 
decades have seen a substantial increase in social protection interventions in 
the developing world; in Africa alone, the number of  countries with safety 
net programmes doubled between 2010 and 2015 (World Bank 2015).
At the same time, there has been increased interest in how social 
protection can help households and communities cope with, mitigate 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 4 July 2017: ‘Courting Catastrophe? Humanitarian Policy and Practice in a Changing Climate’ 31–46 | 33
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
and adapt to climate risks and, ultimately contribute to climate 
resilience (Kuriakose et al. 2012; Davies et al. 2008; Bastagli and Holmes 
2014; OPM 2016). Focusing on resilience,8 Ulrichs and Slater (2016) 
research several social protection programmes in Kenya, Uganda and 
Ethiopia to understand how they contribute to three key resilience 
capacities developed by Bahadur et al. (2015): absorptive, anticipatory 
and adaptive capacity.
Evidence shows that social protection makes a strong contribution 
to households’ absorptive capacity (i.e. the ability to manage adverse 
conditions after a shock) by providing direct support after a shock, in 
addition to increasing incomes and livelihoods in the long term. These 
benefits help beneficiaries maintain consumption levels and avoid 
negative coping strategies after a shock occurs (Ulrichs and Slater 
2016). For instance, in Ethiopia, the Productive Safety Nets Programme 
(PSNP) helps beneficiaries experiencing drought maintain a higher 
level of  welfare and recover more rapidly than non-beneficiaries 
(Knippenberg 2016).
Evidence also shows that social protection can make contributions 
to building anticipatory capacity (i.e. the ability to anticipate shocks 
and stresses and take adequate measures to reduce their impact) both at 
household level and system level. At household level, some evidence 
points to an increase in households’ savings in anticipation of  a 
shock, even if  most programmes do not encourage beneficiaries 
to save (Ulrichs and Slater 2016). At the system level, the research 
finds stronger evidence of  social protection’s contribution to building 
anticipatory capacity, particularly in the cases where programmes 
have evolved to include contingency plans and financing as part of  a 
stronger preparedness system. In 2011, Ethiopia’s PSNP established 
a Risk Financing Mechanism that allowed financial repositioning and 
disbursement of  benefits when a shock occurred (Ulrichs and Slater 
2016). The system was able to deliver benefits to households affected 
by drought six weeks after a request was made for its activation, while 
the existing emergency response mechanism took nine months from the 
launch of  the humanitarian appeal (Hobson and Campbell 2012).
Finally, social protection’s contribution to building adaptive capacity (i.e. the 
ability to adapt and to have in-built flexibility to manage long-term climate 
risks) is less clear. The ability of  social protection to support long-term 
graduation and transformation in the face of  climate risks is limited if  not 
integrated with additional interventions (Ulrichs and Slater 2016).
In this article, we focus on the contribution social protection can make 
to building anticipatory capacity at scale through the integration of  
FbF. Anticipatory capacity is understood here as the ability to take 
proactive action before a foreseen event to avoid or minimise disruption, 
in contrast with the more reactive actions that take place after a 
disturbance (Bahadur et al. 2015).9
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Social protection often relies on large-scale, long-term, nationally-owned 
systems. These systems reach significant sectors of  the population: in 
2015, more than 1.9 billion people in 136 low- and middle-income 
countries were on beneficiary rolls of  social safety net programmes 
(World Bank 2015). Moreover, in recent years, governments and donors 
have made significant investments in setting up social protection systems 
that increase coordination, reduce duplication of  programmes and deal 
with crises and shocks (Devereaux, Roelen and Ulrichs 2015; Marzo and 
Mori 2012). These efforts are underpinned by a strong focus on building 
supporting structures (staff, tools, resources) as well as robust systems 
for targeting and registration of  beneficiaries, delivery of  benefits and 
management of  information.
Social protection platforms can be used during emergencies to 
efficiently expand response, delivering additional benefits to programme 
beneficiaries affected by a disaster, as well as identifying and enrolling 
new beneficiaries that have been made eligible because of  the shock 
(Slater, Bailey and Harvey 2015; OPM 2016). For example, in Lesotho, 
after three successive humanitarian disasters in 2012, the unconditional 
cash transfer Child Grant Programme increased benefits for its 
beneficiaries while expanding to additional disaster-affected households 
(OPM 2016).
By focusing on risk mitigation and anticipatory action, these scalable 
social protection systems may also be able to more effectively prevent 
the impacts of  climate shocks. While a number of  climate risk 
management tools can support this goal, in this article, we explore how 
a forecast-based system for early action and financing can enable more 
timely action when a climate shock is imminent.
3 Increasing anticipatory capacity for managing climate risks through 
Forecast-based Financing
3.1 Why focus on early action and Forecast-based Financing?
There is significant evidence in the climate and disaster risk management 
sectors of  the benefits of  preventative action to avoid disaster losses (Ebi et 
al. 2004; Braman et al. 2013; Coughlan de Perez et al. 2014; Pappenberger 
et al. 2015). However, while investments in early warning systems have 
increased, and there are some compelling success stories, effective early 
action is still rare (Lautze et al. 2012; Clarke and Dercon 2016).
Several challenges limit the effectiveness of  early warning systems: 
technical capacity to issue warnings, the ability of  responsible agencies 
to receive and understand the warning, and the willingness or capacity 
of  people and institutions to take appropriate action (Glantz 2009). 
Since forecast information cannot provide complete certainty, the risk 
of  ‘acting in vain’ and, consequently, the perception of  ‘wasting funds’, 
often prevents early action (Braman et al. 2013; Coughlan de Perez et al. 
2014). Political interest also constrains action by donors and government, 
as the public’s support for action can often only be rallied once the 
impacts of  a disaster are visible (Cárdenas, Cotterill and Wrabel 2016).
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FbF acts as a mechanism that enhances early warning systems by 
catalysing early action measures based on pre-agreed forecast triggers, 
supported by protected funding. Upon actualisation of  a forecast trigger, 
an FbF mechanism automatically releases funding to take anticipatory, 
pre-defined actions before a potential hazard event materialises. For 
instance, in 2016, based on a five-day forecast of  cold waves, the 
Peruvian Red Cross supported the vaccination efforts and distribution 
of  veterinary kits to reduce the risk of  mortality of  Alpacas in the Puno 
region of  Peru (Peruvian Red Cross, German Red Cross and Red Cross 
Red Crescent Climate Centre n.d.).
FbF mechanisms advance traditional early warning approaches towards 
an impact-based forecasting approach. Risk analysis, understanding of  
potential impacts and analysis of  forecast reliability are combined to 
provide a set of  options to trigger actions when a specific forecast threshold 
is reached. In addition, each pre-agreed action embedded in a pre-defined 
standard operating procedure is tied to pre-defined funding sources – 
this is key to ensuring that, once a threshold is surpassed, funding will 
automatically be used to take early action. While it will not fully eliminate 
uncertainty, if  calibrated well, an FbF system ensures that the cost of  
sometimes acting in vain is outweighed by the value of  reduced impacts 
when an extreme event does materialise (Coughlan de Perez et al. 2014).
3.2 Forecast-based Financing: challenges and opportunities
Since 2008, the FbF concept has been piloted by humanitarian actors 
in over 15 countries, primarily at a local level, with actions triggered in 
several countries, including Togo, Peru and Uganda. Key lessons that 
have emerged so far provide insights to opportunities and challenges.
In Bangladesh, where the mechanism is expected to provide a one-off 
cash transfer in advance of  floods, a cost-benefit analysis based on an 
analysis of  literature found that every dollar invested in the programme 
would save three dollars in beneficiary losses (Urrea et al. 2016). Cash 
transfers in advance of  the flood would help households avoid negative 
coping strategies when a disaster materialises.
While this is a promising finding, implementation of  such a system has 
several operational constraints: a successful activation of  forecast-based 
cash transfer depends on the capacity of  the system to identify and 
pre-register beneficiaries, as well as the capacity of  the service provider 
to execute the distribution in the short window of  time between a 
forecast and the occurrence of  the hazard. The process of  establishing 
an FbF system can often be quite lengthy; therefore, in some locations 
triggers for action were reached before the systems were able to respond 
and deliver early actions.
In addition to cash distributions, there are several other early actions that 
could be taken based on forecast information, which should be selected 
based on effectiveness. In Uganda, jerrycans and water purification tabs 
were distributed based on a flood forecast with an aim to reduce diarrhoea. 
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The people receiving these interventions saw a drop in rates of  diarrhoeal 
diseases and losses compared to neighbouring communities, but the 
intervention was not able to eliminate disease and other impacts. These 
actions are now being revised to improve the impacts of  the mechanism.
Ongoing projects have demonstrated the potential for effective use of  
scientific inputs in decision-making, enabling the allocation of  funds based 
Figure 1 Social protection linked to a system-wide FbF mechanism
Source Authors’ own.
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Figure 2 FbF mechanism integrated into a social protection structure or programme
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on rigorous analysis. However, it is also important to consider forecast skill 
in the identification of  actions, to ensure an effective cost-benefit ratio.
While the limited geographic scale of  most pilots to date has provided 
an opportunity for more focused interventions, it has also reached a 
limited number of  people. It has become clear that the sustainability 
and effectiveness of  the FbF approach requires embedding it in broader 
risk management structures, for instance at country or regional level.
4 Integrating Forecast-based Financing into social protection: key 
considerations, challenges and opportunities
4.1 What would the integration of Forecast-based Financing and social 
protection look like?
FbF consists of  three key elements that enable early action: (1) a set 
of  pre-agreed triggers (or danger levels); (2) pre-defined actions to be 
taken when those triggers are met; and (3) a financing mechanism to 
automatically fund those actions (RCCC and GRC 2017).
Conceptual frameworks for linking forecast-based action and financing 
with social protection are beginning to evolve, and this article is an effort 
in that direction. Figure 1 shows a potential method for integrating 
a climate-smart social protection structure or programme into a 
system-wide FbF mechanism. Alternatively, FbF mechanisms could be 
integrated into an existing social protection system, triggering support to 
existing or new beneficiaries (Figure 2). In this case, new and additional 
funding could be allocated and disbursed through a social protection 
system to core or new beneficiaries.
The two models presented in this article are based on ongoing 
discussions among humanitarian and development practitioners and 
will no doubt evolve. In both cases, however, the integration of  FbF and 
social protection would use the existing ability of  the social protection 
programme to reach a large segment of  the vulnerable population and 
help minimise the impacts of  shocks.
In the first model (Figure 1), a wider range of  actions and funding 
could potentially be mobilised by other actors, in addition to the social 
protection actions, thus reaching more people with tailored support. 
An FbF system linked to a social protection structure (Figure 2) might be 
easier to implement in the short term and serve as an initial departure 
point. This model would be particularly relevant for social protection 
programmes that already have a system for shock-response, where a 
logical next step would be to move from response to anticipation of  
shocks by embedding such a mechanism into their existing systems. 
Nevertheless, this model will also require strong coordination and 
consistency with national and regional contingency plans and actions.
Forecast-based triggers for action (thresholds) can be established for 
one or multiple hazards, and actions can be defined according to 
different levels of  probability of  the risk materialising. As a contribution 
to a country or regional disaster risk management system, an FbF 
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mechanism might be linked to early actions in multiple sectors. Specific 
actions for a social protection programme (for instance, expansion of  
transfers, public works, etc.) would be triggered when the pre-agreed 
thresholds for those actions are reached. If  an FbF mechanism is built 
as part of  the social protection structure system (Figure 2), it would 
be important that the triggers and the actions are consistent with 
government contingency plans. Roles and responsibilities for those 
actions would need to be established in standard operating procedures.
Depending on lead time, there are a number of  social protection 
actions that can be triggered. For example, on the 1–3-month time 
frame, public works efforts could be expanded to reinforce critical 
infrastructure. On the 3–7-day time frame unconditional cash transfers 
could be released to support the evacuation of  people and assets, or 
avoid negative coping strategies such as taking high-interest loans. 
When a forecast points to a likely increase of  rain, the mechanism can 
also capitalise on this information, for instance by distributing seeds for 
additional planting to take advantage of  potential asset gains from a 
bumper harvest (Smith 2016).
A financial instrument guaranteeing funds for each of  the actions is 
crucial. It requires a financial protocol that indicates where the funds 
will be physically placed (e.g. international, regional or national level), 
roles and responsibilities for managing the funds, and how funds can be 
accessed once the FbF mechanism is triggered.
4.2 What are the potential synergies and gains?
Recent literature agrees on a number of  features that can make 
social protection systems more effective in managing climate risks: 
(1) climate-aware planning and targeting; (2) ability to scale up support 
during shocks, supported by flexible systems and adequate financing; 
(3) timeliness and predictability of  benefits; and (4) appropriate 
interventions that support households’ livelihoods (Kuriakose et al. 2012; 
World Bank 2013; Bastagli and Holmes 2014). Integrating an FbF 
mechanism would bring practical improvements to social protection 
systems in all these areas. The following list is not exhaustive and the 
scope for expanding research and testing of  these concepts is large.
4.2.1 Climate-aware planning and targeting
Social protection systems must hedge against uncertainty and plan for 
more frequent and more severe disasters when designing interventions, 
including considering direct and indirect impacts on vulnerable 
populations (World Bank 2013). Improvements in forecasting capacity 
have extended the ability to anticipate extreme weather events. When 
combined with risk analysis, forecast and weather information may 
allow for selection of  operational areas based on an analysis of  climate 
risks that considers needs for both long-term support and additional 
scale-up. This information may also allow for dynamic prioritisation 
of  early action and response operations, if  robust enough systems for 
scale-up are in place.
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In addition, because FbF focuses on different levels of  danger and 
thresholds, it can support scale-up of  social protection intervention to 
deal with different ‘layers of  risk’. These can range from the frequent 
but less damaging events to the rare but catastrophic disasters, a key 
feature of  climate-smart social protection (Kuriakose et al. 2012).
Forecast information and risk analysis for a target area, combined with 
other measures of  vulnerability might provide supporting information 
for identification and pre-registration of  potential beneficiaries. This 
can be used to reduce disaster impacts as well as facilitate faster 
response after the shock occurs and is a documented way to make social 
protection systems climate-aware (Kuriakose et al. 2012).
4.2.2 Scalable systems and financing
A key feature of  climate-smart social protection systems is their 
ability to support affected households in the face of  shocks. For this, 
programmes must be able to rapidly scale up during a crisis and back 
down once the crisis is over. An FbF mechanism would be a key piece 
of  such a system, helping to establish objective indicators and agreed 
plans of  action as well as ring-fenced financing. In particular, FbF might 
provide the impetus for the establishment of  contingency financing as it 
links funding to credible forecasts and a plan of  action. Understanding 
pre-existing constraints for effective early action and contingency 
financing is still critical for the design of  an effective FbF system.
Where they exist, FbF can build on and enhance social protection’s 
programmatic and administrative systems that support the delivery of  
long-term benefits as well as scalability, providing an additional layer of  
risk coverage through a post-forecast, pre-disaster mechanism.
4.2.3 Timeliness and predictability of support
Timely support of  beneficiaries is a key element of  a climate-smart 
social protection programme or system. The faster support reaches 
people affected by an extreme event, the less likely they are to resort to 
negative coping strategies (Hillier and Dempsey 2012). Experience from 
social protection programmes has shown that, even if  a programme 
has shock-responsive mechanisms in place, response can still take time 
due to the need to agree on coordinated actions with the humanitarian 
actors and to have solid mechanisms in place well before the shock 
(Hobson and Campbell 2012).
In some instances, a forecast-based mechanism would be able to offer 
additional lead times to enable more timely action. By placing an emphasis 
on actions triggered by objective indicators and supported by protected 
financing, it can enable action as soon as the threshold is reached. 
However, the political will to establish a standardised and objective system 
of  action would still need to be in place from the beginning for the FbF 
mechanism to be designed and implemented successfully.
Similarly, an important feature of  well-implemented social protection 
is its predictability (reliability and regularity). The ability to take timely 
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action can be embedded through standard operating procedures that 
reach social protection beneficiaries more predictably and reliably once 
objectively triggered, if  these are appropriately resourced.
4.2.4 Increased adequacy of interventions
An established, well-functioning social protection programme can offer 
a platform to implement targeted, pre-defined actions more effectively 
when a forecast trigger of  a certain risk is met, whether this is as part of  
a larger system for disaster risk management or as one specific function 
within the social protection programme. Understanding how households’ 
assets and livelihood strategies are affected by climate risks is critical for 
identifying appropriate interventions (Kuriakose et al. 2012). By placing 
an emphasis on risk analysis and impact forecasting, an FbF mechanism 
can enable pre-selection of  actions that are appropriate to context. 
Cost-benefit analysis of  actions is also key to ensure that the right actions 
are triggered at the right time, based on differential levels of  risk.
In Bangladesh, an in-depth analysis of  communities’ coping strategies 
for flood, combined with cost-benefit analysis, helped select cash 
transfer as the most effective action. It was clear that several of  the 
negative strategies households use for evacuation could be prevented by 
making a cash transfer in advance of  a shock.
4.3 Key considerations for sustainably linking Forecast-based Financing 
and social protection
The opportunities and limitations of  FbF are currently being tested in 
several countries, supported by analysis and research (Coughlan de Perez 
et al. 2014; Stephens et al. 2015; Cárdenas et al. 2016). Stephens et al. 
(2015) provide an overview of  technical considerations for forecast-based 
action frameworks and develop corresponding research priorities. Here 
we highlight some of  those key issues and their relevance for linking FbF 
with social protection, fully recognising the need for further research and 
analysis beyond this article.
4.3.1 Forecasts and risk analysis
The success of  an FbF mechanism depends, to a certain extent, on 
forecast skill, i.e. the accuracy in correlating the prediction of  an 
extreme event to the actual occurrence of  one. Forecast skill varies 
across countries and is limited in many cases. Despite investments 
being made all around the world, the ability of  meteorological services 
to systematically provide impact-based forecasting information is still 
limited (Stephens et al. 2015).
This means that the geographic scale and the level of  confidence in 
the ability to act at each scale will vary, depending on the skill of  the 
forecast. A forecast-based action mechanism that is part of  a social 
protection system will need to grapple with these limitations.
4.3.2 Actions and impacts
If  actions do not reach the most vulnerable people, they will not be 
effective. While understanding the risks vulnerable populations are 
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exposed to is essential, the impacts of  climate shock are also a function 
of  underlying vulnerabilities, many of  which are rooted in structural 
inequalities. Discovering and understanding these vulnerabilities is 
essential for prioritising actions.
Similarly, differential vulnerabilities at the community level might have 
an impact on whether agreed actions and their expected consequences 
materialise. i.e. FbF may identify relevant triggers, plans and assured 
funding, but this does not necessarily mean that those at risk will use the 
advance funding to follow the agreed plans.
In addition, if  targeting information is not available for a region, an 
FbF system might not be able to act when that region receives an early 
warning. In small-scale pilots, identification and targeting of  recipients 
is time- and resource-intensive. While a social protection system 
might offer a larger, more sophisticated platform for identification 
and targeting, a substantial part of  these processes would need to be 
completed as the FbF mechanism is being established, so that the 
mechanism can be triggered effectively. The pre-identification and 
pre-registration of  beneficiaries will need to consider the constraints on 
effective actions outlined previously.
Finally, it is important to note that a forecast-based action is not likely to 
eliminate the need for ex-post response, but it should significantly reduce 
it. Appropriate, timely response will need to deal with the residual risks 
to ensure that further suffering is avoided.
4.3.3 Financing
The emerging experience on FbF and social protection shows that 
financing of  these systems requires overcoming significant challenges 
in the way aid funding is structured. While there is agreement that 
long-term, more sustainable systems are desirable, it still requires several 
funding agencies to be convinced of  its cost-effectiveness through 
available evidence and data. While many organisations are already 
acting early to mobilise resources based on available data and evidence, 
what is missing is a country-wide approach to resource mobilisation.
Funding for ongoing FbF pilots has largely come from dedicated project 
funding to support innovations at relatively small scale. The next step 
requires identifying more sustainable sources of  funding. Clarke and 
Dercon (2016) identify instruments that can be used to finance disaster 
risk ex-ante, either for risk retention (contingency funds, ring-fenced 
budget allocations, or contingent credit lines) or risk transfer (traditional 
and indexed insurance or reinsurance, derivatives and capital markets 
instruments such as catastrophe bonds).
While social protection programmes could potentially establish 
contingency funds or budget allocation from programme funds, 
additional sources of  financing would be required. Existing global relief  
pooled funds, preparedness funds, as well as risk transfer instruments 
have also the potential to be sources of  funding in the framework of  FbF.
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A financial instrument for FbF will need to enable rapid release of  
funding as soon as thresholds are reached, thus requiring alignment 
between the FbF mechanism’s triggers and those for releasing the funds. 
Finally, layering of  different financial instruments might offer more 
flexibility and affordability in dealing with different levels of  risk (Clarke 
and Dercon 2016).
4.3.4 Coordination with climate and disaster risk management actors
Successful implementation of  both climate-smart social protection and 
FbF approaches requires partnerships and coordination among diverse 
stakeholders in the climate and disaster risk management sectors; from 
civil society to research institutes to government agencies at all levels 
(World Bank 2013). Coordination across sectors is often difficult because 
of  the need to harmonise different mandates, interests and priorities. 
For instance, understanding of  risks and forecast science respectively are 
often managed by different government institutions.
When integrating FbF, social protection specialists will have a key role in 
early action identification, prioritisation and implementation. Prioritisation 
of  forecast-based actions requires a rigorous analytical and consultative 
process in order to guarantee use of  funds in an uncertain environment.
The delivery of  forecast-based actions will require strong pre-established 
commitments and agreements. For example, in order for a social 
protection programme to deliver cash in anticipation of  a shock, it 
is critical that roles, responsibilities and the necessary administrative 
agreements for delivery agents are established in the design phase, to 
ensure activation between the forecast and the potential disaster.
5 Conclusions and recommendations
The fact that most disasters are related to weather and climate presents an 
opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, it means we can anticipate 
many extreme events before they occur – thus enabling the choice of  
early action. On the other hand, we can expect many of  these extremes to 
become more intense and frequent in the warming climate (IPCC 2013), 
significantly taxing an already strained humanitarian system.
The role of  social protection in helping anticipate, absorb and adapt to 
climate risks and extremes is becoming increasingly recognised. While 
efforts have been focused on how social protection supports households 
in the aftermath of  shocks, we argue that social protection can also 
support increased anticipation, risk mitigation and overall preparedness 
at system level. One way to do so is by more effectively integrating 
climate risk management tools that are being tested in the humanitarian 
sector to reach more people faster, even before the impacts of  
foreseeable extreme events materialise.
To achieve this goal, we propose an innovation: integrate FbF 
mechanisms into social protection systems. This would enable actions 
in advance of  a shock, and guarantee funds for those early actions. 
Such an approach may help increase timeliness of  interventions, likely 
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resulting in improved efficiency and ability to scale up actions to address 
avoidable losses and suffering. It could also support more predictable 
and sustainable anticipation at scale. This can help increase the reach of  
humanitarian action and help protect development gains from extreme 
weather and climate events.
We recommend that the design of  new social protection systems or 
programmes include a feasibility study for the integration of  FbF 
mechanisms from the outset. Such a study should take into account 
several considerations, including the skill of  forecasts and the need for 
comprehensive risk analysis as well as the selection and prioritisation of  
worthy early actions. FbF mechanisms should subsequently be designed 
and implemented in a coordinated way; and should include sustainable, 
ring-fenced funding that can be automatically released when the 
pre-agreed risk triggers are reached.
Regarding existing social protection systems, we suggest that social 
protection actors and disaster managers and scientists converge to discuss 
the elements listed previously. Depending on the local situation, an FbF 
system could be introduced in phases, first targeting the most predictable 
hazards with relatively simple and affordable early actions, and then 
expanding to more complex actions or less predictable events. It will 
be important that donors and governments commit to fund this and 
design the outcome assessments of  their social protection investments to 
assess whether early actions were taken and what difference they made. 
Ultimately, if  properly designed and implemented, people at risk can 
benefit from FbF-infused social protection systems.
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6 Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre, The Hague, the 
Netherlands; International Research Institute for Climate and Society, 
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Department of  Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy, 
University College London, London, UK.
7 Typical forms of  social protection include social assistance (also 
called social safety nets), social insurance, social services and labour 
market interventions. In this article, we use the term social protection 
with a focus on social safety nets, i.e. programmes that help 
households manage chronic and transitory poverty and vulnerability 
by providing non-contributory support based on need. The term 
refers to programmes such as school feeding, unconditional and 
conditional cash transfers, and public works (cash/food for work) 
where resources, either cash or in-kind, are transferred to vulnerable 
individuals or households with no other means of  adequate support 
as part of  a predictable system of  support.
8 Climate resilience here refers to the ability of  a system (national, 
community or individual level) to anticipate, avoid, plan for, cope 
with, recover from and adapt to climate-related shocks and stresses 
(Bahadur et al. 2015).
9 Anticipatory capacity is part of  the overall system’s preparedness. 
Preparedness is understood as ‘the knowledge and capacities 
developed by governments, response/recovery organisations, 
communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, 
and recover from, the impacts of  likely, imminent or current hazard 
events or conditions’ (UNISDR 2009).
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Climate Change and Disasters: 
Institutional Complexities and 
Actors’ Priorities for Mitigation, 
Adaptation and Response
Bahadar Nawab1 and Ingrid Nyborg2
Abstract Over the last decade, Pakistan has faced several major disasters, 
involving both natural hazards and conflict. These crises prompted 
tremendous national and international response, and triggered the 
Government of Pakistan to establish new institutions, policies, strategies 
and action plans. Donors, humanitarian and development organisations, 
however, tend to follow their own policies, plans and interests, which may 
be quite different from the government entities dealing with humanitarian 
efforts, climate change and disaster. To what extent do these different 
perspectives affect the ability of the government to respond effectively 
and coordinate with humanitarian and development organisations during 
different phases of a crisis? This article examines the existing institutions, 
policies and perspectives that guide how government, humanitarian and 
development organisations, and community members understand risk and 
vulnerability, and respond to climate changes. It suggests how knowledge 
sharing and coordination might be improved to better face the challenges 
of risk and vulnerability reduction in the future.
Keywords: climate change, vulnerability, disaster risk reduction, 
humanitarian response, humanitarian policy, knowledge sharing, 
coordination, Pakistan.
1 Introduction
Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has experienced 16 major 
disasters that have caused severe human and economic loss (Government 
of  Pakistan 2010). The location and topography of  the country together 
with institutional, social and economic vulnerability have contributed to 
Pakistan’s frequent and severe experiences of  natural hazards in the form 
of  earthquakes, floods, droughts, cyclones, glacier lake outburst flooding, 
landslides, avalanches and resultant disasters (Government of  Pakistan 
2012). While not all of  these have been triggered by climatic events, 
the occurrence of  such frequent and severe hazards weakens Pakistan’s 
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ability to prevent disaster, putting it as the eighth country most vulnerable 
to climate change (Maplecroft 2012; Malik et al. 2012). The effects of  
recent hazards have been particularly devastating. Heavy monsoon rains 
in 2010 triggered floods that affected 20.5 million people, leaving at least 
eight million homeless, and causing massive damage to infrastructure 
countrywide (ibid.). Before resettlement of  affected households, the 
country had consecutive floods between 2011 and 2015 which badly 
affected agriculture, as well as infrastructure of  health, education and 
other sectors. These floods are not merely a result of  more frequent 
and heavy precipitation; deforestation throughout Pakistan contributes 
significantly to increases in the occurrence and intensity of  floods 
(Mahmood, Khan and Ullah 2016; Ahmed et al. 2015; Government of  
Pakistan 2014, 2010). Also, the 2013–15 drought in Sindh resulted in 
huge losses in agricultural production, affecting people’s income due to 
less production and agricultural labour. These occurrences revealed the 
vulnerability of  Pakistani society and economy to disaster.
While damages and losses have been massive, they could have been 
significantly reduced if  disaster risk reduction measures had been 
incorporated into physical, social and economic development to address 
both the proximate and root causes of  vulnerability. The lack of  attention 
to high levels of  social vulnerability and weak institutions in particular 
have led to most of  the hazards in Pakistan becoming complex disasters 
with long-term consequences. For example, Pakistan has been confronting 
grave humanitarian challenges since 2010, due to consecutive floods 
across the country, and militancy and counter-military operations in Swat 
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (2010–16). Military 
offensives against militant groups have displaced hundreds of  thousands 
from FATA, bordering south-eastern Afghanistan, which has greatly 
increased people’s vulnerability to further hazards. While government 
capacity to respond to such complex challenges has gradually improved, 
the sheer scale and frequency of  the crises demands significantly more 
investment in human, financial and technical resources for strengthening 
both civil society institutions and the relatively weak state apparatus.
The links between climate change and sustainable development are 
particularly important to understand. In Pakistan, climate change 
poses a major risk to achieving the social, economic or environmental 
sustainable development goals (Khan et al. 2016; Government of  
Pakistan 2012). Disasters in the recent past have, for example, had 
far-reaching implications on the food security of  the country in terms 
of  reduction in crop production and harmful effects on livestock health 
(Task Force on Climate Change 2010). They have also destroyed the 
livelihoods of  countless rural households whose land has been rendered 
useless, sometimes indefinitely. Reducing risk and vulnerability to 
climate change must therefore also include investments in social, 
political and economic development.
Current climate change risk reduction approaches in Pakistan are, 
however, not sufficient to address the complexity of  climate-related 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 4 July 2017: ‘Courting Catastrophe? Humanitarian Policy and Practice in a Changing Climate’ 47–62 | 49
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
disasters. Lack of  institutional support and low adaptive capacity to 
climate change have been cited as some of  the main reasons for this 
(Shahbaz et al. 2014). Climate change and disaster-related institutions 
and policies in Pakistan are new, and therefore, relatively weak. During 
the major floods in the 1970s and 1990s and up until the large-scale 
earthquake in 2005, for example, the Pakistan Army carried out rescue 
and relief  activities as there was no institutional arrangement for 
disaster risk management in the country. At the same time, increasingly 
frequent floods, drought, glacier lake outburst floods (GLOFs), and 
landslide hazards motivated the government to join the international 
discourse on climate change and disaster management and develop 
comprehensive policy and measures for disaster response, risk 
management and preparedness. Interest in longer-term risk reduction 
and climate change adaptation also emerged in government ministries 
dealing with environmental, agricultural, forestry and water issues. The 
main government institutions or line departments with some mandates 
to deal with climate change, adaptation and disaster risk management 
or reduction in Pakistan are now:
 l Ministry of  Climate Change (MoCC)
 l Pakistan Climate Change Authority (new, inter-ministry)
 l National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
 l Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA)
 l Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA)
 l Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS)
 l Ministry of  Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS).
This list reflects a recognition of  the need for a broader approach 
to climate change and disasters. These institutions have developed 
explicit policies, strategies and action plans to address short- and 
long-term aspects of  climate change in several ministries. However, 
these interventions remain more reactionary than visionary, and have 
not included any long-term consultative process to formulate clear goals 
and objectives commensurate with ground realities. They also do not 
address the need for broader social and economic reforms that might 
contribute to reducing longer-term vulnerability. As a result, they have 
different and sometimes conflicting priorities and response mechanisms.
In this article, we look at the ways in which different actors such 
as government, humanitarian and development organisations 
understand key concepts such as climate change adaptation (CCA), 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) and vulnerability, and explore how 
this has formed their development of  policy and approach. We then 
look closely at how power and politics impact their ability to support 
longer-term adaptation processes. We end with a discussion of  how 
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a better understanding of  context, power and politics could lead to 
improvements in both humanitarian policy and practice in reducing the 
vulnerability of  people to climate change.
2 Methods
The research was qualitative, based mainly on interviews and document 
analysis. As a first step, all the climate- and disaster-related documents 
in Pakistan since 2000 were thoroughly reviewed. In addition, we have 
also examined the policies of  selected humanitarian and development 
organisations.3 Heads of  the most relevant national climate change and 
disaster management institutions and those involved in formulating and 
executing policies, strategies and action plans were carefully identified 
and selected. Ten federal, provincial and district government officials 
from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Sindh were interviewed to 
understand their working model and how they coordinated with other 
institutions. The heads of  five selected humanitarian organisations 
and their relevant field staff (eight) were interviewed to learn how they 
prioritise their interventions and contribute to government demands 
and initiatives.
To understand ground realities, three villages in Swat KP in the north 
and two villages in Thatta, Sindh in the south were chosen. The 
criteria used to select the villages included topography and geography 
of  the districts, the intensity of  the flood/drought and its consequent 
damages, as well as the government and humanitarian interventions. 
In each selected village, ten interviews with the village leadership (both 
individually and in groups), a minimum of  six focus groups (formed 
according to wealth, gender and livelihoods) and key informants (nine 
in Swat and eight in Thatta) using semi-structured question guides 
and life stories were conducted. Also, a workshop was organised in 
Islamabad where almost 40 representatives of  different humanitarian 
and development organisations participated and shared their activities 
and views of  their work in disaster risk management (DRM) and 
DRR.4 Secondary data provided by the government and humanitarian 
organisations on their policies and activities in DRR and DRM were 
also consulted and analysed.
3 Key concepts and approaches
A major focus of  this article is on analysing climate change-induced 
disasters and the role of  the institutions which are relevant in designing 
policy and implementing practice. The literature helps us in better 
understanding how institutions and organisations are framed and how 
they work. For example, institutions, according to Hasan (2001), are the 
frameworks within which human behaviour, environment and resource 
use patterns are structured through mutual interactions. They can range 
from formal legal organisations to informal patterns of  practice (Leach, 
Mearns and Scoones 1999). They can represent ‘rules of  the game’ 
(North 1990), provide frameworks in which people resolve conflicts and 
peruse their objectives (Commons 1970), and structure the relationships 
of  people in various units of  polity and economy (Hall 1986).
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According to Scott, institutions are ‘cognitive, normative and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour. These are transported by various carriers – cultures, structure 
and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of  jurisdiction’ 
(Scott 1995: 33). Different state, humanitarian and development actors 
perceive the roles of  institutions dealing with climate change disasters 
quite differently. Some see the role of  the state as purely regulative and 
enforcing, involving setting rules, legislation, monitoring, inspecting and 
compliance through the policy of  carrots and sticks (North 1990).
One reason for adopting regulative instruments in state institutions is 
that states prefer to pass laws, not necessarily to properly address an 
issue, but to gain force (see Dornbusch and Scott 1975). Humanitarian 
and development organisations also represent formal institutions in 
which decisions on policy and practice are made. Much of  the behaviour 
of  actors, however, is only apparent in informal practices outside of  or 
embedded in more formal institutions. This study uses an actor-oriented 
approach to try to understand more informal institutional behaviour, in 
order to better understand power relations as they are practised.
In terms of  climate change, this article makes an important distinction 
between hazards and disasters. A hazard is a situation which poses 
a level of  threat to life, health, property or environment. A disaster, 
on the other hand, is a hazard combined with vulnerability (Hazards 
+ Vulnerability = Disaster) (Alexander 1997). Vulnerability is about 
reducing exposure and risk and improving resilience within the existing 
socio-political context (O’Brien et al. 2015).
It is also important to distinguish between DRM and DRR, two of  
the most used terms in climate change discourse in Pakistan. DRM is 
mainly concerned with improving coping capacities in order to lessen 
the adverse impacts of  hazards and the possibility of  disaster. This is 
often the main focus of  humanitarian organisations that are concerned 
with preparedness. DRR is the concept and practice of  reducing disaster 
risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors 
of  disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened 
vulnerability of  people and property, wise management of  land and the 
environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events (UNISDR 
2017). Both mitigation and adaptation is included in DRR, where 
mitigation refers to the prevention of  hazards reaching populations, 
and might involve, for example, hazard-resistant construction to 
reduce vulnerability.5 Adaptation, on the other hand, involves reducing 
vulnerability through adjustment in natural or human systems in response 
to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects (IPCC 2014).
Vulnerability is a key concept connected to risk reduction. Here we 
make a distinction between outcome vulnerability and social/contextual 
vulnerability, in order to understand the rationale behind the choice of  
different interventions by different actors. According to O’Brien et al. 
(2015), outcome vulnerability involves reducing exposure to a hazard, while 
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contextual vulnerability refers to the social, economic and political context 
which hinders or enables individuals and groups to respond to changing 
conditions in the longer term. She argues that while addressing both of  
these types of  vulnerability are necessary, most efforts are focused on 
outcome vulnerability.6
4 Institutional complexities and choices in interventions
Following the 2005 earthquake, and in light of  consecutive floods, 
droughts and other crises, the government established several disaster 
management bodies and institutions, of  which ERRA and NDMA 
(at national, provincial and district levels) are the most central. It also 
re-organised and re-named existing government ministries (i.e. changed 
the Ministry of  Environment to the Ministry of  Climate Change) to 
show that DRR and CCA are high on their agenda. The main policies 
and strategies developed by federal institutions are the:
 l Environment Protection Act 1997 (MoCC (previously Ministry of  
Environment))
 l National Environment Policy 2003 (MoCC/Minister’s Office)
 l National Disaster Risk Management Framework 2007 (NDMA)
 l National Disaster Management Plan 2010 (NDMA)
 l National Rangeland Policy 2010a (MoCC)
 l National Climate Change Policy 2012 (MoCC/Minister’s Office)
 l National Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2013 (MoCC/
Minister’s Office)
 l National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2013a (NDMA)
 l National Agriculture and Food Security Policy 2013b (Ministry of  
Agriculture and Food Security)
 l National Forest Policy 2014 (MoCC)
 l Pakistan Climate Change Authority Mandate 2016 (inter-ministry).
However, despite some progress, these institutions are still not able to 
implement any concrete mitigation and adaptation measures. There 
are several reasons for this. Firstly, with hazards occurring more 
frequently and intensely, these institutions are too young to develop the 
skilled human capital, knowledge and experience necessary to address 
such complex issues. Secondly, politics and power relations among 
and between government bodies and humanitarian and development 
organisations hamper their effectiveness. Who is responsible for what, 
and who is accountable to whom is often unclear, and becomes even 
more complicated in areas where security issues persist (as in FATA 
and Swat). Funding has also influenced the ways in which institutions 
(Endnotes)
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function, collaborate or compete. For example, the MoCC and 
NDMA which initiated climate and disaster policies, are dependent 
on line departments which under the recent eighteenth constitutional 
amendment were decentralised to the provinces, and are thus no 
longer reporting and accountable to the federal ministries. Thirdly, 
there exists a diversity of  understandings of  vulnerability, which in 
turn leads to very different types of  interventions, many of  which are 
neither sustainable nor transformational. For example, if  one views 
vulnerability as being at risk of  exposure to a hazard, avoidance or 
structural protection might be the chosen measure. On the other hand, 
an understanding of  vulnerability as being at risk in terms of  one’s weak 
position in society and inability to adapt, would instead address the root 
causes of  vulnerability such as poverty, lack of  political voice, or gender 
inequality. An important aspect of  this is whether the government 
and humanitarian organisations have the knowledge to understand 
the complexities of  how and why different people experience hazards 
differently, and adapt or fail to adapt to the challenges of  climate change.
The broader institutional landscape in Pakistan in the field of  CCA 
and DRM and reduction is complex, with government, humanitarian 
and development organisations often competing for space and power. 
Policies are as well spread across several government bodies and 
represent different perspectives on how to address climate change 
challenges. This makes it difficult for implementers to make concerted 
efforts, and rather leads to disconnected and competing initiatives. 
What is clear, however, is that these institutions do not operate in a 
vacuum, and are subject to the broader political, economic, social 
and international context in which they work. While the international 
community has been involved in development work in Pakistan for 
decades, there has been a marked increase in the involvement of  
humanitarian organisations as disasters have become more frequent. 
Both the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 flood saw a huge influx of  
international humanitarian organisations intent on providing relief. 
Particularly since the 2010 flood, humanitarian organisations have 
become more interested in how they, too, might play a role not only in 
preparedness, but in DRR and prevention.
The government authorities mentioned frame their policies and 
strategies according to their own interests and priorities – they are not 
necessarily in coordination with other relevant provincial ministries and 
departments. Also, most of  these policies are designed by high-level 
officials in consultation with donors, and not necessarily through 
participatory processes which might have aligned them with ground 
realities. Government officials explained, for example, that most policy 
strategies and action plans are framed mainly by consultants which 
are funded by donor organisations who rarely consult district-level line 
departments or local communities who have lived with climate change 
for decades. Therefore, most of  these policies are donor-driven and only 
in response to climate change, disasters, the Millennium Development 
Goals (MGDs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
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These policy documents are well written, covering internationally 
debated aspects (mitigation, adaptation, emergency response and social 
vulnerability), but they lack action plans with time frames and resources 
for implementation. There is also little emphasis on social vulnerability. 
At the same time, due to devolution of  power to provinces, the roles and 
responsibilities in implementing these policies are somewhat unclear 
and provinces lack financial and human resources to implement them.
The above-mentioned policies were analysed according to their 
emphasis on four key climate change aspects: disaster mitigation, 
emergency response, adaptation and social vulnerability (Table 1). The 
degree of  emphasis given to each of  these aspects in the documents was 
evaluated as strong, fair, weak or neglected, depending on how central 
the focus was (to what degree the policy owned the concept), how 
important it was as a part of  the implementation strategy and action 
plan, time frames, and its reflection in budget allocations. This was also 
complemented by data from the field on implementation.
Table 1 Focus of government and NGO policies on climate-induced disasters
Policies/strategies Disaster mitigation Emergency response Adaptation Social vulnerability
Ministry of Climate Change:
Climate change policy Strong Strong Strong Strong
Climate change policy implementation 
action 
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Climate change authority mandate Strong Weak Strong Weak
Environmental policy Fair Weak Neglected Neglected
Rangeland policy Weak Strong Weak Neglected
Food security and agriculture policy Neglected Strong Fair Neglected
Forest policy Strong Weak Neglected Neglected
NDMA:
Disaster risk reduction policy Strong Fair Neglected Strong
Disaster management plan Neglected Strong Neglected Weak
Disaster risk management framework Neglected Strong Neglected Neglected
Earthquake rehabilitation and 
reconstruction policy
Weak Strong Weak Neglected
Pakistan Red Crescent principles Neglected Strong Neglected Weak
NGOs:
Humanitarian organisations Weak Strong Weak Weak
Development organisations Strong Weak Depends on NGO Weak
Source Authors’ own.
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As shown in Table 1, there is variation in focus both within the government 
and between humanitarian and development non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Within the MoCC, the climate change policy, action 
plan and climate change authority strongly emphasised mitigation and 
adaptation, while these aspects are rarely incorporated in the environment 
and other sectoral development policies where real investment on the 
two should be made. The NDMA, on the other hand, continues to focus 
on response and has neither the mandate nor the resources and capacity 
for mitigation and adaptation. Due to frequent disasters in Pakistan, 
humanitarian organisations focus on response and have little time and 
resources to work in disaster mitigation, or adaptation. Development 
NGOs work mainly in disaster mitigation, with a select few (mostly in 
agriculture) involved in adaptation. Aside from the attention given in 
the climate change policy and disaster risk reduction policy, both the 
government and NGOs have neglected the issue of  social vulnerability.
These different areas of  interest, focus and understanding create tension 
between government, development and humanitarian organisations 
when it comes to real interventions. The MoCC aims for strong 
mitigation and adaptation but it would cost around US$9.7 billion, 
which is almost equivalent to the cost of  an average single flood event 
in Pakistan (Government of  Pakistan and UNFCCC 2011). This shows 
that the planned global adaptation fund of  around US$100 billion is a 
gross estimation, leaving developing countries with limited possibilities 
to invest either in adaptation or mitigation.
The policy documents represent a wide-ranging effort on the part 
of  the government in identifying hazards, risk, vulnerability, climate 
change and disaster-relevant mitigation, response and management 
efforts. However, the documents also confuse both central government 
and its line departments as well as NGOs, as they often talk about the 
same things with slightly different connotations. The policy documents 
overlap and are confusing in terms of  institutional vulnerability, 
definitions, jurisdictional conflicts, policy disconnects and resource 
gaps. For example, the MoCC strongly emphasises mitigation and 
adaptation, but has no initiatives in the recent past in support of  
these policies. Likewise, NDMA policy strongly focuses on social 
vulnerability, but in practice implements mainly disaster mitigation 
and outcome vulnerability. These federal government institutions have 
big communication gaps among themselves and with the provincial 
line ministries and departments. This hampers effective disaster risk 
management and reduction in Pakistan. The policies fail to assign 
responsibilities for who will do what to achieve DRR in Pakistan. The 
DRR draft policy appears to be a supplement of  the National Disaster 
Risk Management Framework (2007–12), but fails to integrate the 
changes due to devolution of  power into provinces.
In addition to the disconnect between policy and implementation, 
these policies suffer from lack of  political commitment, funding, skilled 
human resources, coordination, fragmentation, overlapping and unclear 
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agendas among government agencies horizontally and vertically. For 
example, there is no mechanism where the MoCC, NDMA or other 
federal ministries can force provincial governments to prioritise policies 
and relevant interventions and their implementations. Provinces 
are not bound to those policies and they often implement their own 
sector-specific development agendas which are not necessarily in line 
with the MoCC and/or any other federal government policies. As 
a result, institutions are especially weak at the district levels where 
real implementation should occur. Government programmes and 
policies often end up with vague interventions and support that do 
not help much in reducing people’s exposure to physical hazards. In 
addition, local elites capture much of  the resources intended for the 
most vulnerable, limiting even further the possibility of  addressing the 
resource and information needs of  the most vulnerable.
How the government will implement these ambitious policies is thus 
still a big question mark. The link between longer-term CCA and DRR 
remains unclear in most of  the policies and in organisations dealing 
with disaster response, early recovery, rehabilitation and development. 
This includes a fundamental lack of  understanding of  the relationship 
between risk and vulnerability, and in particular social vulnerability to 
climate change (Nyborg and Nawab, this IDS Bulletin).
Humanitarian and development organisations must relate not only 
to Pakistan’s policies, but to their own organisation’s policies as well. 
Until recently, NGOs were undertaking mitigation and adaptation 
advocacy and networking in Pakistan either on their own, through 
general-purpose fora such as the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF),7 
the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC),8 and the UN/NDMA-
led cluster and working groups. In late 2011, the ability of  INGOs to 
undertake DRR activities more concertedly increased significantly with 
the establishment of  the National DRR Forum, a network of  more 
than 100 organisations including civil societies, NGOs, INGOs, donor 
agencies, government officials and academics. This is an informal group 
of  civil society organisations voluntarily coming together on issues of  
common interest in the field of  DRR/M and CCA, at the national 
level in Pakistan. The purpose of  the DRR Forum is to enhance 
coordination, communication and information sharing on DRR/M and 
CCA among all relevant stakeholders in order to promote, improve and 
integrate DRR and CCA in emergency and development programmes 
in Pakistan (DEC 2012).
The biggest challenge for humanitarian organisations and government 
institutions alike lies in the area of  more ‘preventive’ activities which 
touches on the realm of  DRR. While many development organisations 
and ministries, and particularly those working on agriculture and 
livestock systems, have been dealing with the challenges of  climate 
change in Pakistan for many years, the idea of  prevention is a new area 
for those organisations and government bodies used to responding to 
disaster. The concepts of  risk and vulnerability in particular can take on 
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very different meanings depending on one’s conceptual and practical 
universe of  experience.
4.1 Power and politics in choice of intervention
How government, humanitarian and development actors actually 
choose activities depends on a combination of  factors. First is their 
underlying understanding of  risk, vulnerability and adaptation, which 
varies greatly according to their particular knowledge base and donor 
interest. The national government has knowledge on policy and political 
processes at higher levels but they often have less experience in the field. 
This gap could easily be filled by the local departments at the district 
level but they are often not consulted during policy formulation and 
thus the policies are not evidence-based. Development organisations are 
good at participatory processes but they lack relief  and rehabilitation 
experience which is a landmark of  humanitarian organisations. Local 
communities have rich knowledge about the impacts of  climate 
change and how they might adapt to it. But they alone cannot cope 
with such huge and sudden hazards. They clearly and cleverly observe 
slow climate change phenomena and adapt their livelihoods and 
infrastructure accordingly – something which needs to be understood 
and strengthened by government and humanitarian actors. Researchers 
are good in understanding and generating knowledge and technological 
innovation on CCA and DRR, but generally they cannot convince 
policymakers and practitioners in bringing real change. Action research 
would be an exception, but is not common in Pakistan.
Second is the politics around interventions, and the ways in which 
powerful interests influence the decisions of  which approach to take 
in terms of  response. One of  the biggest barriers for humanitarian 
interventions in Pakistan to move into mitigation and adaptation 
mode is the political and institutional constraints. The national and 
provincial governments, for example, are often headed by different 
political parties who have different interests and agendas, and could 
be additionally contradictory to humanitarian and development 
organisations’ mandates and interests. There are still barriers between 
humanitarian and development funding and institutions, which make it 
difficult to share knowledge and foster collaboration across government 
departments and between humanitarian and development actors, 
government and NGOs, and donors and organisations. There are a 
few recent initiatives, however, which try to address this. One is the 
creation of  the Pakistan Climate Change Authority, a cross-ministerial 
council on climate change (see previous section). In terms of  knowledge 
sharing, the DRR Forum, which includes members of  the Pakistan 
Humanitarian Forum, is playing an important role at national level 
to share knowledge among organisations. The government, however, 
is unfortunately not active in these fora, particularly the NDMA 
and PDMAs. Recent government restrictions on humanitarian and 
development organisations concerning their mandate, funding sources 
and versatility is also hampering their work and coordination. Even 
more important is whose knowledge is counted when decisions on 
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funding take place. Such decisions are often taken in UN systems and 
by donors – not necessarily considering national researchers and local 
knowledge.
What is more critical, however, is what happens at the district level, where 
the competence and capacity of  government officials is extremely limited, 
and organisations seldom cooperate. There is little awareness at this level 
of  the relationship between hazards and a broader understanding of  how 
the political, social and economic context influences vulnerability. Here, 
the politics of  knowledge are in play, where those with power in terms of  
funding and political clout decide how issues are defined and addressed 
(Tanner and Allouche 2011; Eriksen et al. 2015). In government, activities 
and approaches remain dictated by line departments, and brought 
together only in emergencies by the district administration. Strong donor 
steering of  local organisations, often through a contracting system, 
discourages local competence-building and participation of  communities 
in designing assessments and interventions. In this way, knowledge 
of  vulnerabilities at the local level remains inaccessible, since all the 
decisions have already been made at higher levels.
The lack of  voice and involvement of  a broader set of  community 
members will allow inequalities that determine vulnerability to persist. 
Understanding people’s perceptions about climate change and disasters is 
becoming an increasingly important tool in fostering better adaptability 
and ultimately human transformation (Chaudhary 2011; Yi, Ismail 
and Zhaoli 2012). Local perceptions and knowledge of  local risks on 
issues around climate change and disasters are important because it 
is the communities themselves that make decisions on how they best 
could adapt to changing scenarios (Kansiime 2012). For example, 
sensitivity of  ecological regions, changes in temperature, rainfall pattern 
and floods and drought are more likely to be seen in studies of  local 
dynamics and practices than by only examining regional or global trends. 
Understanding how local communities recognise climate change-induced 
crises and how they cope is quite crucial for designing better mitigation 
and adaptation measures (Thomas, Twyman and Oshbar 2007).
5 Conclusions
Pakistan has recently developed discrete institutions and policies for 
climate change and disasters. However, in spite of  some progress, the 
government has to go a long way to materialise and implement the 
policies, and achieve the targets. Poor coordination on policy action 
plan between central government and the provinces, knowledge gaps 
and stakeholder coordination hamper efforts in addressing disaster 
mitigation, CCA and DRR.
The main actors, for example government, humanitarian and 
development organisations, researchers and the local community have 
different understandings, interests and approaches to climate-induced 
disasters and how to address them. Listening to and understanding 
each other is one issue, and agreeing on an action plan and prioritising 
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interventions is another. Those with power in the form of  either 
political clout or funding have the authority to define which issues are 
important, without consulting critical knowledge from other actors, and 
particularly local people directly affected by hazards and disasters.
Based on these conclusions, we can identify three areas as important 
in ensuring that humanitarian policy and practice contributes to 
reducing the vulnerability of  people to climate change and disasters in 
Pakistan. First, there is the need for significant capacity building at all 
levels of  government and within NGOs as to how to identify not only 
the vulnerable, but the drivers of  that vulnerability in that particular 
context. Second, there is a need to design processes where a broad range 
of  community members are brought into the decision-making process 
at district level. This will involve capacity building of  both community 
members and district government staff, with the facilitation by a body 
or actor trusted by government, NGOs and local community members. 
Finally, investments in mitigation and adaptation in developed countries 
will have the greatest effect in reducing climate change. In countries 
such as Pakistan which suffer from the consequences of  poor climate 
policy in the global North, funding for reducing hazards alone will not 
prevent disasters – an investment in people’s capacity to adapt is key to 
preventing disasters.
Notes
1 Associate Professor/Head, Department of  Development Studies/
High Mountain Research Center, COMSATS Institute of  Information 
Technology (CIIT) Abbottabad, Pakistan (bahadar@ciit.net.pk).
2 Associate Professor, Department of  International Environment and 
Development Studies (Noragric), Faculty of  Landscape and Society, 
at the Norwegian University of  Life Sciences (NMBU)  
(ingrid.nyborg@nmbu.no).
3 The policies for humanitarian and development organisations 
represent a composite based on reviews of  policy documents, as well 
as interviews with staff. The policies and interviews were chosen at 
random from the list of  members of  the Pakistan Humanitarian 
Forum (PHF) and the Disaster Risk Reduction Forum (DRR).
4 ‘How can Humanitarian Actors Contribute to Climate Change 
Adaptation? Exploring Innovative Approaches to Thinking Long-
Term in the Short Term’ held on 21 November 2014, in Islamabad.
5 Or in global climate change circles, it refers to the reduction of  
greenhouse gasses (UNISDR 2013).
6 See Nyborg and Nawab, this IDS Bulletin for a more detailed 
discussion of  this distinction.
7 A forum of  50 international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) working in Pakistan, established in 2002.
8 A network of  13 UK-based aid organisations responding to 
emergencies worldwide. 
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Social Vulnerability and Local 
Adaptation in Humanitarian 
Response: The Case of Pakistan
Ingrid Nyborg1 and Bahadar Nawab2
Abstract This article looks at the experiences of two areas hit hard by the 
2010 mega-floods in Pakistan, one in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one in 
Sindh. It examines how different humanitarian actors understand climatic 
changes, risk and vulnerability, how this influences their choices of disaster 
risk reduction activities, and whether these activities promote changes 
which are merely cosmetic, or transformational. The findings point to the 
need to expand institutional understandings of risk and vulnerability to 
include social vulnerability in disaster risk reduction measures, and the 
importance of knowledge sharing and collaboration between humanitarian 
and development organisations, government and local communities, 
particularly at the district levels, to be able to address long-term risk 
reduction and adaptation.
Keywords: vulnerability, climate change, humanitarian response, 
humanitarian policy, development, adaptation, risk assessment, Pakistan.
1 Introduction
Reducing vulnerability in the face of  repeated disasters in Pakistan 
is a huge challenge for humanitarian and development actors alike. 
Both national and international humanitarian actors have over the 
last 12 years responded to a broad range and frequent occurrence of  
crises in Pakistan. These have included earthquakes, floods, drought 
and conflict, from the far north to the far south, which have adversely 
affected millions of  people in terms of  loss of  life, livelihoods and 
assets (Swati 2015). In light of  this, the Pakistani government has put 
disasters, and particularly climate change disasters, high on the political 
agenda (Nawab and Nyborg, this IDS Bulletin). Also, in addition to 
their main focus on relief, humanitarian actors show a growing interest 
in contributing to both hazard preparedness and the reduction of  
vulnerability of  populations to climate change in the longer term.
A greater focus on disaster risk and vulnerability reduction, however, 
is challenging for the humanitarian community. The vast majority of  
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funding of  humanitarian operations continues to be based on appeals 
in the wake of  emergencies, and is overwhelmingly used for relief  
(UNOCHA 2017; ADB and World Bank 2010). Funding for prevention 
is difficult for humanitarian actors to obtain, as it is considered the 
domain of  development actors. This can create challenges even within 
an organisation practising both relief  and development, where there 
can be restrictions on using funding for relief  or preventative measures. 
Efforts to address longer-term vulnerability issues are also hampered 
by competing understandings among government, humanitarian and 
development actors of  risk, vulnerability, and what might constitute 
transformational change. Knowledge remains segregated in different 
communities of  practice, with little interaction and institutional overlap 
(Polastro et al. 2011; Schipper and Pelling 2006). In particular, local 
knowledge and experiences of  climate change and how their underlying 
vulnerability influences their ability to adapt is seldom considered in 
planning and implementing interventions (Christoplos, Mitchell and 
Liljelund 2001). In this respect, the politics around humanitarian 
assistance play a clear role in determining which knowledge bases are 
given space in humanitarian discourse and practice, including which 
definitions of  risk and vulnerability are given precedence (Eriksen, 
Nightingale and Eakin 2015). The fact that the vast majority of  
humanitarian assistance continues to focus exclusively on relief  and 
short-term response is a political decision. This limits the space for those 
humanitarian actors moving into disaster risk reduction who are aiming 
to achieve transformational change to reduce people’s vulnerability in 
both the short and the longer term (O’Brien et al. 2015).
This article explores the ways in which government, humanitarian and 
development actors understand risk and vulnerability, and how this affects 
their choice of  approach to longer-term adaptation. Do humanitarian 
actors, including the government, adequately understand the complexities 
of  the local contexts in which they work? Are they able to contribute 
to not only mitigation and adaptation per se, but to reducing the social 
vulnerability of  those most at risk? How do power relations influence policy 
and practice? The article begins with a discussion of  how disaster risk 
management and reduction, climate change adaptation and vulnerability 
are understood in the climate change literature. This is followed by 
illustrative examples of  the responses to and impact of  the mega-floods of  
2010 in Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Thatta, Sindh. In each of  
these cases we examine the complexity of  these communities in order to 
understand how vulnerability is shaped by their particular social, cultural, 
political and economic context. We then examine how the government 
and the humanitarian community understand the concepts underlying 
climate change and its effects (e.g. risk, adaptation, mitigation, disaster risk 
management (DRM), disaster risk reduction (DRR) and vulnerability), 
and how this understanding, embedded in power relations, influences the 
way in which they approach their work with communities. We end with 
a discussion of  how a better understanding of  the social context, power 
and politics could lead to improvements in both humanitarian policy and 
practice in reducing the vulnerability of  people to climate change.
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2 Understanding risk and vulnerability
There is a key distinction in the climate change literature in the use of  
the term vulnerability, based on whether the focus is reducing exposure to 
hazards and saving lives in the short term, or addressing social conditions 
and the drivers of  vulnerability. This plays out in the ways humanitarian 
organisations understand and engage in risk management and reduction 
activities. In this section, we consider how risk and vulnerability are 
defined, and then operationalised in concepts such as DRM and DRR, 
which are central to climate change discourse in Pakistan.
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) defines risk simply as the combination of  the probability of  
an event and its negative consequences (UNISDR 2017). The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) expands this by describing 
risk as ‘the probability of  harmful consequences, casualties, damaged 
property, lost livelihoods, disrupted economic activity, and damage to 
the environment, resulting from interactions between natural or human-
induced hazards and vulnerable conditions’ (2011: 11). Disaster risk, 
therefore, is understood as ‘the potential disaster losses, in lives, health 
status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular 
community or a society over some specified future time period’ (IRP 2017). 
Based on these definitions, DRM is defined as ‘the systematic process of  
using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills and 
capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities 
in order to lessen the adverse impacts of  hazards and the possibility of  disaster’ 
(UNISDR 2017). This is the main focus of  humanitarian organisations 
which are concerned with preparedness (authors’ emphasis added).
DRR, on the other hand, is ‘the concept and practice of  reducing 
disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal 
factors of  disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, 
lessened vulnerability of  people and property, wise management of  land and 
the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events’ (ibid., 
authors’ emphasis added). We emphasise here the additional aspects of  
managing causal factors and reducing vulnerability of  people in DRR 
as key distinctions from DRM. According to this view, DRR is in fact an 
expansion of  DRM, inclusive of  its attributes.
According to the IPCC (2012), DRR denotes both a policy goal or 
objective, and the strategic and instrumental measures used for:
 l anticipating future disaster risk (forecasting);
 l reducing existing exposure, hazard, or vulnerability; and
 l improving resilience.
This includes a clear focus on not only reducing risk, but ‘lessening 
the vulnerability of  people, livelihoods, and assets and ensuring 
the appropriate sustainable management of  land, water, and other 
components of  the environment’ (IPCC 2012: 46).
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Reducing risk in these terms involves two well-known – but not 
always well-understood – aspects: mitigation and adaptation. In 
short, mitigation refers here to the prevention of  hazards reaching 
populations, and might involve, for example, hazard-resistant 
construction to reduce vulnerability (in global climate change 
vocabulary, however, it refers to the reduction of  greenhouse 
gas emissions). Adaptation, on the other hand, involves reducing 
vulnerability through ‘adjustment in natural or human systems 
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects’ 
(UNISDR 2017). What is often confusing is that while both mitigation 
and adaptation involve reducing vulnerability, they in fact conceptualise 
the term completely differently. O’Brien et al. (2007) make a very 
important distinction between reducing outcome vulnerability, and 
reducing contextual vulnerability. According to the authors, outcome 
vulnerability involves reducing exposure through climate change 
mitigation, or activities that limit negative outcomes, i.e. reducing 
risk, or improving resilience. Reducing contextual vulnerability, on the 
other hand, involves altering the context (socioeconomic-political) in 
which climate change occurs, so that individuals and groups can better 
respond to changing conditions in the longer term. They argue that 
while addressing both types of  vulnerability are necessary, most efforts 
are focused on outcome vulnerability.
3 Methods
In order to understand how this plays out in practice, we examine both 
government and non-governmental organisation (NGO) responses 
to and impacts of  the 2010 floods in Pakistan. Government staff at 
national level involved in climate change and disaster management, 
as well as various line departments, were interviewed (ten in total). 
Secondary data provided by the government and organisations on 
policies and activities in DRR and DRM were analysed. A workshop 
was conducted in Islamabad where almost 40 representatives of  
different humanitarian and development agencies shared and discussed 
their work in DRM and DRR (Noragric, CIIT and NORCROSS 
2014). To study local perceptions of  response and impact, we chose 
three villages in Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which had experienced 
flood and conflict, and two villages in Thatta, Sindh which had 
experienced repeated floods and drought. The criteria used to select the 
villages included topography and geography, the intensity of  the flood 
and damages, and the extent and type of  government and humanitarian 
interventions. District government, humanitarian and development staff 
were also interviewed. At the community level, individual interviews 
(eight in Swat, nine in Thatta) and focus group interviews (nine in 
Swat, six in Thatta) were conducted, based on differences in wealth, 
status, gender and livelihoods. The semi-structured question guides 
covered a broad range of  issues including livelihoods, power relations, 
infrastructure and extent of  government services, experiences of  
hazards and climate change, and interventions.
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4 Government and humanitarian responses – relief, reconstruction and 
preparedness
The ways in which the floods impacted the two study areas were very 
different. In Swat, the waters came with little warning, at high velocity. 
The water quickly overflowed the river banks, receded after a few days, 
and left in its wake deposits of  sediment and debris several metres 
high. People living on both sides of  the River Swat experienced loss of  
life, livestock, houses, agricultural fields, hotels, roads and bridges. In 
two of  the study villages, floods had almost completely washed away 
the irrigated land, whereas in the third village it affected the land only 
partially. In Thatta, a lowland area, the water breached the river and 
channels early on, and spread extensively, in south Punjab and upper 
Sindh, staying for up to six months before receding. Standing crops 
were destroyed, and villagers were completely dependent on food aid 
until they could return to their villages. As in Swat, the flood hit prior to 
harvest, such that crops were destroyed in the fields. As the water began 
to recede, some landowners were able to begin cultivating again, while 
others experienced such extensive damage to their soils that the fields 
were unusable.
The government and international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) gave assistance in both areas after the flood, either directly 
or through the UN cluster system. The response was implemented 
in phases defined by the Provincial Disaster Management Authority 
(PDMA) as relief, early recovery, reconstruction and development. 
The government had both a coordinating role through the PDMA, 
and provided direct assistance along with humanitarian organisations 
and the army, which assisted in providing relief  to remote and isolated 
areas where roads had been destroyed. After the initial three-month 
rescue and relief  operation, the government conducted a survey of  the 
damage in the affected population and distributed Watan cards (cash 
grants for consumption and rehabilitation), a few recovery items, and 
coordinated rehabilitation efforts. As the flooding reached the plains, 
most humanitarian organisations moved south to continue their relief  
work (ADB and World Bank 2010).
In both Thatta and Swat, a few humanitarian organisations remained 
past the relief  and rehabilitation phases to work on preparedness, 
training local women and men in DRM to respond quickly to save 
lives. Activities in DRM included the formation of  village disaster 
management committees and emergency response teams trained 
in search and rescue, first aid, preparedness and evacuation plans, 
and equipped with DRM kits. Capacity building in DRM was also 
prioritised nationally by the National Disaster Risk Management 
Authority (NDMA), which established the National Institute of  Disaster 
Management (NIDM) for district government capacity building. Even 
though humanitarian organisations, through their DRM activities, had 
a longer-term engagement in the affected areas, the focus remained on 
managing short-term response. The activities identified were based on 
assessments of  the physical effects of  earlier hazards.
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5 Disaster risk reduction – a shift from preparedness to prevention
The government’s National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy was 
developed in 2013 (Government of  Pakistan 2013). The international 
community then established a national DRR Forum, where both 
development and humanitarian actors meet regularly to share ideas and 
discuss ways to reduce risk in practice. While most of  the organisations 
dealing with DRR are development organisations, there are several 
humanitarian organisations that have moved beyond DRM and into 
DRR activities, in an attempt to contribute to not only preparedness but 
prevention.
As mentioned earlier, DRR includes aspects of  both mitigation and 
adaptation, but we found that not all organisations dealt with both. 
Humanitarian organisations, when performing DRR activities, focus 
almost exclusively on mitigation activities. This includes the building of  
mitigation structures, such as checking dams to stop erosion and reduce 
water flow during flash floods, to reducing exposure to hazards. These 
are also common mitigation activities of  development organisations. In 
addition, however, development organisations address adaptation, or the 
reduction of  vulnerability through longer-term ‘adjustment in natural 
or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or 
their effects’ (UNISDR 2017). This involves activities such as livelihood 
programmes, DRR committee formation, agricultural innovations, 
and resource management training, designed to help people adapt to a 
changing climate in the long term. When the staff of  the humanitarian 
organisations were asked why they did not engage in these types 
of  adaptation activities, they replied that these were ‘development’ 
activities, something that they simply did not, as humanitarian 
organisations, engage in. Likewise, only a few development 
organisations were engaged in DRM, as this was considered the domain 
of  humanitarian organisations.
What is common for both humanitarian and development organisations 
dealing with DRR, whether in terms of  mitigation and adaptation, is 
that all of  them focus on reducing vulnerability to exposure of  hazards 
and climate change, while none of  them focus on contextual or social 
vulnerability. For example, organisations informed the research team 
that their assessments and activities do not include the mapping of  
vulnerability at an individual level, only at a community level. They also 
focus on supporting livelihoods, such as agriculture, without focusing 
on differences or power relations according to gender, wealth, class, 
land tenure and education which might affect people differently in 
their ability to adapt to climate change. Even though those working 
with DRR were quite aware of  how a lack of  attention to underlying 
differences in vulnerability allows elites to capture resources and 
benefits, they felt it was beyond their capacity to change an assessment 
system which was defined by donor and government understandings of  
local risk and vulnerability.
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6 Understanding root causes of vulnerability
The floods in Pakistan were considered a natural disaster by the 
government and local communities. There are, however, several 
drivers of  vulnerability that involve both people and politics. One is 
the utilisation of  natural resources upstream. The degradation of  the 
upper catchment areas in Swat, climate change and mismanagement 
of  water all play a role in causing hazards and disasters. In the case of  
flooding, the extensive felling of  forests in the highlands, poor catchment 
management, overgrazing in the sensitive mountains, high levels of  
firewood consumption, and uncontrolled cultivation, all reduce water-
retention capacity and cause increased surface water runoff and soil 
erosion, increasing the quantity, velocity and sediment load of  the 
headwaters entering the river system. Activities aimed at reducing the 
intensity of  these processes in the highlands could play an important 
role in preventing or at least lessening the impact of  the floods on people 
in the lowlands. In order to do this, one would need to understand the 
political and social vulnerability context of  their use in the highlands.
Another driver of  vulnerability in the study areas and throughout 
Pakistan, is inequitable social structures. Key resources such as land are 
controlled by local elites, landlords and tribal leaders. Poor households 
and communities are often pushed into cultivating marginal land, which 
is less productive and also located in areas more vulnerable to hazards. 
During the 2010 floods, for example, there were numerous complaints 
in the Charsadda area of  KP against landlords and government officials 
conspiring to divert floods away from the lands of  rural elites and 
towards poor people and their properties. Such underlying social and 
political inequities and the limitations they put on women and men’s 
lives and livelihoods contributes to increasing their vulnerability to 
hazards, leading ultimately to disaster (Taylor 2013).
In order to discover these underlying drivers, a detailed understanding 
of  both the differential impact and the barriers to adaptation of  
different women and men in the affected communities is necessary. 
In Swat, for example, the loss of  fertile land on the riverside has had 
different implications for the livelihoods of  landowners and tenants. 
Larger landowners lost their property, but most had other assets and 
livelihood options. Smaller landowners and tenants, however, lost 
their only source of  income, and many had to move from the area to 
find work. Some development organisations assisted in rehabilitating 
agricultural lands, but in many cases the damage was so severe that land 
demarcation became an issue and their lands are still not restored. Also, 
conflict in Swat in 2009 contributed significantly to the vulnerability 
of  households to the flood. When the floods hit in 2010, people had 
not yet recovered from the political conflict the year before, when 
orchards had been vandalised, harvests confiscated, and people lost 
their jobs and had to relocate (Nyborg et al. 2012). Many were still 
suffering from trauma from the fighting and their experiences of  being 
internally displaced people (IDPs), and there was a general lack of  trust 
between members of  the communities. In addition, gender disparities 
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in terms of  education, income-earning opportunities and mobility 
hinder many women’s participation in activities which could reduce 
their vulnerability to both fast- and slow-onset hazards. In general, 
limited livelihood options, education opportunities, health facilities, 
functioning institutions, and security for large parts of  the population 
in Swat have all increased people’s vulnerability to floods (Khalid, 
Nyborg and Nawab 2015; Elahi, Nyborg and Nawab 2015; Khan, 
Shanmugaratnam and Nyborg 2015).
In Thatta, the 2010 floods were followed by heavy rains in 2011, 
resulting in high levels of  salinity. Some fields experienced a 50 per cent 
decrease in yields, others lay completely barren. None of  the villagers 
interviewed were able to reclaim their degraded land, as the drainage 
improvements necessary would require the use of  heavy digging cranes 
that were beyond their means. The only significant investments in 
land by the international community and the government have been 
the construction of  massive bunds and the raising of  the roadways 
to provide safe transportation routes in the event of  future flooding, 
and some construction of  housing on higher ground. While these are 
important investments, their contribution to the recovery of  livelihoods 
is limited. The effect of  the floods on longer-term livelihoods has 
been extensive, and different for different villagers. In the two villages 
studied, most of  the land is owned by two or three larger landowners, 
who had tenants (with long-term tenant relationships), sharecroppers 
(shorter-term relationships with larger landowners, but owned small 
plots of  land as well) and labourers working their land. After the flood, 
when the damaged land was producing only half  of  the yields, there 
was not enough work for many of  the labourers and sharecroppers, and 
only some of  the tenants were able to continue to work in the fields. The 
large landowners started to do much of  their own labour, and produce 
mainly for their own consumption. Due to higher levels of  education of  
several of  their family members, landowners were able to supplement 
their farm income with salaries from government jobs. Sharecroppers 
increasingly supplemented their income from other sources, and some 
stopped cultivation completely on their damaged land in order to work 
as labourers. Those labourers and sharecroppers who lost their local 
livelihoods have had to move to the city (Hyderabad) for several months 
of  the year for casual labour. These unskilled labourers are considered 
the most vulnerable in terms of  loss of  livelihood, and include several 
women household heads who either are widows or who have a husband 
not able to work.
What we see in both areas is that the flood had both short-term and 
long-term effects, which were very different depending on one’s starting 
point before the flood. Attempts to respond to the flood, however, 
focused exclusively on assessing losses and damage to assets from this 
particular hazard (in addition to emergency relief  efforts). While this is 
important, it is not sufficient for understanding ongoing processes that 
make people vulnerable to hazards, nor does it account for the impact 
of  the floods on those with few assets – to put it bluntly, those with 
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lots of  assets will always show the greatest losses and damage, but not 
necessarily in terms of  their livelihoods since they usually have other 
opportunities, social networks and assets to fall back on. A focus on 
losses alone will thus mask the tremendous effect of  the flood in further 
weakening the possibility of  adaptation by the poor who already have 
suffered from longer-term political and economic marginalisation and a 
weakening of  coping strategies (Eriksen, Brown and Kelly 2005). It also 
masks the effects of  less apparent changes in climate that fall outside 
of  the concept of  ‘hazard’, but that threaten longer-term sustainability, 
such as long-term changes in temperature, and slow-onset drought.
7 Barriers to addressing social vulnerability in DRR
Our study finds that there are two areas which hinder actors in 
addressing social vulnerability in their DRR work. First is the choice 
of  inadequate assessment tools for defining damages, losses and 
vulnerability to future disaster. The second is the politics around 
interventions, and the ways in which powerful interests and institutions 
influence whose knowledge counts in making decisions of  which 
approach to take for DRR.
7.1 Focus and choice of assessment tools
Internationally, there is a multitude of  hazard risk assessment tools and 
methodologies available to governments and organisations (Caribbean 
Development Bank and CARICOM 2009; UNICEF 2012; US 
Department of  State 2012). The focus on asset losses, however, is by 
far the most common measure of  vulnerability, with a clear focus on 
measuring the risk of  exposure (Caribbean Development Bank and 
CARICOM 2009). Even when attention is given to population sensitivity 
and resilience in addition to exposure, and underlying factors that 
contribute to vulnerability (Turner et al. 2003; Thomalla et al. 2006), 
the focus remains on exposure, and the description of  the human 
condition remains static and apolitical. While such tools are undoubtedly 
critical for a country like Pakistan where sound geo-metrological-
demographic data are lacking, and no national standard methodology 
or institutionalised capacity to conduct multi-hazard risk assessments 
exists, they are not sufficient for understanding social vulnerability. Reed 
et al. (2013), for example, argue for using the sustainable livelihoods 
approach in climate change vulnerability analyses to capture some of  
the underlying causes of  weak adaptive capacities. Reed also emphasises 
the importance of  stakeholder participation in processes of  adaptive 
management to ensure longer-term adaptability (Reed 2008).
In Pakistan, government, humanitarian and development risk assessments 
continue to focus exclusively on reducing the risk of  hazards reaching 
populations – despite the attention to contextual vulnerability in national 
policy documents. At the national level, the NDMA is slowly building the 
capacity of  government in disaster risk assessments through the training 
of  line departments and their provincial- and district-level staff. In 
addition to focusing on exposure, risk assessments are mainly conducted 
by technical government or NGO staff lacking in local knowledge, with 
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little or no participation of  local community members. It is clear from 
our study that villagers can easily describe shifting weather patterns, and 
what this has meant to their lives and livelihoods both in the short and 
long term. Their experience and understanding of  the social, natural and 
political context in which they live is also best expressed by them. The 
intensity of  their experience of  conflict, and the intensity of  heat in the 
summers that cause heatstroke and make it difficult to labour outdoors for 
more than a few hours a day, risks being lost in figures of  temperature and 
precipitation. Local women and men can best explain how these events 
and conditions affect different villagers differently, depending on their 
resources and ability to switch to other income sources when agricultural 
land is destroyed or lost. This knowledge, however, remains unavailable to 
actors who consistently measure and plan interventions through top-down 
processes where local women and men are not included.
In order for risk assessments to capture relevant information on 
exposure and social vulnerability, they need to be both participatory 
and provide data on more than aggregated damage, losses and physical 
risks. While development organisations have a long history of  focusing 
on participatory development, humanitarian organisations tend to use 
external experts for assessments rather than local sources in the belief  
that the information will be less biased. An exception to this is recent 
work by the Pakistan Red Crescent: it has developed an Integrated 
Vulnerability and Capability Assessment (IVCA) which is conducted 
together with communities to help understand how it might strengthen 
community resilience in the face of  various disasters (IFRC n.d.). The 
assessments are conducted with the help of  local volunteers, and the 
Red Crescent as a permanent fixture at the district level is able to follow 
up the findings with local government and development organisations. 
The IVCAs, however, do not include an analysis of  social differences 
within the village, which hampers the ways in which they can identify 
and cater to the needs of  the most vulnerable. With adjustments to 
methodology which allow for intra-village and household disaggregation 
and deeper analysis of  the drivers of  vulnerability, IVCAs can become 
powerful tools in engaging local people in decisions concerning longer-
term adaptation for DRR. The DRR Forum is currently exploring the 
possibility of  developing an improved IVCA which includes attention to 
social vulnerability. Linking IVCAs with district government technical 
assessments and longer-term adaptation activities (i.e. agricultural 
research on heat and drought-tolerant varieties) could address both 
short- and long-term needs. In this way, humanitarian organisations 
can both contribute to and have access to critical information on the 
vulnerability of  community members long before a hazard hits, such 
that their efforts following a disaster are both timely and reach those 
who are in need of  assistance.
7.2 Politics, institutions and DRR interventions
Another barrier for humanitarian interventions in Pakistan to move into 
DRR and contribute to adaptation and prevention is the sectoral nature 
of  the political and institutional landscape. There are still barriers 
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between humanitarian and development funding and institutions which 
make it difficult to share knowledge and foster collaboration across 
government departments, and between humanitarian and development 
actors, between the government and NGOs, and between donors and 
organisations (Thomas 2014; Eakin, Lemos and Nelson 2014). There 
are a few recent initiatives which try to address this. One is the attempt 
at national-level government to create a cross-ministerial council on 
climate change (Nawab and Nyborg, this IDS Bulletin). Also at national 
level, the DRR Forum, which includes members of  the Pakistan 
Humanitarian Forum, is playing an important knowledge-sharing role 
among organisations (the development of  a common IVCA is only 
one example). The government, including the NDMA and PDMA, is 
invited to these fora, but unfortunately seldom attend.
More critically, however, is what happens at lower levels, and particularly 
the district level, where the competence and capacity of  government 
officials is extremely limited, and organisations seldom cooperate, unless 
they have personal contacts. Here, the politics of  knowledge are in play, 
where those with power in terms of  funding and political clout decide 
how issues are defined and addressed (Eriksen and Lind 2009; Eriksen 
et al. 2015; Tanner and Allouche 2011). In government, activities and 
approaches remain dictated by line departments, and brought together 
only in emergencies by the District Commissioner. Strong donor steering 
of  organisations, often through a contracting system, discourages local 
competence-building and participation of  communities in designing 
assessments and interventions. In this way, knowledge of  vulnerabilities 
at the local level remains inaccessible, since all the decisions are in reality 
already made at higher levels. The lack of  voice and involvement of  a 
broader set of  community members allow inequalities that determine 
vulnerability to persist.
Again, there are exceptions. In one district in Sindh, the District 
Commissioner requested the local Pakistan Red Crescent office to act 
as permanent coordinator for the District Disaster Management Unit 
(DDMU). Its status as a humanitarian organisation under the auspices 
of  government provided a functioning link between government and 
NGOs working in the area. If  the IVCAs are adjusted to incorporate 
contextual vulnerability, this could link the knowledge at community 
level to both practitioners and government. Another example is the 
work by the national DRR Forum to create and activate the DRR fora 
at district level. A pilot project forms community committees in selected 
districts in KP and facilitates meetings with the district authorities to 
discuss priorities in development investments. This could be a strong 
tool to make local governments and organisations accountable to 
communities. If  these measures are to be possible, however, donors 
and central offices of  both organisations and government need to set 
aside political rivalries and open up processes that are more locally 
determined. Without such processes, it is difficult for governments 
to execute and implement effective longer-term DRR strategies, and 
difficult for communities to adapt to climate change.
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8 Conclusions
Our findings show that most responses to disasters in the study 
areas focus on vulnerability to hazards, or outcome vulnerability. 
While these responses may be important contributions to protecting 
populations physically in the short term, they are neither sustainable 
nor transformational in terms of  reducing the drivers of  vulnerability 
in society. Contextual vulnerability, or attention to the drivers of  
vulnerability, are seldom considered by government, humanitarian or 
development actors. This was evident in both the choice of  activities 
themselves, and the risk and needs assessments studied. Our findings 
also show that despite the rich knowledge of  drivers of  vulnerability 
at the local level, this is not systematically incorporated into the 
decision-making processes of  the government, humanitarian and 
development organisations when designing mitigation and adaptation 
activities. Where participatory methods are used, they are not used 
to discover social difference and vulnerability between members of  
communities. We found that this was due to a lack of  understanding 
of  the significance of  social vulnerability by most of  the actors, a lack 
of  knowledge sharing between actors, and political power relations in 
humanitarian and development assistance which privileges knowledge 
bases at the national and international levels. The consequences of  not 
considering the different ways in which people are vulnerable is that 
activities will strengthen existing inequalities, and vulnerability will in 
fact increase precisely for those people who are the most disadvantaged.
In light of  these findings, we recommend the inclusion of  social 
vulnerability into risk and needs assessments at all levels, and that these 
assessments are truly participatory in the sense that a broad range of  
village women and men from different social, economic and ethnic 
backgrounds are able to share their knowledge effectively. We also 
recommend that fora where government, humanitarian, development 
and research actors can share knowledge take place not only at the 
national level, but at the district level, such that there is both better 
coordination and more participation by community members. Finally, 
we recommend that donors re-examine their top-down mechanisms of  
funding such that participatory processes of  planning and implementation 
are indeed possible. This includes a shift in focus from contracting to 
competence-building of  local government and communities in designing 
and implementing activities that directly affect their lives.
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The Power of ‘Know-Who’: 
Adaptation to Climate Change in a 
Changing Humanitarian Landscape 
in Isiolo, Kenya
Marianne Mosberg,1 Elvin Nyukuri2 and Lars Otto Naess3
Abstract This article examines adaptation to climate change in view 
of changing humanitarian approaches in Isiolo County, Kenya. While 
humanitarian actors are increasingly integrating climate change in their 
international and national-level strategies, we know less about how this 
plays out at sub-national levels, which is key to tracking whether and 
how short-term assistance can support long-term adaptation. The article 
suggests that increasing attention to resilience and adaptation among 
humanitarian actors may not lead to reduced vulnerability because resources 
tend to be captured through existing power structures, directed by who you 
know and your place in the social hierarchy. In turn, this sustains rather than 
challenges the marginalisation processes that cause vulnerability to climate 
shocks and stressors. The article highlights the important role of power and 
politics both in channelling resources and determining outcomes.
Keywords: Kenya, drylands, climate change, climate change 
adaptation, power relations, humanitarian aid, contextual vulnerability, 
marginalisation, resilience, pastoralism.
1 Introduction
Concerns over human-induced climate change have led to a growing 
emphasis among humanitarian agencies on the need to adjust 
and change their approaches towards strengthening resilience and 
supporting adaptation. State and non-state actors at the international 
and national level increasingly demonstrate a focus on resilience 
and adaptation to climate change in their humanitarian policies and 
practices, in part reflecting broader changes within the humanitarian 
sector (Bennett and Pantuliano 2016; Eriksen et al., this IDS Bulletin). 
However, little is known so far about the implications of  these changes 
for vulnerability outcomes at sub-national and local levels.
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To address this gap, this article documents changes in humanitarian 
actors’ policies and practices in Isiolo County, Kenya, and discusses 
whether and how these changes affect patterns of  vulnerability and 
potentials for transformational adaptation, with a specific emphasis 
on power relations and marginalisation processes. Isiolo County is 
an interesting case for several reasons. It is located in the Arid and 
Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) of  northern Kenya, and is one of  the poorest 
and least developed parts of  the country (Republic of  Kenya 2012b). 
After decades of  neglect, Isiolo has, however, in recent years received 
increasing attention and investment, as a site for a number of  flagship 
projects4 under the ‘Vision 2030’ development strategy of  Kenya 
(Republic of  Kenya 2013a). The new investments and flow of  resources 
have led to significant optimism, as well as new avenues for power plays 
and political struggles.
Following recent studies (e.g. Denton et al. 2014; O’Brien et al. 2015), 
we consider that to adapt to climate change, transformative changes are 
needed alongside incremental improvements in livelihoods. This puts 
the focus on socio-political drivers of  vulnerability to climate change 
and variability, including power relations and marginalisation processes 
(Eriksen, Nightingale and Eakin 2015; Tschakert et al. 2016).
Based on interviews and data collected in six sites in Isiolo County, this 
case study identifies significant emerging changes in the approaches of  
state and non-state humanitarian actors in Isiolo. There is a move away 
from sector- and project-based short-term interventions towards more 
holistic, integrated and longer-term approaches – at least on paper. 
Climate change concerns appear to be one of  the drivers behind these 
changes, with concepts such as resilience, adaptation and disaster risk 
reduction increasingly gaining traction among humanitarian actors. 
The humanitarian–development divide seems to be eroding at the 
county level, and socio-political processes such as devolution, growing 
political attention and new funding opportunities are bringing about 
both opportunities and challenges for adaptation processes.
Although it is still too early to see how the emerging ‘paradigm 
shift’ in the humanitarian landscape in Isiolo will affect longer-term 
vulnerability to climate change, this study cautions that unless more 
emphasis is placed on addressing socio-political drivers of  differential 
vulnerability in the ‘new’ humanitarian policies and practices, they 
run the risk of  reinforcing processes that reduce the vulnerability of  
some at the expense of  those who might need it the most. This is 
in large part because humanitarian assistance gets ‘woven’ into the 
sociocultural and political fabric of  Isiolo. Rather than challenging 
existing asymmetric power relations and dynamics leading to differential 
vulnerability, they appear to, at best, sustain – or, at worst, exacerbate 
existing marginalisation processes. Access to resources to cope with 
and adapt to climate change are to a large extent dependent on your 
place in a social hierarchy, your authority to influence decision-making 
processes and your links to economically or politically powerful people 
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(your ‘know-who’), which in turn is shaped by your ethnicity, gender, 
age, livelihood and wealth. Thus, despite changes in humanitarian 
policies, this study saw few indications of  changing practices or activities 
addressing root causes of  differential vulnerability, nor promoting any 
systemic, transformative change.
The next section sets out the theory and methodology. This is followed 
by an assessment of  vulnerability drivers in Isiolo and the role of  power 
(Section 3), together with an account of  changes in humanitarian 
approaches in Isiolo and the attention to climate change (Section 4). 
Section 5 reflects on the overlaps and tensions between humanitarian 
changes and vulnerability drivers. The article concludes (Section 6) 
by suggesting that support to adaptation among humanitarian actors 
will require more focus on the governance of  resource access as root 
causes for vulnerability, and that this needs to be carried out alongside 
improved access to climate-related technology and resources.
2 Theory and methods
To address the relationship between humanitarian approaches and 
vulnerability in Isiolo, we need to understand what factors shape 
vulnerability patterns. Vulnerability is here understood as a present 
inability to cope with and respond to climate variability and change, 
caused by multiple interacting contextual conditions and processes 
(O’Brien et al. 2007). This contextual understanding of  vulnerability is 
a processual and multidimensional view of  climate–society interactions 
whereby climate variability and change is seen to occur in the context 
of  political, institutional, economic and social structures and changes 
(O’Brien et al. 2007). As demonstrated also by this case study, vulnerability 
is highly dynamic and uneven across and within groups, and may 
change if, for instance, power relations shift. Strategies people employ 
to respond to stressors and change processes (i.e. coping, adapting) are 
an inherent part of  the vulnerability context, and reflect pre-existing 
structures of  social vulnerability (Eriksen et al. 2014; Forsyth and Evans 
2013). Such responses may entail negotiating with others to ensure 
access to and control over resources in the face of  shocks and change. 
Adaptation to climate change is considered fundamentally a governance 
issue – a process through which individual or collective deliberate actions, 
or inactions, are negotiated and structured (Adger, Lorenzoni and 
O’Brien 2009). Power is an intrinsic aspect of  such negotiations between 
individuals and groups with differing, and at times competing, interests 
and aspirations (Eriksen et al. 2015). Power not only determines the extent 
to which a person or group has access to resources and/or whose voices 
are heard in decision-making processes, it also delineates authority to 
decide which development pathways are deemed desirable (Ensor et al. 
2014; Eriksen et al. 2014; Swyngedouw 1997). ‘Authority’ is here seen as 
the ability to exert one’s agendas over another’s within environmental 
governance and adaptation processes (Eriksen et al. 2015).
Recognising that climate change is fundamentally a development 
issue, any efforts aimed at adaptation should support a move towards 
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more climate-resilient development pathways – meaning development 
trajectories that combine mitigation of  emissions, equitable development 
and reduced vulnerability (O’Brien et al. 2015; Pelling, O’Brien and 
Matyas 2015). ‘Resilience’ is here considered to be the ability of  an 
individual, group or a system ‘to resist, absorb, accommodate to and 
recover from the effects of  a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and restoration of  its essential basic 
structures and functions’ (UNISDR 2009: 24). Resilience is a broad 
concept that spans the disaster risk management continuum, from the 
pre- to the post-disaster phase, and moves beyond merely being the 
opposite of  ‘vulnerability’ by also focusing on factors such as capacities, 
exposure and self-organisation. Reducing vulnerability may contribute 
to strengthening resilience to shocks and stressors – but greater 
transformations are often needed, such as empowering marginalised 
groups to influence decisions that concern their lives and livelihoods.
This study employed a qualitative research approach, and empirical 
data was collected in Isiolo town, Kinna, Garba Tula, Malkadaka, 
Gafarsa and Belgesh between February and March 2015. Additional 
key informant interviews were conducted in Nairobi. Data collection 
included open-ended and semi-structured qualitative interviews, 
participatory observation at meetings and humanitarian interventions, 
and a review of  relevant documents and statistics from Isiolo and 
Nairobi. Eleven focus group discussions, 33 key informant interviews 
and 40 household interviews were conducted, totalling 84 interviews 
with more than 170 informants, of  which 118 were women. The 
wealth, education level, social status, source of  livelihood and ethnicity 
of  informants varied widely.
3 Vulnerability in Isiolo: drivers and the role of power relations
Isiolo County has a population of  143,234 (Republic of  Kenya 
2013a). Pastoralism is the principal livelihood activity, along with 
agro-pastoralism or farming, trade, casual labour, charcoal production 
and formal employment. The county suffers from recurring droughts, 
with recent ones in 2009, 2011, 2014 and 2017, and floods, notably 
in relation to strong El Niño episodes like the ones that took place in 
1997/98 and 2015/16 (Jebet and Muchui 2015). Respondents across 
the sites perceive that temperatures are increasing while precipitation 
is decreasing; droughts are becoming more frequent, and the rainy 
seasons are increasingly unpredictable. Previously, droughts occurred 
after periods of  10–15 years, but now they occur every two to three 
years. These changing climatic conditions affect pastoralists and farmers 
in Isiolo in important ways. Respondents tell of  pasture grounds drying 
up and some species of  grass disappearing altogether. Reduced rainfall 
intensity has also led to drying up of  springs, and reduced water 
availability due to a sinking water table and limited recharge.
These impacts are closely linked to a number of  other factors that 
shape the vulnerability context, such as cultural and religious customs 
and norms, conflict and insecurity, power relations and marginalisation 
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processes. For instance, while female genital mutilation (FGM) and 
under-age marriages are prohibited in Kenya, these practices are still 
widespread in Isiolo and have a number of  harmful implications for 
female health, such as causing complications during pregnancies and 
childbirth. Furthermore, due to religious beliefs, weather forecasts and 
the idea of  preparing for climate change were resisted by many on the 
grounds that it is beyond human control, and commercial loans and 
insurance were, according to informants, considered haram – or illegal 
within Islam. This restricts investments in measures that may limit risks 
or diversify livelihoods.
Power and socio-political relations in Isiolo are closely linked to 
markers of  social differentiation, including ethnic affiliation, gender, 
age, livelihood, education and wealth. As in other parts of  Kenya, 
ethnicity is still among one of  the most significant identity markers in 
Isiolo, and tribalism and clannism are a fundamental aspect of  political 
processes and struggles over access to resources and decision-making 
power (Auma 2015; Sharamo 2014). Isiolo is home to a number of  
ethnic groups, including the Borana, Somali, Turkana, Samburu, 
Sakuye, Gabra, Rendille and Meru, and recurring inter-ethnic clashes 
and cattle-rustling sporadically lead to loss of  lives and livestock, 
displacements and hampers mobility (Jebet 2016; Sharamo 2014).
Current patterns of  power relations have deep historical roots. 
The Borana ethnic group, a branch of  the Cushitic Oromo people 
originating from southern Ethiopia, is the most populous in Isiolo 
today, and is considered to be the most dominant in politics and 
decision-making processes. Traditionally a nomadic, pastoralist people, 
the Borana migrated to northern Kenya during the end of  the 1900s 
in search of  water and pasture. One group started to settle near water 
wells in Wajir, but after recurring conflict between the Borana and 
Somali over access to water and grazing rights, the British colonial 
government in 1932 decided to transfer the area of  Wajir to the Somali 
in exchange for the Ewaso Nyiero area of  Isiolo, which was given to 
the Borana people (Aguilar 1998; Arero 2007). This group of  resettled 
Borana people was from then on referred to as the ‘Waso Borana’, and 
is still by many considered to be the rightful ‘owners’ of  Isiolo. This 
notion of  autochthony, meaning that a people is entitled to a certain 
piece of  land due to their ancestral rights to it (Bøås and Dunn 2013), 
can still be found resonated in the rhetoric of  Borana politicians during 
election campaigns. According to informants in this study, election 
campaigns in Isiolo are characterised by ethnic cleavages, rather than 
opposing political ideologies, and loose alliances between representatives 
from different tribes/clans are commonly formed based on linguistic, 
cultural and religious traits.
Intra-ethnic clan structures are also of  great importance to how 
authority and power is delineated. For instance, within the Borana 
ethnic group, there are ten clans of  varying size. The clans Karayo and 
Warjida are commonly the greatest rivals in Isiolo politics. Karayo is the 
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most populous in Isiolo County, with about 50 per cent of  all Borana 
people in Isiolo, while Warjida is the clan of  the current governor, 
and is therefore according to informants considered to be the ‘clan in 
power’. The clans considered to be the least powerful were according 
to informants the minority clans of  Hawatu, Nunito and Digalu. These 
were explained to be low in both number and political influence.
Wealth is another key marker of  societal differentiation in Isiolo. Major 
wealth indicators include having livestock, educated children and big 
houses. The poor were identified as those without livestock, without 
education, and those who relied on livelihoods such as casual labour, 
charcoal production or petty trade. Wealth is also closely associated with 
the impression of  being ‘successful’ and having the ability to make good 
choices, thus shaping people’s relative authority in decision-making 
processes.
Among the Borana, livestock is also a major determinant of  power 
and authority. As explained by a key informant, ‘those with less than 
30 heads of  livestock are considered to be poor; those with more than 
30 are well off; while those with more than 50 are considered to be 
rich.’ Camels are the most expensive.5 Cattle are worth roughly a tenth 
of  the value of  a camel, while sheep and goats are worth a hundredth. 
Keeping livestock is, however, not only considered to be an investment 
and a source of  food and income, but is closely related to identity and 
pride. The following quote typifies this: ‘Recognition here is when you 
have herds. Nobody recognise you if  you don’t have herds. People don’t 
even know you. You just remain and work in a world of  oblivion.’6
Livestock ownership is increasingly being concentrated into fewer and 
fewer hands of  wealthy pastoralists, and the gap between rich and poor 
is increasing as the rich are able to employ strategies that minimise their 
own and capitalise on other’s losses during droughts (Tari and Pattison 
2014). For example, wealthy pastoralists may send their livestock for 
grazing at ranches in other parts of  Kenya during extended dry seasons 
or droughts, or bribe park rangers to send their livestock for grazing 
inside Meru National Park.
The importance of  livestock for authority and social standing is well 
illustrated through the example of  the marginalisation of  the Watha 
group. The Watha is an endogamous7 group of  former Boran pastoralists 
who allegedly lost their livestock herds at some point in history and 
started hunting wild animals, such as giraffes, elephants or antelopes, 
and gathering honey, fruits, roots and berries for survival. These hunters 
and gatherers coexisted peacefully with the pastoralist Boran people for 
decades. A key informant described the relationship thus:
In times of  major drought, when all livestock of  the Boran was dead, the Boran 
respected the Watha a lot, because the Boran didn’t have skills to hunt. So the 
Watha gave them meat. The ‘relief  food’ of  that time was that of  wild animals 
provided by Watha.8
(Endnotes)
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This changed when it became illegal to hunt wild game in Kenya in 
1977 (Barnett 1998): as a result, the main livelihood of  the Watha 
was effectively criminalised. The Watha then had to find alternative 
livelihoods, and started farming, doing casual labour or producing 
charcoal. ‘That was when they became totally poor and respect was 
lost. Their dignity lost. After the prohibition, there was no relief  coming 
from Watha, so nobody cared about them any more’, our informant 
continued. ‘Although some of  the hunters and gatherers even went back 
and started owning livestock, people don’t consider Watha as people 
with dignity.’ To this day, the Watha are stigmatised in the Borana 
community, and excluded from decision-making processes.
In addition to the Watha group, this study also revealed that women, 
people from minority ethnic groups, people with disabilities, orphans, 
people living with HIV/AIDS and widows felt discriminated against 
and excluded from accessing resources and decision-making processes. 
This also included a group of  people that were displaced from their 
homes during the 2007–08 post-election violence in Kenya, locally 
referred to as the ‘Tenne’ people.
4 The changing humanitarian policy landscape in Isiolo
Humanitarian interventions in Isiolo date back to the period after the 
Shifta War of  1963–68, when the newly independent Kenyan government 
fought secessionists in the Northern Frontier District (NFD), who wanted 
NFD to become integrated into the ‘Greater Somalia’ (Arero 2007; Dahl 
1979; Hogg 1983). The Shifta conflict was brutal and had detrimental 
effects on the livelihoods and economy of  people in northeastern Kenya, 
and a severe drought in 1970–71 left the already destitute population in a 
severe condition. According to Hogg (1983), 95 per cent of  the total camel 
population in Isiolo was lost between 1963 and 1970, from 200,000 heads 
to 6,000, while the small stock population declined by 90 per cent.
Massive relief  operations were then initiated by the Kenyan government 
and various religious and international aid organisations, and at one 
point, as many as 140,000 people were living on famine relief  in 
northern Kenya (nearly half  of  the total population of  the NFD at that 
time) (Dahl 1979; Lewis 1963). Small-scale irrigation schemes were 
also established to provide pastoralists who had lost their livestock with 
alternative sources of  food and income (Hogg 1983).
After the 1970s, the post-independence Kenyan government held back 
investments in infrastructure and service delivery in the former NFD 
region as they argued that public investments should go to areas with 
abundant natural resources where revenues would be higher (Elmi 
and Birch 2013). The collective punishments of  the Cushitic-speaking 
pastoralists of  northern Kenya by the Bantu-dominant government 
during and after the Shifta conflict led to mistrust of  the government 
among the Borana (Hjort 1979). As explained by Arero (2007: 297), 
‘The Borana felt they were being punished for a problem caused by 
the activities of  the Somali, and as a result they began to lose faith in 
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the young Kenyan nation’. Governmental neglect of  infrastructural 
development also led to a high reliance on humanitarian relief, provided 
primarily by non-state actors, during periods of  stress such as drought 
or floods. However, as also pointed out by informants in this study, these 
short-term interventions did not address or change the root causes of  
vulnerability – they just treated the symptoms.
The last decade has, however, seen a significant transformation in the 
governmental approach to development in the ASAL regions of  Kenya. 
In 2012, the Government of  Kenya approved the Sessional Paper No. 8 of  
2012 on National Policy for the Sustainable Development of  Northern Kenya and 
other Arid Lands, also referred to as the ASAL policy (Republic of  Kenya 
2012a). Here the government acknowledges that impoverishment in 
ASAL regions is partly a result of  conscious public policy choices taken 
in Kenya’s past, and declares a commitment to facilitate sustainable 
development, strengthen climate resilience and ensure sustainable 
livelihoods in the ASALs (Republic of  Kenya 2012a). The Kenyan 
‘Vision 2030’ development blueprint launched in 2007 also declared 
Isiolo County as a site for the establishment of  a flagship project, while 
the subsequent ‘Vision 2030 Development Strategy for Northern Kenya 
and other Arid Lands’ aimed to achieve: ‘A secure, just and prosperous 
Northern Kenya and other arid lands, where people achieve their full 
potential and enjoy a high quality of  life’ (Republic of  Kenya 2007, 
2012b). Furthermore, the Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) Strategy 
launched in 2014 places particular emphasis on strengthening climate 
resilience in the ASAL regions (Republic of  Kenya 2013b, 2014). 
According to informants in this study, the renewed focus on development 
of  the ASAL regions is not only attracting private investments, but also 
leading to greater availability of  donor funding and an influx of  both 
humanitarian and developmental (or mixed mandate) non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and United Nations agencies.
Echoing a paradigm shift in the humanitarian sector internationally, 
state and non-state actors interviewed in this study were also 
emphasising sustainability, community participation and capacity 
building as increasingly important. Furthermore, as a result of  the 
growing emphasis among donor agencies on partnerships and holistic 
and cross-sectorial approaches in the humanitarian and development 
sector, both humanitarian and development NGOs in Isiolo are 
increasingly coming together and forming consortiums to access funds. 
This is, according to informants, changing the humanitarian landscape 
in the area, and contributing to eroding the humanitarian/development 
divide. Even humanitarian NGOs in Isiolo are increasingly embracing 
‘resilience’ thinking in their policies and strategies and moving towards 
longer-term integrated programmes.
5 Humanitarian assistance and vulnerability to climate change in Isiolo
In spite of  a growing emphasis on climate change and resilience in 
humanitarian policies in Isiolo County, humanitarian practices seemed in 
this study to remain more or less the same, and little seems to be done in 
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practice to address unequal power relations and marginalisation processes 
that lead to differential vulnerability. Humanitarian efforts implemented 
in response to drought during the time of  this study were still focusing 
on addressing basic needs (e.g. relief  food, water trucking) and providing 
some livelihood support, primarily to pastoralists (including livestock 
off-take and re-stocking, distribution of  hay, vaccinations, medicines 
and concentrates such as saltlicks, molasses and minerals), but also some 
to farmers (provision of  hand pumps for irrigation). Those relying on 
other sources of  income were not given any livelihood support and, as 
identified earlier, these were commonly understood to be among the 
most vulnerable. Rather than support transformational adaptation 
processes, the humanitarian efforts thus served to keep the status quo and 
consolidate existing vulnerability patterns.
The phenomenon of  ‘elite capture’ has been well documented in 
development research previously (e.g. Dasgupta and Beard 2007; 
Platteau 2004) and was, perhaps not surprisingly, also to some 
extent observed in this case study. Respondents argued that wealthy, 
well-educated people with a large social network were able to capitalise 
on their ties with people in power to channel humanitarian resources 
to their own families and ethnic kin. Many local informants argued 
that they felt bypassed and neglected by both development projects 
and humanitarian assistance from government or non-state actors, 
and argued that these interventions were influenced by existing power 
structures such that those who were marginalised in the community 
were effectively restricted from accessing humanitarian assistance (and 
development aid more broadly). As a female, elderly farmer said:
That assistance depends on your ‘know-who’. That help always goes to the rich, and 
the poor remain without help. Those who are in charge of  giving out the assistance 
are only concerned with helping their friends or building their own wealth.9
An elderly male agro-pastoralist10 also said: ‘The assistance that 
comes to this area goes to those people in charge and they only give to 
their relatives. So those who need it never benefit.’ In Kinna, among 
those who complained the most about being neglected included the 
marginalised groups of  Watha, Meru, Kikuyu and Tenne; and minority 
clans such as Digalu and Nunito, women, and non-pastoralists relying 
on charcoal production, petty trade or casual labour.
State and non-state humanitarian actors operating in Isiolo emphasised 
that their activities were needs-driven and based on comprehensive 
vulnerability assessments and community consultations, and an 
increased focus on ‘bottom-up’ approaches and ‘participation’ in both 
project design and implementation was found to be evident in this 
study. This was primarily done through engaging with local formal 
and informal institutions, such as the chiefs, village elders, community 
committees or community-based organisations. These institutions do 
not, however, necessarily represent the views and interests of  everyone in 
the community equally. Many respondents in this study argued that the 
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people who were selected to represent the community in local institutions 
such as the village elders were typically those with economic, social and 
political power and authority, and informants complained that these 
‘representatives’ channel benefits and resources through personal and 
family relations and along clan lines. A male informant provided an 
example of  this; some poor, vulnerable women were supposed to be 
given goats by a humanitarian NGO, and in order to find out whom 
the most vulnerable women in that community were, a local committee 
was consulted and given the task of  submitting a list of  names of  the 
most needy. However, the list included almost exclusively women from 
one particular clan, and was neither representative nor needs-based. 
This, and other examples, seem to indicate that local power relations 
and patterns of  authority thus influence the ‘participatory’ process of  
targeting and lead to some being favoured over others.
Furthermore, some informants argued that they were not reached by 
humanitarian (or development) aid because they were not considered 
to be part of  the community, and therefore were not able to sit on 
committees or even be invited to community meetings (barazas). For 
instance, an informant said:11
Watha people end up being disadvantaged because we are within the community, 
but nobody asks for us. NGOs tell the community to select their own committees 
which they think are appropriate, and unfortunately, we are not part of  the 
people who will be selected.
This exemplifies some of  the challenges with using the notion of  
‘community participation’ uncritically, as widely discussed by Cannon 
and Schipper in the World Disasters Report 2014 (IFRC 2014).
When those who are invited to represent the community are already 
the most wealthy and powerful, the question is to what extent the 
priorities and interests put forth by those who are invited to participate 
in the ‘participatory’, ‘bottom-up’ process actually reflect the needs of  
those who are the most vulnerable? Are their views representative of  a 
heterogeneous population? Findings in this study suggest that they do 
not. Interventions seem to do little to reduce the underlying causes of  
differential vulnerability, also bringing into question the extent to which 
findings from ‘participatory’ vulnerability assessments and consultations 
are acted upon in practice. It might be argued that these are often 
conducted primarily for the sake of  ‘ticking a box’ in donor proposals 
and reports, and do not necessarily guide interventions in practice.
This case study accentuates the difficulties of  adopting a technical 
approach to adaptation. Interventions become part and parcel of  
socio-political structures. By operating within existing socio-political 
structures, and not challenging these, asymmetric power relations, 
marginalisation processes and associated vulnerability patterns may be 
reproduced. For instance, humanitarian assistance that supports only 
certain livelihoods or coping strategies in emergency situations, or that 
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is being channelled through existing local institutions, may inadvertently 
strengthen the relative power of  some over others in a social hierarchy, 
and thereby indirectly contribute to consolidating vulnerability patterns. 
People who already have authority to influence decision-making 
processes, based on their subjectivity and status in the ‘community’, 
are often also those who end up controlling access to resources. 
Humanitarian interventions may serve to either entrench or challenge 
such inequities, and need to take into proper consideration how to 
address power relations and marginalisation processes that contribute to 
differential vulnerability, in order to reach the most disadvantaged and 
support a move towards climate-resilient development pathways.
6 Conclusions
This article has discussed to what extent changes in humanitarian 
approaches in Isiolo County, Kenya, may help reduce vulnerability 
and support transformational adaptation to climate change. Our 
findings suggest that while the landscape of  humanitarian efforts are 
changing, with part of  the motivation being climate change, there 
are key challenges remaining in tackling power asymmetries and 
marginalisation processes.
In particular, we show the importance of  understanding how historical 
trajectories and relationships shape decision-making in contexts with 
weak formal institutions. This study highlights the importance of  paying 
particular attention to the role of  power and politics in the design and 
implementation of  humanitarian interventions, and ensuring that 
‘community’ participation does not exacerbate existing vulnerability 
dynamics but rather gives a voice to the marginalised.
The findings add to the growing number of  studies that question 
assumptions about linear causal relationships between, on the one hand, 
increased focus, funding and knowledge about climate change among 
humanitarian actors, and on the other, outcomes for those who have 
the least capacity to cope with and adapt to climate change. Findings 
suggest in turn that increased resources and funding could feed into, and 
entrench, existing power relations, supporting the very processes that 
create vulnerability in the first place (Lockwood 2013). To avoid this, 
the findings suggest, in line with a growing number of  studies (Adger et 
al. 2009; Brown 2015; Taylor 2015; Eriksen et al. 2015; Tschakert et al. 
2016), that adaptation is fundamentally a governance issue and more 
attention is needed to the socio-political factors and processes that drive 
adaptation decisions and outcomes at sub-national and local levels.
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Social Protection or Humanitarian 
Assistance: Contested Input 
Subsidies and Climate Adaptation 
in Malawi
Ruth Haug1 and Bjørn K.G. Wold2
Abstract The purpose of this article is to assess factors that contributed 
to the apparent success of the Farm Input Support Programme (FISP) in 
the period 2005–15, and discuss the lessons that can be learned from this 
experience in relation to climate change adaptation. Important factors 
were the ability to balance external and internal drivers that affected policy 
formulation, national ownership and prestige that influenced and motivated 
implementation capability, creation of conducive conditions for agricultural 
development and the demand-driven nature of the programme. However, 
the flooding in 2015 and the drought in 2016 revealed that Malawi is in dire 
need of more effective measures that can reduce long-term vulnerability 
and build resilience to future adverse impacts of climate change. Still, 
lessons learned from the social protection programme can prove useful in 
relation to multiple efforts towards achieving sustainable climate change 
adaptation that could reduce the need for future humanitarian assistance.
Keywords: social protection, humanitarian assistance, input subsidies, 
climate adaptation, Malawi.
1 Introduction
Climate change contributes towards increased uncertainties around 
future risks for national food scarcity and a possible worsening of  
food insecurity and hunger in many countries in Africa (IPCC 2014; 
Hallegatte et al. 2016). Risks of  drought and flooding call for an 
increased focus on climate adaptation and effective emergency responses 
that consider longer-term resilience (Thurlow et al. 2014; Challinor et al. 
2016). Vulnerability to disasters such as drought and flooding is closely 
related to poverty (Hallegatte et al. 2016). Malawi is a country with 
extensive experience of  drought and flooding. Serious hunger triggered 
by drought brought Malawi into the international crisis headlines in 
the 1990s and the first half  of  the 2000s. From 2005 to 2015, however, 
Malawi was able to go from being at the receiving end of  extensive 
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humanitarian assistance to becoming self-sufficient in staple foods, 
even exporting maize to Zimbabwe and Kenya (NSO 2005–2015; 
Government of  Malawi 2016), as well as the country’s traditional 
agricultural export commodity, tobacco. But after a decade of  keeping 
serious hunger at bay, flooding in 2015 followed by El Niño and severe 
drought in 2016 brought Malawi back into the disaster headlines with 
almost half  of  the population being in need of  food relief  in 2016 (WFP 
2016). From the mid-1990s, the Malawian government adjusted its 
agricultural policy to fight food insecurity and hunger, and invested in 
social protection through different input subsidy programmes such as the 
Farm Input Support Programme (FISP), which started in 2005 (HLPE 
2012; Government of  Malawi 2016). The main goal of  social protection 
in the form of  farm input subsidies has been to produce enough food in 
the country to avoid hunger. The political changes and the subsidised 
inputs have, according to several sources (Carr 2014; Arndt, Pauw 
and Thurlow 2014; Pauw, Beck and Mussa 2014; Government of  
Malawi 2016), contributed towards preventing hunger and the need 
for humanitarian assistance in the decade 2005–15. According to the 
Government of  Malawi (2016), the FISP was able to advance food 
security by improving agricultural productivity, but failed to develop 
the necessary resilience in relation to the 2015 flooding and the 2016 
El Niño and drought. The purpose of  this article is to assess factors that 
contributed to the apparent success of  the social protection programme 
FISP, and to discuss the lessons that can be learned from this experience 
in relation to climate change adaptation.
2 Approach and analytic framework
This article is based on analysis of  data collected by the National 
Statistical Office of  Malawi (NSO) and the Ministry of  Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Water Development (MOAIWD) in the period 1997–
2014, and a review of  the literature including policy documents and 
newspaper articles, as well as a limited number of  key informant 
interviews with university and ministry employees. Each year, the 
statistical unit in the MOAIWD produces and distributes detailed crop 
estimates to stakeholders in the country, based on data collected by the 
extension officers. The figures on area cultivated and total production 
at national, district and local levels by crop are available on demand. 
Most of  the graphs presented in this article are based on these figures. 
Unfortunately, the MOAIWD and NSO apply slightly different survey 
approaches resulting in different estimates. The NSO is dependent on 
donor funds for many of  the national surveys. For donors operating 
in many countries, the main interest may often be consistency across 
countries rather than over time within Malawi. As described in detail 
by Beck, Pauw and Mussa (2015), this may give inconsistent time series, 
especially for data constructs such as poverty estimates, when based on 
various survey types. It is therefore essential to follow trend estimates 
within each of  the two major survey approaches rather than combining 
them. In cases where statistical data that has not been published are 
used, reference is given to the main publication from the survey that 
included these data.
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To analyse factors that contributed to the apparent success of  the social 
protection programme FISP in improving food security in the period 
2005–15, we assess the political landscape that shaped the formulation 
of  the FISP policy including national and international drivers. Secondly, 
we look at implementation capability in accordance with Booth et al. 
(2006) who underline that the degree to which policies are implemented 
depends on governance, power relations, institutional capability, voters’ 
support, monetary resources and priorities. Thirdly, we analyse the 
appropriateness of  the technology in relation to political frame conditions 
and impact. Regarding impact, we lean on Birner et al. (2006) who imply 
that social and technological innovations should result in impacts such 
as productivity increase, improved food and nutrition security, reduced 
poverty, better gender and social equity, more employment opportunities 
and increased resilience at all levels. To analyse trends in the food 
and nutrition security situation, we rely on the Global Hunger Index 
(IFPRI-GHI 2015). Lastly, to analyse what lessons could be learned from 
the social protection (FISP) experience in relation to climate change 
adaptation, we apply Eriksen and Marin’s (2015) key principles for 
sustainable climate change adaptation:
 l Describe vulnerability contextually, including multiple stressors;
 l Acknowledge differing values and interests that affect adaptation 
outcomes;
 l Suggest how local knowledge can be incorporated into adaptation 
responses;
 l Consider potential feedback between local and global processes;
 l Empower vulnerable groups in influencing development pathways 
and their climate change outcomes.
3 Social protection the ‘Malawian way’
Around 85 per cent of  the Malawian population (approximately 
17 million people) live in rural areas (WB 2016). Agriculture accounts 
for 30–40 per cent of  gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 per cent 
of  foreign export earnings (EAD/UNDP 2016). Malawi is a country 
that is used to experiencing recurrent disastrous famines triggered by 
drought and flooding. Between 1967 and 2014, Malawi suffered seven 
serious droughts and 19 floods that adversely affected smallholders’ 
production and food security (Government of  Malawi 2015). In 2015, 
Malawi received the highest rainfall on record for the country, causing 
severe flooding, particularly in the Southern Region (ibid.). In 2016, 
El Niño-induced drought contributed towards another state of  disaster 
(WFP 2016). Over the last decades, different Malawian governments 
have put in place various policies and strategies to secure food in the 
country. In the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 2012–2016 
(MGDS II), the government emphasised the strengthening of  disaster 
risk management coordination, development of  an integrated national 
early warning system and implementation of  mitigation measures in 
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disaster-prone areas (EAD/UNDP 2016). Several other national policies 
and strategies such as the Disaster Preparedness and Relief  Act 1991 
(DPR), the National Disaster Risk Management Policy (NDRM), and 
the National Climate Change Policy have shaped policies and actions 
in preparation for the possible disasters that climate change may bring. 
In 2015, Malawi was granted support from the Green Climate Fund 
for the project ‘Scaling up the Use of  Modernized Climate Information 
and Early Warning Systems in Malawi’ (Green Climate Fund 2015). In 
2016, the Government of  Malawi presented a new National Resilience 
Plan aimed at addressing the causes of  climate change and minimising 
the negative effects on food security (Government of  Malawi 2016).
Social protection in the form of  input subsidies has been used by 
different Malawian governments both in relation to recovery schemes 
such as starter packages after drought, as well as in relation to long-term 
development efforts to increase productivity and improve food security 
(Sjaastad et al. 2007). Regarding the serious droughts in 1991/92 
and 1994/95, humanitarian interventions by donors included food 
relief, but did not originally allow input subsidies. However, due to the 
low production of  maize, the World Bank accepted that a free input 
programme should be established in 1995, and production increased as 
a subsequence (ibid.). After a year, the government abandoned the input 
subsidies under pressure from donors (Harrigan 2003). In the following 
years, fertiliser use dropped drastically and so did production, resulting 
in increased food insecurity and hunger. This situation led the Malawian 
government to establish its own subsidy programme in 1998, the Starter 
Pack Programme that lasted until 2000 (Harrigan 2003).
Then another devastating famine took place in the 2001/02 season, 
and donors were again willing to support input subsidy programmes 
(Sjaastad et al. 2007). Donors agreed to fund a larger fertiliser scheme, 
the Extended Targeted Input Programme for a limited period. In 2004, 
Dr Bingu wa Mutharika was elected as president, and with him came new 
policy reforms reversing the privatisation that had taken place during the 
structural adjustment period (ibid.). The Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Cooperation (ADMARC) was re-nationalised (but still allowing 
competition from private traders) and a new input subsidy programme, 
the FISP, was introduced. In his election campaign, presidential candidate 
Bingu wa Mutharika promised to extend the input subsidy programme if  
elected, and he kept his promise when he came into office.
Although donors have played an important role in discussions around 
input subsidies in Malawi, the FISP has, to a large degree, been funded 
by the Malawian government and not by direct donor support; for 
example, in 2005/06 no direct donor support to the programme was 
reported (Dorward and Chirwa 2014). In the following years, direct 
donor support varied from 5 per cent of  total costs at the lowest level 
in 2013/14, to 32 per cent at the highest level in 2011/12 (Dorward 
and Chirwa 2014). The FISP has been a costly programme for the 
Malawian government and the lion’s share of  public spending on 
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agriculture has gone into funding it. In 2014, agriculture accounted 
for around 20 per cent of  government spending and the FISP received 
around 70 per cent of  this amount (Government of  Malawi 2016).
The design of  the FISP has varied over the last ten years, but three 
important features have remained more or less static. Firstly, the programme 
involves both private and public input distributors, which means that the 
ADMARC operates in low-profit remote areas. Secondly, there is a targeting 
element, as the subsidised input should preferably reach the poorest half  of  
the farming population, ensuring distribution to about half  of  the farmer 
households in the country. Thirdly, the subsidies cover a large share of  the 
input costs, around 90 per cent of  the price. A crucial element was to make 
the subsidy programme 90–100 per cent free to allow even risk-averse and 
cash-constrained farmers to use the coupons themselves rather than selling 
them cheaply to better-off farmers, district officers or traders.
4 Contested subsidies
As described previously, social protection the ‘Malawian way’ involves 
targeted subsidisation of  chemical fertiliser and improved seed. This 
policy has been heavily contested for various reasons. Donors and 
experts have challenged the input subsidies from a market liberalist 
point of  view, claiming that input subsidies are not economically 
viable and that they distort the market (Minot and Benson 2009; 
Jayne and Rashid 2013; WB 2015). Similarly, reversing the structural 
adjustment’s privatisation of  the ADMARC has been contested. The 
Source Government of Malawi (2016).
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input subsidy programme is further contested from an environmental 
sustainability point of  view in relation to possible soil degradation and 
loss of  long-term soil productivity (De Schutter 2014; Grist 2015). The 
programme is also contested when it comes to crowding out necessary 
measures in relation to longer-term sustainable development, resilience-
building and adaptation to climate change (Dorward and Chirwa 2014; 
Chinsinga and Chasukwa 2016; Government of  Malawi 2016).
On the other hand, subsidising farm inputs has been successful in 
increasing agricultural productivity and improving household food 
security in the country, and thereby reducing the need for humanitarian 
assistance (Sjaastad et al. 2007; Carr 2014; Arndt et al. 2014; Pauw et 
al. 2014; Government of  Malawi 2016). Figure 1 shows surplus maize 
production in relation to national requirement after the FISP was 
introduced in the period 2005–15. Figure 2 illustrates a decline in the 
number of  people in need of  food relief  followed by a sharp increase 
after the 2015 flooding and the 2016 drought.
Whilst the Government of  Malawi (2016) portrays the FISP as a success, 
in the sense that it broke the cycle of  food insecurity, the programme 
failed to build the necessary resilience to withstand serious flooding and 
drought. The causal relationship between the FISP, productivity increase 
and improved food security could be questioned as other factors could have 
played a role, such as favourable rainfall. However, several studies of  the 
FISP provide convincing evidence of  a positive impact on improved food 
security (Carr 2014). Pauw and Thurlow (2014) go as far as stating that 
there has been a dramatic decline in food insecurity in Malawi due to the FISP. 
Arndt et al. (2014) estimate that each dollar spent on the FISP generates 
$1.62 in national welfare improvements. Arndt et al. (2014) argue that in 
order to understand the impact of  the FISP, indirect benefits should also be 
included; otherwise, two fifths of  the FISP benefits are not captured.
Source Government of Malawi (2016).
Figure 2 Trends in people in need of food assistance
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5 Factors that made the FISP work
When it comes to addressing the multiple stressors faced by Malawi, 
opinion differs as to what degree the reform of  the ADMARC and 
subsidised inputs are the way forward. Statistical data show considerable 
production and productivity increase in the FISP period 2005–15. 
Compared with maize yield levels in neighbouring countries under 
similar production conditions, Malawi is doing better (WB 2016). 
Without the input subsidy, improved seed and fertiliser would have been 
out of  reach for most Malawian smallholders (Carr 2014). The increase 
in maize production has more or less happened without an increase in 
the area under maize cultivation (MOAIWD 1997–2015).
Figure 3 shows that total maize production almost trebled in the period 
1997–2014. Figure 4 illustrates how maize yields per hectare (ha) have 
more than doubled in the same period. The yield level for local maize 
averaged less than one Mt per ha while the yield level for hybrid maize 
reached around three Mt per ha over the last five years. Hybrid maize 
is rarely cultivated without fertiliser application, whilst local maize is 
grown both with and without fertiliser. Hence, the production curve for 
hybrid maize also indicates results for fertiliser use.
Increased production has definitely improved the food availability situation 
in Malawi, as shown in Figure 1. However, food security entails access 
to food and not only availability. In order to assess changes in the food 
security situation, we have looked at how Malawi has scored on the Global 
Hunger Index (GHI). GHI scores combine multiple indicators such as 
Source MOAIWD (1997–2015).
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child nutrition and child mortality into one index number, which falls 
within the range 0–100, where a high score indicates severe food insecurity 
(IFPRI-GHI 2015). Malawi’s score has improved considerably from 58.9 in 
1990 to 27.3 in 2015, which is slightly better than Tanzania and much 
better than Zambia (ibid.). Malawi has been able to reduce child mortality 
from 1 in 4 in 1990 to 1 in 13 in 2013, and has improved in all of  the child 
nutrition indicators monitored through the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) process (WHO 2015). In Malawi, food security is about who 
produces the food, as improved food availability at national level will not 
be sufficient to secure poor smallholders’ access to the available food.
5.1 Balancing different interests and drivers
Formulating a policy that both reversed privatisation decisions made 
during structural adjustment, and establishing a substantial social 
protection programme in the form of  input subsidy, was a balancing 
act juggling different national and international interests. Bingu wa 
Mutharika, Malawian president from 2004 to his death in 2012, regarded 
input subsidies as an effective alternative to food relief. He was able to 
manoeuvre in a political landscape influenced by external factors such 
as donors’ unwillingness to support his policy, scepticism towards state-
controlled institutions and subsidies, scepticism towards chemical fertiliser 
and hybrid seed, demanding public–private partnerships and uncertain 
international market conditions, such as food and fertiliser prices.
On the other hand, President Bingu wa Mutharika faced internal drivers 
such as a strong demand from the voters (predominantly smallholder 
Source MOAIWD (1997–2015).
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farmers) for free or heavily subsidised improved seed and fertiliser. In 
this sense, input subsidies are heavily politicised; on the other hand, it 
could be argued that this is how democracy works: voters use the power 
of  their vote to make demands on the government. In this way, farmers 
could be said to empower the government to go against the advice of  
experts and the views of  many donors to go ahead and/or continue with 
input subsidy programmes. Bingu wa Mutharika seemed to realise that 
going against subsidies would mean losing the election, but at the same 
time, his state budget depended heavily on funding support from donors.
The two presidents succeeding Bingu wa Mutharika, his vice-president 
Joyce Banda and his brother Peter Mutharika, continued with the 
FISP. However, different governments have been open about the need 
to improve the FISP. At a FISP symposium in July 2014, Malawi’s 
Minister of  Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development, Allan 
Chiyembekeza, called for a discussion on how the programme could 
work better, whilst maintaining that:
Official government estimates show that average maize yields have 
more than doubled since the introduction of  FISP contributing to 
rapid agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of  around 
10 per cent per annum between 2005 to 2011 (StarAfrica 2014).
5.2 National ownership and prestige
The input subsidies and re-nationalisation of  the ADMARC have 
been strongly owned by the Malawian presidents. President Bingu 
wa Mutharika defended the input subsidy programme in many fora, 
such as during a speech at Boston University in which he pointed out 
that ‘although Western countries say African governments should 
not subsidise agriculture, Western governments subsidize their own 
farmers’ (BU Today 2010). President Mutharika’s brother and current 
president Peter Mutharika has continued Bingu wa Mutharika’s position 
regarding Malawi’s right to decide its own policy, including input 
subsidies. At the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 
December 2015, Peter Mutharika stressed that:
[The] China Africa partnership needs to walk the path of  localization 
of  international goals and indigenization of  policies. One of  the 
saddest tragedies in most Africans is that we lost faith in ourselves, and 
stopped believing in ourselves, that we own the capacity to change our 
situation – Africa needs partnership that inspire[s] this inner capacity 
and dignify [sic.] our longing for self-dependence (Nyasa Times 2015).
Since 2007, China has played an important role in Malawi, providing 
both grants and loans to projects in areas such as education, energy, 
agriculture, water supply, tourism, trade and infrastructure (Banik 
and Chasukwa 2016). The collaboration with China has opened an 
alternative funding opportunity that has made Malawi somewhat less 
dependent upon its traditional donors. President Bingu wa Mutharika 
came into serious dispute with donors that led to the British High 
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Commissioner being expelled from Malawi in 2011 because he 
supposedly accused Mutharika of  being ‘increasingly arrogant and 
autocratic’, which contributed towards freezing and cuts in aid from the 
UK and USA (Somerville 2012). Reduction in support from traditional 
donors hit Malawi hard as foreign assistance accounts for approximately 
40 per cent of  its development budget (Somerville 2012).
5.3 Implementation capability
What is particularly interesting with the FISP is the capability not only 
to formulate a policy, but also to be able to implement it in spite of  
significant institutional, logistical and funding challenges. President 
Bingu wa Mutharika was well aware that in order to ensure support for 
himself  and his party, it was not enough to present a policy for improved 
food security; he had to demonstrate that he was also able to deliver 
on affordable fertiliser and improved seed to be re-elected. What we 
have seen in Malawi is not only that the government has gone against 
the advice of  many experts and donors when changing the policy and 
establishing the input subsidy programme, but also that the government 
had the capability to implement and follow through with the programme.
As described previously, the contestation around whether or not to have 
an input subsidy programme as well as how to design it, might have given 
the government additional motivation to ensure that implementation 
took place. Problems such as timely delivery, distribution throughout 
the country, uncertainties as to how the programme would work each 
year (for example, in relation to the number of  targeted farmers and the 
level of  subsidy) were more or less dealt with. The tight budget situation 
in Malawi and the willingness (or lack of  willingness) among donors to 
co-finance, influences each year’s design of  the programme. From the 
central level, coupons are passed down to the districts and then to local 
chiefs who distribute coupons according to poverty criteria. Farmers who 
were not happy with how local chiefs distributed the coupons took action 
and established new villages in the same area. Their ‘own’ chief  could 
then garner the responsibility for the distribution of  coupons. However, 
the government closed this practice in 2008.
When the government cuts back on input coupons, chiefs are often 
blamed for the reduction. Such reductions make it difficult for the chiefs 
to distribute the coupons in a fair and predictable way. The extension 
system plays an important role in relation to advising on fertiliser use 
and what kind of  seed to use (open-pollinated or hybrid). The media’s 
focus on the performance of  the subsidy programme has probably 
also revealed shortcomings, and contributed to the implementation. In 
addition, Malawi has a relatively strong farmers’ union in the NASFAM, 
which voices farmers’ views.
5.4 Political frame conditions and impact
In relation to the implementation of  the FISP, the frame conditions 
were conducive to making it worthwhile for both smallholders and 
estates to invest capital and labour in efforts towards increasing their 
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production. Smallholders are usually short on both capital and labour, 
a factor that should be recognised in efforts to make changes in farming 
practices and technology (Kirrane, Sharkey and Naess 2012). The 
input and output market worked well in most parts of  the country. 
Where private traders were not willing to go because of  low profits, the 
ADMARC stepped in. Farmers experienced that maize cultivation was 
profitable and a good way of  earning some cash in addition to securing 
food for the household. Regarding impact, according to Birner et al. 
(2006) social and technological innovations should result in impacts 
beyond production and food security, including reduced poverty, 
better gender and social equality, more employment opportunities and 
increased resilience at all levels.
Since poverty reduction and gender equality are used as arguments 
for supporting the FISP, to what degree subsidies have reached these 
groups is an important factor in assessing the programme as a social 
protection measure. Figure 5 shows that between 35 and 60 per cent 
of  the population have benefited from receiving subsidised fertiliser in 
the period 2001–11, and coupons have been distributed to all poverty 
groups. Whilst it may be assumed that the poor and less vocal groups 
lost out in the local distribution of  vouchers, it appears that even the two 
lowest quintiles are well represented among the receivers throughout 
this period. Figure 5 illustrates that in 2004, around 45 per cent of  the 
Source WMS 2001–2004 (NSO 2002–05); IHS2 (NSO 2005); WMS 2006–2009 (NSO 2007–10); WMS 2011 (NSO 2012b).
Figure 5 Share of farmers receiving fertiliser coupons by poverty quintile
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two poorest poverty quintiles received fertiliser coupons, while less than 
30 per cent of  the highest quintile did.
In 2011, the situation had improved for all groups; the two poorest 
quintiles received 50 and 58 per cent each. Data from 2013/14 show 
that 47 per cent of  farmers in the poorest quintile and 52 per cent in 
the second poorest quintile received coupons, while 30 per cent of  the 
wealthiest group received coupons (WMS 2014 (NSO 2015)). With 
regard to gender equality, around the same proportion of  male and 
female recipients are reported for 2013/14 (ibid.). To what degree this 
distribution of  coupons is satisfactory from a poverty point of  view is 
Source Estimates for 1997/98, 2004/05 and 2010/11 from IHS1, IHS2 and IHS3 (NSO 2000, 
2005, 2012b); for 2004–09 from WMS (NSO 2005–10) and for Pauw 2010/11 from 
Pauw et al. (2014).
Figures 6a and 6b Poverty head count by IHS1, IHS2 and IHS3 and WMS 2004–2009 
both compared with Pauw et al. (2014)
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arguable, as a larger proportion of  poor smallholders could have been 
reached.
To what degree the FISP has contributed to poverty reduction in 
Malawi is also arguable. Different poverty analyses in Malawi apply 
different approaches and do not necessarily provide the same results. 
In order to assess the poverty trends under the FISP, we have looked 
at available data and results from the Integrated Household Surveys 
(IHS) (NSO 2005, 2012a) and the Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) 
2001–2004 (NSO 2002–05), WMS 2006–2009 (NSO 2007–10),  
WMS 2011 (NSO 2012b). The IHSs show hardly any change in 
the average poverty level from 1997–98 to 2004–05 and 2010–11. 
However, these data have been re-analysed by Pauw et al. (2014), who 
found a larger decrease in poverty, as illustrated in Figure 6a. Their 
analysis is more consistent with the WMS model based on WMS 
estimates as illustrated in Figure 6b. The poverty headcount data in 
Figures 6a and 6b indicates that poverty levels are highest in the rural 
southern part of  the country and lowest in urban areas. Although 
the data show a downward trend in poverty, a poverty level of  on 
average 40–50 per cent is still very high. What we do not know is the 
contra-factual situation; what would the poverty situation be without 
the FISP? According to Chinsinga and O’Brien (2008), the FISP is as 
important to Malawians as the National Health Service is to Britain.
6 Sustainable climate change adaptation
In the previous section, we have assessed the factors that have contributed 
to the apparent success of  the social protection programme FISP 
in improving food security and reducing the need for shorter-term 
humanitarian assistance in the period 2005–15. However, as the flooding 
in 2015 and the El Niño/drought in 2016 showed, Malawi is in dire need 
of  additional measures that can reduce long-term vulnerability and build 
resilience towards climate change. What lessons, if  any, can be learned 
from the FISP experience in relation to climate change adaptation? 
Eriksen and Marin’s (2015) key principles for assessing sustainable climate 
change adaptation provide a frame for addressing this question.
The first principle is to describe vulnerability contextually, including multiple 
stressors. The predicted negative impact of  future climate change on 
economic growth and social development in Malawi is like a black cloud 
hanging over the country (Thurlow et al. 2014; Challinor et al. 2016). Already, 
Malawi is unable to cope with the serious droughts and flooding that are 
affecting it. According to the IPCC (2014), maize-based food systems such 
as in Malawi might experience yield losses from 18–22 per cent by 2050. 
In addition, poverty, corruption, donor dependency, small landholdings, 
and reliance on agriculture, particularly maize for food, and tobacco for 
export, contribute towards a situation of  serious vulnerability.
The second principle is to acknowledge differing values and interests that affect 
adaptation outcomes. The FISP provides a valuable lesson regarding how 
to balance different interests and drivers when formulating a policy 
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contested by diverse actors for various reasons. Trusting one’s own 
judgement rather than listening to external experts and donor advice, as 
well as listening to the demands of  the people appear to be lessons for 
future Malawian governments.
The third principle is to suggest how local knowledge can be incorporated 
into adaptation responses. The lesson here is that since the FISP was only 
successful with regard to production and food security, and apparently 
unable to reduce longer-term vulnerability and build resilience, the 
inclusion of  local knowledge might have helped in this situation. 
However, it is questionable as to what degree local knowledge could 
be the solution to the huge challenge of  climate change adaptation. 
Perhaps local knowledge could be interpreted as recognition that some 
form of  social protection is needed in Malawi.
The fourth principle is to consider potential feedback between local and global 
processes. A lesson from the FISP experience in this regard is that the 
national ownership and prestige that went into making the FISP a 
success contributed towards its implementation capability.
The fifth principle is to empower vulnerable groups in influencing 
development pathways and their climate change outcomes. A lesson here is 
that the Malawian government appeared somewhat vulnerable in 
its negotiations with donors regarding the FISP as a development 
strategy. To a certain extent, voters empowered the government by 
voicing a strong demand for subsidised inputs. Overall, when assessing 
what lessons could be learned from the FISP experience in relation 
to sustainable climate change adaptation, it is important to recognise 
situation specificity. We should thus be cautious when trying to draw 
general conclusions as regards applicability for future situations.
7 Conclusion
The policy reforms and the input subsidy programme FISP are heavily 
contested and far from perfect, but still, have been able to contribute 
towards positive results as regards agricultural productivity, food security 
and possibly poverty reduction. It is difficult to envisage how Malawi 
would cope without a social protection programme of  some sort. 
Without social protection and considering the effect of  future climate 
change, there would probably be substantial increases in human suffering 
and the need for demanding international humanitarian interventions.
There are many lessons to be learned from the FISP, not least related to 
the government’s ability to implement the programme and the role that 
national ownership and the demand from voters played in this regard. 
However, the flooding in 2015 and the drought in 2016 revealed that 
Malawi is in dire need of  more effective measures than the FISP that 
can reduce long-term vulnerability and build resilience to the future 
adverse impacts of  climate change.
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Rethinking Food Aid in a 
Chronically Food-Insecure Region: 
Effects of Food Aid on Local 
Power Relations and Vulnerability 
Patterns in Northwestern Nepal 
Sigrid Nagoda1
Abstract The impacts of repeated food aid programmes on households’ 
livelihood strategies and capacity to adapt to stressors such as climate 
change were investigated in the chronically food-insecure district of Humla 
in Nepal, using food security as an entry point for analysing vulnerability. 
The study questions food aid as a tool to reduce vulnerability, and argues 
that it may indirectly impede the enhancement of food security by 
reinforcing inequalities and local power structures that drive household 
vulnerability. The article concludes that a refocus addressing the social 
dynamics that shape local vulnerability patterns is needed before food aid 
can contribute to enhancing households’ long-term adaptive capacity.
Keywords: vulnerability, climate change, humanitarian aid, food security, 
power relations, Nepal.
1 Introduction 
In many areas, climate variability and change are increasing the stress 
on already pressed farming systems (CCAFS 2012; IPCC 2014), 
leading to an increased focus on food security programmes and 
disaster risk reduction measures as ways of  reducing vulnerability 
(IPCC 2014; IFRC 2014). Food aid is one of  the main tools used 
by the humanitarian  community to address food insecurity and to 
alleviate acute food shortages. In 2011, the United Nations World Food 
Programme (WFP) delivered 3.6 million metric tonnes (Mt) of  food to 
99.1 million people in 75 countries (WFP 2012a). However, food aid 
is not without controversy. While some consider it a key tool for saving 
people from hunger (WFP 2012b), others have raised concerns that 
food aid may undermine livelihood strategies of  already marginalised 
households and cause aid dependency among recipients when provided 
repeatedly over a long period of  time (Barrett and Maxwell 2005; 
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Lentz, Barrett and Hoddinott 2005). Such criticisms of  food aid have 
contributed to increased attention on the need for humanitarian 
assistance to be redesigned to address vulnerability to multiple stressors, 
including climate change, more effectively (IPCC 2014; Eriksen et al. 2015b). 
The climate change literature increasingly describes vulnerability as 
being driven by multiple social and environmental processes including 
economic and political change, marginalisation, and inequality, 
rather than by climate change alone (Adger 2006; IPCC 2014). In 
particular, power through social relations has been identified as a key 
factor affecting and creating vulnerability, since it influences people’s 
entitlement to resources, access to formal and informal networks 
of  support, as well as their extent of  decision-making (McLaughlin 
and Dietz 2008; Ribot 2010). An important dynamic identified 
by Nagoda and Eriksen (2015) is that in times of  food crisis, local 
vulnerability patterns may be reinforced through a deepening of  the 
inequality and dependency between those with access to resources and 
decision-making opportunities, and those who are excluded from these.
It is within such a complex vulnerability context that governments and 
humanitarian organisations face the difficult task of  responding quickly to 
people suffering from acute food shortage, while at the same time reducing 
their longer-term vulnerability. Addressing this challenge requires an 
enhanced understanding of  how aid may affect the different drivers of  
vulnerability (Eriksen, Nightingale and Eakin 2015a; Tschakert et al. 2016). 
Building on the recognition that power relations and marginalisation 
processes are key factors that shape differential vulnerability patterns 
(Ribot 2010; Pelling 2011; Taylor 2014), this article offers an empirical 
contribution to the nascent field of  politics of  adaptation by investigating 
social vulnerability patterns and food aid interventions in two villages in 
the district of  Humla in northwestern Nepal. 
Food aid interventions in Nepal provide a particularly interesting case 
for studying how aid interventions affect differential vulnerability 
patterns at the local level. Nepal is among the poorest countries in 
the world (WFP 2012b) and social exclusion based on caste, gender 
and ethnicity is considered a key factor affecting people’s vulnerability 
and the poverty situation (Bista [1991] 1994; Cameron 2007). Several 
regions of  the country are chronically food-insecure (Adhikari 2008) 
and highly vulnerable to climate change (Xu et al. 2007), leading 
humanitarian agencies to scale up their interventions in an effort to 
enhance food security and people’s adaptive capacity (WFP 2009). 
The study undertakes a twofold analysis. First, it investigates the impacts 
of  repeated food relief  distribution in enhancing or substituting local 
livelihood strategies, including the extent to which it creates food aid 
dependency at the household level. Second, it considers how food 
aid influences power and interdependency relations within villages, 
and the impacts of  such interactions on household vulnerability. With 
growing attention and resources directed to promoting climate change 
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adaptation worldwide (Agrawal and Perrin 2009; IPCC 2014), this 
study contributes to the debate about how humanitarian interventions 
can better address the related problems of  chronic food insecurity and 
vulnerability to climate change in poor rural households. 
2 Theoretical framework: humanitarian interventions and social 
vulnerability
The danger of  creating aid dependency is frequently raised as a 
criticism of  humanitarian aid (Lentz et al. 2005; Barrett and Maxwell 
2005; Little 2008). Most definitions of  food aid dependency converge 
with Little’s claim that it is ‘a condition where farmers modify their 
social and economic behaviour in anticipation of  food aid’ (2008: 861). 
The assumption is that by abandoning their livelihood activities in 
expectation of  food aid, households may become more vulnerable to 
climate variability and change. 
However, a definition of  dependency that focuses only on the direct 
consequences of  the anticipation of  aid may be too narrow to explain 
how aid interventions affect vulnerability. The indirect influence of  aid 
on pre-existing sociocultural and power relations among households 
may be at least as important in determining long-term household 
vulnerability (Mosse 2005; Barnett 2008). For example, Duffield et al. 
(2000), and Harvey and Lind (2005) found that food aid may impact 
on local social relations and pre-existing interdependencies between 
individuals and households, as well as between populations, groups and 
communities. On the one hand, such interdependencies may have a 
positive impact on people’s vulnerability in terms of  generating social 
capital when households have a mutual interest in helping each other 
through a crisis. On the other hand, the impact may be negative if  
the intervention leads to increased inequality and a risk of  becoming 
trapped in an exploitative relationship (Harvey and Lind 2005). 
In Humla, interdependencies are formed by formal and informal 
sociopolitical structures and networks along the lines of  caste, class, 
gender, ethnicity, kinship and other social groups that are important in 
shaping local vulnerability patterns (Nagoda and Eriksen 2015). 
The main question this study addresses is: ‘How does food aid 
impact on people’s vulnerability in the context of  climate stressors 
and socioeconomic changes?’ First, to analyse the effect of  food 
aid on livelihood strategies, we examine the importance placed by 
the interviewees of  this study on food aid as a coping strategy in 
times of  crisis and how it influences various livelihood options such 
as agriculture, trade, and daily labour. This analysis builds on the 
assumption that if  food aid leads to more robust livelihood strategies, 
for example by contributing to more diversified livelihood options, it 
may have a positive and lasting influence on households’ vulnerability 
to stress. Second, the analysis examines how local power relations are 
affected by food aid and how changes in local interdependencies affect 
differential vulnerability patterns at the household level. 
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The article builds on the Food and Agriculture Organization of  the 
United Nations (FAO) definition of  food security as ‘a situation that 
exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic 
access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO 2002: 
Glossary). Since people’s perception of  their food security situation is 
subjective, the information collected in the interviews is not interpreted 
as an absolute measure of  food security, but rather as an entry point 
for analysing causes and processes driving vulnerability. Several 
researchers such as Eakin, Lemos and Nelson (2014) and Lemos et al. 
(2016) show that reducing vulnerability ‘requires a combination of  
interventions that address not only climate-related risks (specific capacity) 
but also the structural deficits (e.g. lack of  income, education, health, 
political power) (generic capacity) that shape vulnerability’ (Lemos et al. 
2016: 170). Hence, and in line with a contextual interpretation of  
vulnerability (O’Brien et al. 2007; IPCC 2014), the study analyses not 
only the challenges and possibilities that people experience in securing 
food, but also other factors they consider important for their wellbeing 
and adaptive capacity, such as health, education, dignity, and freedom 
from oppression. 
Since vulnerability is dynamic and ever-changing (Eriksen, Brown and 
Kelly 2005; Twyman et al. 2011), this article analyses the effects of  food 
aid as part of  a contextual vulnerability dynamic where environmental, 
sociocultural, economic and political factors interact, and where food 
aid is one of  various factors leading to changes. In the investigation, a 
failure to provide nutritious food of  sufficient quality is thus seen as an 
outcome of  the processes and structures driving the inherent state of  
vulnerability. Hence, the study does not attempt to isolate the impacts 
of  food aid on vulnerability, nor does it pursue a quantitative line of  
argument based on the volumes of  food aid that have been provided. 
Rather, it seeks to understand how, by being part of  the social dynamic 
of  a village, food aid interventions may strengthen, or weaken, the social 
power relations that shape differential vulnerability patterns. 
3 Methods and case study
3.1 The study sites 
The district of  Humla in far northwestern Nepal is particularly 
appropriate for studying the impacts of  repeated food aid on local 
vulnerability to stressors, including climate change. The district is one 
of  the poorest in Nepal (UNFCO 2013), with around 80 per cent of  
the 50,000 inhabitants being classified as food-insecure (DFSN 2010). 
Humla is also vulnerable to climate change, including changes in 
precipitation patterns (NPC 2010; Ministry of  Environment 2010), 
which contributes to further deterioration of  the region’s food security 
situation (WFP 2012b). In response to the chronic food insecurity 
situation, the district has received food aid for more than three decades, 
leading some authors to question the impact of  food aid on people’s 
longer-term adaptive capacities and coping strategies (Bauck et al. 2007; 
Adhikari 2008).
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Humla is a mountainous district with altitudes varying from 1,524 to 
7,337 metres above sea level (masl) (Roy 2010) and is characterised by its 
remoteness, limited infrastructure, and weak and sporadic presence of  
government institutions, in particular beyond the district headquarters 
at Simkot (Roy 2010; Nagoda and Eriksen 2015). 
The main livelihood strategies in the district are subsistence agriculture 
and trade in non-timber forest products (NTFPs), Furu,2 and rice and 
salt exchanged with Tibet, in addition to daily labour and temporal 
migration (Roy 2010). Ownership of  livestock is an important part 
of  these strategies. Out of  Humla’s 5,655sq km (DDCO 2006), only 
around 98sq km are cultivated and less than 11sq km are irrigated 
(UNFCO 2013). Land endowments are small, with an average of  about 
0.5 hectares per household, but with important differences between 
households, especially in the southern part of  Humla where better-off 
households may have up to two hectares while destitute households have 
as little as 0.1 hectares of  land (Nagoda and Eriksen 2015). 
People in Humla can be roughly divided into two groups based 
on religion and mother tongue: the communities of  Buddhist 
Tibetan-speaking Lamas who live in northern parts of  Humla, and 
the Hindu Nepali-speaking communities that live in southern parts 
of  Humla. The Hindu Nepali-speaking people are further divided 
according to the caste system of  the Hindu religion. The most important 
castes in Humla are Brahmin, chhetri and thakuri who are considered high 
castes, and dalits who are considered low castes (untouchables). 
Local social, political and economic networks and relations are essential 
parts of  people’s survival strategies (Bishop 1990; Cameron 2007). Such 
relations are also shaped by social inequalities and marginalisation 
processes based on caste, class, ethnic group and gender, and form part 
of  a broader system that enhances or inhibits people’s access to various 
assets (Bista 1994; Cameron 2007). A previous study has revealed a 
strong correlation between people’s food security situation and their 
caste, gender and ethnic belonging (Nagoda and Eriksen 2015). While 
all of  the dalits interviewed for this study were considered food-insecure, 
this was the case for about 60 per cent of  the high-caste households 
and none of  the Lama households. Women often face greater economic 
marginalisation since their access to land and means of  production are 
in the hands of  their male family members. Buddhist Tibetan Lamas 
have better access to economic networks, in part due to their geographic 
and cultural proximity to Tibet, making them less vulnerable to 
variations in agricultural output than most Hindu-speaking households.
3.2 Food aid in Humla 
According to interviews with government officials, food distribution in 
Humla began in the 1950s through the Nepal Food Corporation (NFC), 
an agency under the Ministry of  Industry, Commerce and Supplies that 
is still selling rice at subsidised prices in food-insecure regions today. 
Although sporadic during the early decades, food distribution in the 
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region increased steadily during the 1990s due to the support of  the 
WFP (Adhikari 2008). 
No data have been made available for this study regarding total volumes 
of  food aid to the district, but conservative estimates based on interviews 
with WFP staff indicate that approximately 7,980 Mt of  food were 
distributed in Humla between 2004 and 2011.This equates to around 
20kg per capita per year for the district as a whole, but with large 
annual variations as well as large variations between villages. 
At the time of  the study, the WFP was implementing Food for Work 
and Food for Assets programmes (FFW/FFA) in Humla, as part of  the 
organisation’s Protracted Relief  and Recovery Operation (PRRO) in 
Nepal. Each of  these programmes lasted for a period of  40–60 days, 
with participants undertaking labour activities in exchange for food that 
was supposed to cover three to four months of  the households’ food 
consumption (WFP 2012a). In the villages visited, most households 
were expecting to receive 120–160kg of  rice by participating in the 
programmes. The objective of  the PRRO is to ‘strengthen the resilience 
of  the most vulnerable households and communities by building 
long-term human capital and productive assets’ (WFP 2012c: 9). The 
focus is on creating new income-generating activities by building 
irrigation systems, roads, paths, fences, community buildings, and 
cultivating new crops for commercialisation (e.g. attis3 and apples). All 
households may participate in the projects. 
Table 1 Characteristics of the villages studied, Humla district, Nepal
Village Syaandaa Khankhe
Region Northern part of Humla Southern part of Humla
Altitude (masl) 2,745* 1,700
Religion Hindu Hindu
Caste chhetri thakuri and dalits
Number of households 152* 90
Persons per household 6.3* 7.2
Child mortality per household 1.4 0.9
Main livelihood strategies Agriculture, trade, and wage labour Agriculture, trade, wage labour, 
migration, and food aid
Main crops cultivated Buckwheat, millet, barley, wheat, 
potatoes, and seasonal vegetables
Rice, millet, barley, wheat, corn, and 
seasonal vegetables
Main livestock Yaks, yak/cow hybrids, horses, sheep, 
and goats
Cows, buffaloes, sheep, and goats
Note Data based on fieldwork 2010–11, except those denoted with an asterisk, which are *based on Roy (2010). 
Source Based on data from Table 1 in Nagoda and Eriksen (2015).
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3.3 Data collection
Field studies were carried out over a five-year period from 2009 to 2014 
with two long-term stays in the field in 2010 and several shorter visits 
between 2011 and 2014, in order to take the temporal dynamics in the 
villages into account. Using qualitative methods, data were collected 
through 48 semi-structured and informal household interviews in the 
village of  Syaandaa and 49 in the village of  Khankhe. To follow up on 
particular issues raised in household interviews, a total of  seven focus 
group interactions were undertaken in the villages, with participants 
from different castes and wealth categories including women, traders and 
elders. An additional 74 interviews were conducted with policymakers, 
donors and representatives of  aid agencies in Kathmandu (46 interviews) 
and Simkot (28 interviews). Hence, all the data presented in this article 
have been triangulated by a high number of  interviews at local, district 
and national levels, through observations of  everyday life in the villages, 
and by participating in informal and formal meetings and gatherings. 
The villages of  Khankhe and Syaandaa were considered highly 
food-insecure in 2010 (DFSN 2010) and received approximately 624 Mt 
and 144 Mt of  rice respectively between 2008 and 2013.4 Both villages 
are situated on the eastern part of  a mountain range with access to 
forests and rivers, but with different environmental and sociocultural 
characteristics (see Table 1).
4 The effect of food aid on vulnerability in Humla 
4.1 Food aid and the dependency syndrome
Government officials and development workers frequently express 
concerns that repeated food aid may create aid dependency in the 
region of  Humla. However, although data from the study highlight that 
(i) more land is left fallow today than ten years ago; (ii) villagers consume 
more rice and eat less of  the traditional crops; and (iii) food trading 
patterns have changed over recent years, these changes in livelihoods 
cannot be attributed to food aid alone. Rather, they are the result of  the 
interaction of  complex social and environmental changes. 
The observed increase in fallow lands was primarily explained in 
household interviews as the result of  changes in climatic conditions, 
and by a shortage of  manpower and manure. For example, finger millet 
(l.n. kodo) – a crop that needs abundant rain and manpower – has become 
difficult to cultivate because of  changes in rainfall patterns. Informants 
attributed the lack of  manpower to more children going to school, and 
the shortage of  manure to the fact that many poor households sold their 
animals as they could not afford the increased fees claimed by the Forest 
User Groups5 in the south for grazing during winter. Hence, the study 
does not support the argument that food aid has created disincentives 
for agricultural production. In fact, only 5 per cent of  the informants in 
Syaandaa and 7 per cent in Khankhe considered that they had a surplus 
of  food annually, and none of  the households would work less on their 
fields because of  food aid. As one informant said: ‘We are too poor to 
take the chance of  not working on our fields.’ 
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During interviews, some policymakers recounted how food aid creates 
disincentives for local trade, referring specifically to the reduction in the 
traditional salt–rice trade between Tibet and neighbouring districts. For 
centuries, the salt trade was a major livelihood strategy in the region, 
where traders would buy salt in Tibet and exchange it for grains in 
southern Nepal (Von Fürer-Haimendorf  1988; Bishop 1990). However, 
reasons for the decline in the trade are complex. Older informants, 
who had been involved in the salt trade, said that the decline started 
in the late 1960s with the closing of  the Tibetan borders by China 
and the distribution of  subsidised salt by the Government of  Nepal 
(Salt Trading Corporation of  Nepal 2013). The salt trade is known 
to be a tough and time-consuming activity that requires animals, and 
was conducted mostly by the better-off Lama people in the North. 
Nowadays, Lama households prefer the more lucrative trade in NTFPs, 
and to buy rice from the NFC office in Simkot. 
In addition, food aid is considered too unreliable to replace other coping 
strategies. All of  the food-insecure households stated that the food 
received is insufficient and its supply too unpredictable to meet their 
needs in times of  stress. Indeed, borrowing food and money from fellow 
villagers is a much more important coping strategy than receiving food 
aid. Eighty-three per cent of  the food-insecure households interviewed 
in Syaandaa and 81 per cent in Khankhe said they would borrow food 
and money within the village in order to survive a food shortage, thus 
highlighting the importance of  local social networks and relations in 
times of  crisis. Other coping strategies include daily labour (12 per cent 
of  interviewees in Khankhe; 48 per cent in Syaandaa), trade (23 per 
cent in Khankhe; 9 per cent in Syaandaa), selling assets (12 per cent 
in Khankhe; 5 per cent in Syaandaa), and seasonal migration (12 per 
cent in Khankhe; none in Syaandaa). In times of  crisis, food aid is 
appreciated as a short-term opportunity to access food. For example, 
one informant explained how, for a few weeks, quick access to rice 
through food aid programmes enabled him to engage in daily wage 
labour and repay his debts. However, apart from some temporary 
changes in coping strategy for a few households, no informants claimed 
that food aid had replaced more erosive coping strategies, such as eating 
seed, selling land, or taking their children out of  school. 
Hence, food aid is found to be only one among several factors influencing 
the production systems, economy and trading patterns in the study area. 
Other factors such as changes in climatic conditions and diversification 
of  trading opportunities with NTFPs are more important in altering 
livelihood activities. Using Little’s (2008) definition of  food aid dependency, 
it may therefore be argued that food aid has not created a situation of  
‘aid dependency’ in the study area, as households have not ‘modified 
their social and economic behaviour in anticipation of  food aid’ (Little 
2008: 861). On the other hand, food aid is not found to have any long term 
positive effects in terms of  reduced vulnerability of  the poorest households. 
Section 4.2 presents a discussion on how food aid interventions influence 
the power relations that shape local-level vulnerability patterns.
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4.2 The effect of food aid on interdependencies, power, and inequity
External interventions such as food aid occur in a context of  pre-existing 
structural and cultural intra-village dependency relations (Duffield et 
al. 2000; Harvey and Lind 2005). This investigation suggests that food 
aid interventions affect households’ vulnerability patterns over time 
by consolidating interdependency relations in two main ways that are 
closely interlinked: first, by reinforcing the gap between the better-off 
and the poor; and second, by reinforcing existing power dynamics and 
unequal power relations in decision-making processes at the village level. 
These two aspects are discussed below.
First, interviews and observations show that livelihood opportunities 
created by food aid and the accompanying programmes (FFW/FFA) 
remain confined mostly in the hands of  the better-off members of  the 
community. The analysis demonstrates, for example, that in Khankhe, 
irrigation systems supported by FFW/FFA programmes were built 
to bring water to the rice fields of  the thakuris and not to the dalits, 
since the fields of  the dalits are of  poor quality, in areas too steep for 
cultivating rice or too far from the village. The cultivation of  attis and 
apples, which was supposed to facilitate trading opportunities, is another 
illustration of  how the poorest tend to be excluded from the benefits of  
food aid interventions. Out of  97 respondents, only two stated that their 
food security had improved as a result of  opportunities to engage in 
trade and none of  the most food-insecure households interviewed had 
the time, financial resources or manpower required to take advantage 
of  new trade opportunities. As summarised by one informant: ‘Nothing 
has changed with food aid. The rich stay rich and the poor stay poor.’ 
The differential impact of  food aid interventions means that not only do 
poorer households benefit relatively less than wealthier households, but 
participating in the projects may also have other unintended effects that 
can undermine their future adaptive capacity. For example, families with 
little manpower are usually among the most food-insecure, and whilst 
most of  them praised the food received from WFP, they also explained 
that the work associated with the WFP activities has to be undertaken 
in addition to all their daily tasks. In a focus group discussion several 
women from poor households admitted to taking their children out 
of  school in order to participate in the FFW/FFA projects, and said 
that they had even less time to breastfeed their babies and cook for the 
household. One woman said: ‘Because of  all the work, women have 
more health problems, and with the WFP projects the workload is even 
bigger. People don’t count our work as productive unless we are working 
in the field.’ During the fieldwork, many women and children were seen 
carrying stones for WFP projects.
The second way that food aid interventions affect households’ 
vulnerability patterns is that they tend to strengthen the decision-making 
authority of  the most influential over the most vulnerable. This could be 
observed in the user committees (UCs) that were formed to ensure that 
the FFW/FFA projects are well planned and implemented according 
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to local needs. The UCs are organised in each village and are supposed 
to be representative of  the different groups within the community. 
However, although women and dalits appear on the lists of  UC members, 
these groups complain that they are not heard during meetings. Many 
dalits and poor families are of  the opinion that the UCs do not represent 
their interests, and some choose not to attend the meetings feeling 
that it is a waste of  time since they cannot influence any decisions. 
A woman belonging to a UC expressed that she felt excluded from 
decision-making, since ‘the men do not want to listen to the women’. 
Many development workers were aware of  these challenges, but felt they 
did not have the mandate to challenge social structures at village level. 
As one development worker put it: ‘Dalits and women only participate on 
paper, but are not part of  the decision-making process. Unfortunately, we 
[development organisations] can do little to change this, since the UC is 
formed by the community itself.’ 
Importantly, in interviews and focus group discussions the most 
food-insecure households identified exclusion from decision-making 
processes as a main reason for their vulnerability. Because the policy 
spaces at the local level are dominated by male members of  better-off 
high-caste families, the most food-insecure households felt they had no 
real opportunity to influence the design of  food aid programmes in the 
villages. This leads to types of  interventions that, as described above, 
do not address the longer-term needs of  the most food-insecure, but 
rather consolidate the pre-existing intra-village power structures where 
the food-insecure households have to borrow food or money from the 
better-off in order to survive a crisis. This creates a precarious situation 
for the most vulnerable as the need to repay their debt, for example 
by working on other people’s land, limits their capacity to manage 
and improve their own livelihoods. At the same time, the better-off 
households see their status and position in the village being reinforced.
The above shows that power relations are important in defining who 
benefits from food aid projects and illustrates how a technocratic 
approach (such as food distribution, construction of  irrigation systems 
or paths) to food insecurity fails to challenge pre-existing, structural, 
intra-village relations. It also suggests that food aid, through using and 
thus legitimising existing power structures and relations (exemplified 
here by the UCs), risks consolidating the very inequalities and power 
relations that cause household vulnerability in the first place. This 
challenge is, of  course, not unique to food aid but a dilemma all 
external interventions may face when the most vulnerable are excluded 
from decision-making processes.
5 Conclusion: questioning food aid’s capacity to reduce vulnerability
The study finds that while food aid may alleviate short-term food 
shortages, it does not effectively reduce vulnerability or enhance 
long-term livelihood strategies. Food aid and the accompanying 
development programmes (FFW/FFA) in Humla are found to 
reinforce power relations and inequalities that drive vulnerability by 
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legitimising existing power structures at the village level and where the 
food-insecure, in times of  crisis, have no choice other than to rely on 
the better-off households for survival. As such, food aid itself  forms 
part of  the complex dynamic that shapes the local vulnerability context 
and may indirectly impede the enhancement of  food security because 
it contributes to consolidating unequal power relations rather than 
challenging the local power structures that drive household vulnerability 
in the long term.
Humanitarian aid is regarded by some as a mechanism that could 
potentially boost adaptation efforts when activities are appropriately 
planned (WFP 2012c; IPCC 2014). However, adding to the results of  
recent studies that have uncovered social, institutional and political 
barriers to improving the link between development and climate change 
adaptation efforts (Nagoda 2015; Lemos et al. 2016; Tschakert et al. 2016), 
the findings of  this study underscore the risk that humanitarian responses 
that do not take unequal power relations into account may increase the 
vulnerability of  the poorest when faced with future crises. A profound 
refocus that addresses the power imbalances and social dynamics that 
drive local vulnerability is needed before food aid can be expected to 
contribute to enhancing households’ long-term adaptive capacity. 
Notes
1 Department of  International Environment and Development Studies 
(Noragric), Faculty of  Landscape and Society, at the Norwegian 
University of  Life Sciences (NMBU) (sigrid.nagoda@nmbu.no).
2 Furu is a cup made of  wood that is collected by the Lama people of  
Upper Humla in forests in the southern parts of  Nepal. 
3 Attis is a herb with an economic value in Humla of  about 500 
Nepalese rupees per kg (see Roy 2010).
4 Data obtained through interviews with WFP staff.
5 Forest User Groups in Nepal can be defined as ‘village-based 
organisations established to protect, develop, and use a particular 
area of  national forest as a community forest’ (Khadka 2009: 56).
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What Does Climate Change 
Adaptation Mean for Humanitarian 
Assistance? Guiding Principles for 
Policymakers and Practitioners
Sigrid Nagoda,1 Siri Eriksen2 and Øivind Hetland3
Abstract Vulnerability to climate change is the result of complex interactions 
of various social, political, economic and environmental conditions. 
Humanitarian actions, while often having short-term and ‘neutral’ 
intentions, necessarily influence the development pathways that define 
people’s vulnerability to climate change. On the one hand, humanitarian 
interventions risk reinforcing existing vulnerability patterns by increasing 
the gap between those who benefit from different programmes and those 
that remain marginalised. On the other, addressing climate change may 
provide new opportunities for transforming the development pathways that 
create vulnerability in the first place. However, while there are shifts at the 
policy level towards integrating humanitarian assistance with longer-term 
development, considerations about how humanitarian action may support 
transformational adaptation are often missing. This article describes 
a framework for integrating climate change adaptation concerns into 
humanitarian policies and actions, which has been developed in collaboration 
with several humanitarian organisations to support efforts to reduce 
longer-term vulnerability and the recurrence of humanitarian crises. 
Keywords: humanitarian assistance, climate change adaptation, 
vulnerability, transformational change, guidelines, policy processes.
1 Introduction
Humanitarian assistance and climate change adaptation are often 
regarded as two separate disciplines in practice as well as in academia. 
They are often carried out by different actors, governed through different 
policies, funded through different mechanisms, and have different goals. 
However, while the main objective of  humanitarian assistance is – and 
must be – to save lives and alleviate immediate suffering, it makes a 
lot of  sense to do so in a way that reduces longer‑term vulnerability 
and the recurrence of  humanitarian crises. Indeed, the humanitarian 
sector is already moving to integrate longer‑term approaches such as 
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social protection (Haug and Wold; Costello et al. and Marin and Naess, 
this IDS Bulletin), disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness as 
well as through the resilience agenda (see, for example, IFRC 2016a; 
Jeans, Thomas and Castillo 2016). However, while there are shifts at the 
policy level towards integrating humanitarian assistance with longer‑
term development, considerations about how humanitarian action may 
support transformational climate change adaptation are often missing.
As outlined by Eriksen et al. (this IDS Bulletin), climate change intersects 
with humanitarian crises and how they are handled in four main ways: 
first, many disasters are climate-related; second, climate change may 
contribute to social changes that influence the nature of  humanitarian 
crises (also non‑climatic crises); third, how a non‑climatic disaster is 
handled is critical for how vulnerable a community may be to future 
climate events; and fourth, humanitarian aid can either support or 
undermine transformations towards climate‑resilient development 
pathways (development trajectories that combine mitigation of  
emissions, equitable development and reduced vulnerability; see also 
Eriksen et al., introduction to this IDS Bulletin). Hence, how we design 
and implement humanitarian interventions have an impact – sometimes 
a substantial impact – on future vulnerability to climate change. This 
calls for approaches to reduce climate vulnerability as part of  the 
humanitarian response in order to prevent and address the growing 
number of  protracted crises and ultimately address the underlying 
causes for vulnerability. 
However, the challenge is not merely to make shorter-term measures 
long term, it is also about transforming the nature of  the measures and 
the way that they are carried out so that they open up space for multiple 
vulnerability knowledges and alternative development pathways 
(Eriksen et al., this IDS Bulletin). What constitutes opportunities to 
support potential transformational adaptation (adaptation that changes 
the fundamental attributes of  a system in response to climate and 
its effects as opposed to incremental adjustments – IPCC 2014) is 
context specific: First, vulnerability is dependent on social, political, 
economic and environmental changes as well as inequitable social and 
power relations generating vulnerability for a group or individual at a 
particular point in time and space. Second, the way that a humanitarian 
organisation interacts with donors and other development actors frames 
what actions are possible within a particular vulnerability context. 
Third, what might constitute more climate‑resilient development 
pathways – as well as the political spaces for challenging current 
pathways – varies between contexts. Hence there is no ‘blueprint’ for 
‘good adaptation’ in humanitarian actions. What may make sense in 
one context may not be practically possible or may even exacerbate 
vulnerability in another (Eriksen et al. 2011). Instead, humanitarian 
organisations require a framework for analysing the vulnerability and 
institutional contexts in which they work in order to reflect on what 
‘good adaptation’ may be for whom and in which contexts, and identify 
the practical spaces for altering practices within current planning and 
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implementation. Such a framework should also assist organisations to 
interrogate the assumptions regarding vulnerability and development 
that underlie their work, as well as to help them reflect upon whether or 
not there is a need to rethink the way that they operate.
In this article, we describe the development of  key principles aimed at 
providing such a framework for analysis and reflection that are further 
described in Eriksen et al. (forthcoming). Importantly, these principles do 
not provide a ‘blueprint’ nor aim to replace the great number of  guidelines 
in support of  climate change adaptation currently used by humanitarian 
and development organisations. Rather, they aim to help organisations 
understand how their existing approaches and guidelines link to climate 
change adaptation, recognise where gaps or contradictions exist, and 
identify opportunities (and limitations) for humanitarian interventions to 
help drive transformative types of  adaptation.
The development of  these guiding principles formed an important 
part of  the project ‘Courting Catastrophe? Humanitarian Policy and 
Practice in a Changing Climate’ (2012–16). The project involved 
seven case studies of  different humanitarian approaches in various 
geographic and institutional contexts, including in Nepal, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. In particular, 
the guiding principles are a result of  discussions with practitioners 
and policymakers, feedback on presentations of  research findings at 
conferences and seminars, as well as interviews with the representatives 
of  various humanitarian organisations. 
In the following section, we describe the conceptual underpinnings 
of  transformational adaptation, and what it means for humanitarian 
approaches and their role in development in a broader sense. In Section 3 
we describe how key findings from across the Courting Catastrophe 
case studies form a starting point for developing guiding principles 
within this conceptual framework. In Section 4, we use the normative 
principles of  sustainable adaptation to frame the guiding principles for 
how humanitarian interventions can support transformative adaptation. 
Drawing on findings from the case studies, we highlight key questions 
and practical entry points relevant to each principle. 
2 Humanitarian aid in the context of transformational adaptation
Disaster and crisis of  current systems can represent an opportunity for 
dramatic changes and transformation. However, they can also represent 
an opportunity for vested interests and entrenched power structures to 
yield their agency and get their interests/actions implemented without 
critical resistance because of  the urgency and institutional crisis due to 
disaster. Humanitarian lifesaving actions, while they often have short‑term 
objectives, necessarily form part of  the actions that comprise development 
pathways, as they risk reinforcing or altering practices, social structures 
and norms. A critical question to ask in this regard is under what 
conditions or through which modalities/approaches do humanitarian 
actions contribute to either transformation or entrenchment?
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Transformative change can be generally represented through three 
interacting spheres of  transformation, referred to as the practical, 
political, and personal spheres (O’Brien and Sygna 2013). These spheres 
capture the ways that beliefs, values and worldviews interact with 
political decision-making and governance, as well as with on-the-ground 
practices that contribute to sustainable systems. According to O’Brien et 
al. (2015), transformation in practice is contingent on a political sphere, 
which includes the systems and structures that create the rules, norms 
and incentives for different types of  behaviours and practices. These 
in turn are influenced by subjective views of  systems and relationships 
that are represented in a personal sphere. Indeed, individual and shared 
beliefs, values and worldviews often drive political priorities and goals 
and influence framings of  problems and solutions, which can lead to 
conflicts and tensions in decision-making processes that often impede 
transformative change.
While there are shifts at the international policy level towards 
integrating humanitarian assistance with longer‑term development 
and to integrate longer‑term perspectives into humanitarian assistance, 
this shift seldom explicitly considers the transformational potential of  
humanitarian aid in a climate change context. Humanitarian assistance 
is generally accepted to mean the aid and action designed to save lives, 
alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during 
and in the aftermath of  man‑made crises and natural disasters, as 
well as to strengthen preparedness for and prevent the occurrence of  
such situations (Good Humanitarian Donorship 2017). What marks it 
out from other forms of  aid and foreign assistance is that it should be 
guided by the principles of:
 l Humanity: saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is 
found;
 l Impartiality: acting solely on the basis of  need, without 
discrimination between or within affected populations;
 l Neutrality: acting without favouring any side in an armed conflict or 
other dispute where such action is carried out; and
 l Independence: the autonomy of  humanitarian objectives from 
the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor 
may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being 
implemented. 
(Global Humanitarian Assistance 2017)
The broad endorsement of  the humanitarian principles by most 
humanitarian actors has led to the term ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ 
as a means to distinguish humanitarian actions from interventions 
that may have political and security objectives (Bennett, Foley and 
Pantuliano 2016). This distinction is particularly important for 
humanitarian actors that engage in conflict zones and in order to reach 
victims from different sides of  a conflict. 
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However, a strict interpretation of  the humanitarian principles has 
also been criticised for contributing to an artificial division between 
humanitarian assistance and development efforts (Bennett et al. 2016). 
In real‑life operations, it is argued, there is no linear transition or 
‘handover’ between ‘development’ and ‘humanitarian’ interventions. 
Still, a range of  different structures, institutions and modes of  operation 
uphold this division, sometimes at the cost of  ensuring the necessary 
coordination between what is regarded to be humanitarian activities on 
the one side and development on the other. 
The need for better coordination among the wide range of  
humanitarian and development actors engaged in emergency situations 
is widely recognised. Over the last few decades, various initiatives 
and processes have been undertaken to improve the efficiency of  
the humanitarian system, including the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182 in 1991,4 the establishment of  the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 1992, the Humanitarian 
Reform Agenda with the Cluster Approach in 2005,5 and the IASC 
Transformative Agenda in 2011. 
Most recently, several international events, such as the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, and the Sustainable Development Goals agenda 
in 2015, and the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016 
have stressed the need for the removal of  artificial barriers between 
short‑term and longer‑term interventions. An important outcome of  
the WHS, for example, was the Grand Bargain that aims to reform 
the system for humanitarian funding, simplify reporting requirement, 
increase support to local partners, and bridge the gap between 
humanitarian and development interventions. 
Integrating adaptation in the humanitarian response challenges 
the division between development and humanitarian assistance. It 
obliges humanitarian actors to include the capacity, understanding 
and expertise from other sectors, and to plan and to implement 
humanitarian interventions within a longer-term horizon. Below, we 
outline five key ways in which humanitarian aid is directly relevant for 
transformation. 
3 Research approach and five key recognitions
An examination of  the seven case studies (many of  which are described 
in separate articles in this IDS Bulletin) gleaned five common themes 
that are key to identifying entry points for transformative adaptation in 
humanitarian actions. These are:
 l Vulnerability is complex and its root causes are often 
multidimensional.
 l Lasting solutions to humanitarian crises require that root causes for 
vulnerability are identified and addressed.
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 l Power relations are important drivers of  differential vulnerability 
patterns at the local level and shape policy processes and their 
outcomes.
 l Poorly designed humanitarian interventions risk enhancing local 
vulnerability patterns.
 l Preparedness and planning are key for avoiding protracted crises and 
ensuring early response.
Vulnerability is complex and its root causes are often multidimensional 
This recognition highlights the importance of  understanding vulnerability 
as shaped through the interactions of  multiple socio‑environmental 
processes including economic and political changes, marginalisation 
and inequity. Indeed, disasters and the human suffering involved are 
seldom caused by a climate extreme or shift in climate extreme on its 
own – they are the result of  a combination of  social and environmental 
factors, including for example conflict and political instability, settlement 
patterns, socioeconomic marginalisation, fragile institutions, and poor 
infrastructure and social welfare provision (O’Brien et al. 2007; Reid 
and Vogel 2006; Eakin and Lemos 2006; Twigg 2015). Vulnerability 
is dynamic, specific to each situation, and may vary greatly between 
individuals and groups within the same villages. The case study from 
Nepal, for example, shows that the most vulnerable, often women and 
people from low castes, would highlight oppression and social inequality 
as causes of  their entrenched vulnerability. High caste people from 
the same villages, on the other hand, would point to a lack of  physical 
infrastructure such as the absence of  irrigation channels as the main 
reason for their climate change vulnerability (Nagoda, this IDS Bulletin). 
Thus, our approaches need to start with a sound understanding of  the 
environmental, social and political factors shaping vulnerability in the 
particular context that we are addressing.
Lasting solutions to humanitarian crises require that the root causes for 
vulnerability are identified and addressed
Vulnerability to climate events manifests itself  in its most extreme form 
in humanitarian disasters, and such disasters are often a starting point 
for understanding which groups are most vulnerable, and what social 
and environmental processes lead to their vulnerability. In many cases, 
humanitarian staff have a sound understanding of  the local complexities 
creating vulnerability. Nevertheless, too often, humanitarian interventions 
address only the symptoms and not the root causes of  a crisis, while we 
need to be doing both. For example, the Nepal case study demonstrates 
how better-off households with high-quality land close to the river 
may benefit much more from the construction of  irrigation channels 
during Food for Work interventions than poor households with land 
in poor conditions, far from the village and too steep for irrigation (see 
Nagoda, this IDS Bulletin). This recognition implies that humanitarian 
interventions must be conceived as a part of, and contributing to, ongoing 
development processes and that this must be reflected in the planning 
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and design of  humanitarian programmes and interventions. This is 
a strong argument for a holistic and coordinated approach between 
development and humanitarian actors and programmes.
Power relations are important drivers of differential vulnerability patterns 
at the local level and shape policy processes and their outcomes
The third recognition underscores the importance of  socio‑political 
factors in determining local vulnerability and how these shape 
humanitarian interventions. In reality, most communities are 
heterogeneous, constituted by people and groups of  people with 
conflicting interests, needs and ideas. Our study from Kenya, for 
example, shows that better-off men have more opportunities to influence 
local-level decision-making processes through social and political 
networks with local leaders and governmental representatives. The most 
vulnerable, on the other hand, were often marginalised in local policy 
spaces and did not believe in their own deliberative strategy (Mosberg et 
al., this IDS Bulletin). In the short term, understanding how socio‑political 
dynamics shape local vulnerability patterns is essential for humanitarian 
actors to ensure that the aid benefits the most vulnerable households and 
individuals. In the longer term, it is necessary for designing programmes 
so that they can address the dynamics that determine vulnerability. 
Critically, humanitarian organisations and their staff form part of  
the power dynamics – and the production of  particular vulnerability 
understandings and ideas of  ‘good development’ – themselves.
Poorly designed humanitarian interventions risk enhancing local 
vulnerability patterns
Importantly, humanitarian interventions are never neutral as they are 
implemented within the frame of  existing social and political structures 
where some people may benefit more than others. Even if  do-no-harm 
approaches may be high on the agenda among humanitarian 
organisations, this recognition highlights that poorly designed 
interventions may nevertheless do harm by enhancing the vulnerability 
of  already marginalised groups and individuals, and may even contribute 
to prolonging a humanitarian crisis. In consequence, programmes that 
are primarily designed to respond to acute humanitarian needs also need 
to take into consideration possible implications on how humanitarian 
interventions may influence longer-term vulnerability patterns. 
Preparedness and planning are key for avoiding protracted crises and 
ensuring early response
With some exceptions, a crisis does not occur ‘out of  the blue’. 
Experience tells us that investing in crisis prevention and preparedness 
pays off, and knowledge about the local vulnerability context before 
the crisis hits buys time and is invaluable information when planning 
and designing a humanitarian response (see, for example, Haug and 
Wold, this IDS Bulletin). A well‑designed humanitarian response that has 
already taken the above recognitions into account in the planning phase 
is more likely to address the root causes of  climate vulnerability and 
reduce the long‑term impact of  the crisis. 
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These five key findings have implications for what is required for 
humanitarian aid to be more transformative, that is, to contribute not 
only to longer‑term measures but also to transformative adaptation. The 
findings underwrite the work of  other studies (see, for example, IASC 
2009; IFRC 2014a; Bennett et al. 2016; Jeans et al. 2016) that highlight 
the need for more cross‑disciplinary approaches to vulnerability that 
allow for coordination within and between organisations rather than 
competition for resources. The findings also suggest the need for more 
financial and administrative flexibility that allow for more focus on 
risk reduction and preparedness as well as allocations to long-term 
development in the aftermath of  a disaster. Crucially, they demand a 
better comprehension of  the political economy of  the country and how 
it influences differential vulnerability patterns at local level. Specifically, 
there must be a fundamental understanding that no intervention is ever 
neutral, in that it contributes to the political economy of  development. 
Communities cannot be seen as homogenous – interests are diverse, 
there are both positive and negative effects of  an intervention on 
different people, and people will seek to negotiate access and influence 
humanitarian aid to their advantage. The power to do so is greatly 
differentiated within a society.
4 Guiding principles outlined
Knowing that humanitarian operations may increase the vulnerability 
of  some while alleviating the suffering of  others suggests the need for 
organisations to reflect on the role that different actors have in the 
shaping of  the vulnerability context at local, national and international 
level. Such reflection may be difficult when there is a need to react 
quickly to crises, and in the face of  emergencies that are complicated, 
with different actors having different interests and expert skills. How 
can one make sense of  this complexity and act to reduce rather than 
increase vulnerability for certain groups? Who represents the ‘local’ 
and can one link the different ‘local’ knowledge with expert knowledge, 
policy development and decision-making processes? 
Several organisations have already developed guidelines that go beyond 
a mere hazard-based understanding of  vulnerability by also taking social 
vulnerability into account (for example, the International Federation 
of  Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 
2016b, 2016c, 2017) and Jeans et al. (2016)). In order to take such 
efforts further, a framework that guides reflection on the significance 
of  transformational adaptation in local work is required, posing new 
questions that help organisations interrogate the way that current 
practice may support or undermine climate‑resilient development 
pathways. In this section, we use the normative principles of  sustainable 
adaptation in order to outline guiding principles for the humanitarian 
sector, using the key findings described in the section above to identify 
entry points within planning, implementation, and evaluation of  actions. 
The guiding principles further described in Eriksen et al. (forthcoming) 
outline questions to be posed at various stages of  planning, 
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implementing and evaluating humanitarian interventions, using the five 
principles of  sustainable adaptation described in Eriksen et al. (2011) 
and Eriksen and Marin (2011). Sustainable adaptation was selected as 
an approach because these are explicit normative principles developed 
to help adaptation efforts address poverty, inequality and environmental 
integrity. The terms ‘adaptation’ and ‘sustainable’, when used 
uncritically, can be used to conceal vested interests and avoid resistance 
and critical examination (Brown 2011). At the same time, the very 
term adaptation is problematic in terms of  the tendency to depoliticise 
interventions and delink them from development processes (Taylor 
2015). The normative principles are intended to provide very explicit 
criteria for identifying the positive and negative impacts of  adaptation 
processes, helping actors within the humanitarian sector to critically 
examine their own measures and processes. Below, we propose some 
questions that can help identify opportunities for humanitarian actions 
to support transformational adaptation. 
Principle 1. Recognise the context for vulnerability, including multiple 
stressors (stressors other than and including climate change) 
Given that responses should be sensitive to the wider vulnerability 
context, including multiple stressors that contribute to vulnerability, the 
analysis should attempt to answer the following key questions:
 l What are the main reasons for being vulnerable (caste, ethnicity, 
gender, poverty, disability…)?
 l What factors other than climate change (political, social, economic 
and environmental) contribute to these people’s vulnerability? How 
do these processes interact and influence people differently?
 l What are the historical, cultural and political processes that have 
shaped the vulnerability of  individuals or groups?
 l Which interventions have been carried out before? Which projects/
programmes have been considered successful? Why and for whom?
Principle 2. Acknowledge that differing values and interests affect 
adaptation outcomes
Given that responses should take into account that different actors have 
different values and interests which may affect adaptation outcomes, the 
mapping should attempt to answer the following key questions: 
 l Which are the main groups/actors with an interest in adaptation 
programmes and their outcomes in the region, and why?
 l What are the main differences in needs/interests between different 
groups?
 l How/to what extent are the views/interests of  the most vulnerable 
groups taken into account in national/international climate change 
adaptation policies and approaches? 
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Principle 3. Integrate local knowledge into adaptation responses 
Given that successful responses need to have a conscious approach 
towards which knowledge is recognised and how it is used in project 
design and decision-making, the strategy should attempt to give answers 
to the following key questions:
 l What are the different interests and needs at local level and what 
are the reasons for this diversity of  ‘local’ knowledge (also note the 
different conflicts and how these are negotiated at local, regional level)?
 l How can programmes ensure that the different types of  local 
knowledge are integrated with other sources of  knowledge when 
planning projects and formulating policies? 
 l In particular, what can be done to ensure that the voices of  the 
most vulnerable are taken into account within the formulation and 
the implementation of  policies and programmes at both local and 
national levels?
Principle 4. Consider potential feedback between local and global processes
Given that responses to reduce vulnerability do not happen in isolation 
but may directly or indirectly influence and be influenced by larger-scale 
processes, the strategy should attempt to give answers to the following 
key questions:
 l What are the potential effects of  national and international 
programmes at the local level?
 l How do organisations work across scale? What are the other ongoing 
processes addressing development and adaptation in the region and 
how do these processes coordinate at national, regional and local level? 
 l How can the coordination between different sectors and 
organisations, including between civil societies and governments at 
local, national and international level be strengthened?
Principle 5. Empower vulnerable groups to influence development 
pathways and their climate change outcomes
Given that marginalisation and social exclusion are important factors 
shaping vulnerability processes, the strategy should attempt to give 
answers to the following key questions:
 l Who are the most vulnerable and what are their contexts (situations) 
that make them vulnerable?
 l What are the political, economic, cultural and social processes 
that hinder the most vulnerable from influencing decision-making 
processes at local, regional and national level?
 l What are the opportunities that exist within the humanitarian 
action in question to support their active participation in influencing 
development pathways?
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5 Concluding reflections: barriers and opportunities for humanitarian 
aid to contribute to adaptation
Integrating adaptation concerns into humanitarian responses represents 
an opportunity to address humanitarian needs and at the same time 
reduce the risk of  recurring crises. The growing recognition of  the need 
to integrate humanitarian assistance with longer‑term development 
has generated a number of  policy recommendations for humanitarian 
actors, including better coordination between organisations, more focus 
on preparedness, better inclusion of  local actors in decision-making, 
better understanding of  the local context, and enhanced financial 
flexibility and transparency (see outcome of  the 2016 World 
Humanitarian Summit).6 However, the scale and intensity of  current 
and recurring humanitarian crises in different parts of  the world suggest 
that much more must be done to address entrenched vulnerability 
patterns. Our findings show that climate change adaptation can 
contribute with additional insights as we take on the challenge 
of  responding to acute humanitarian needs while simultaneously 
addressing longer‑term vulnerability concerns and supporting more 
climate‑resilient development pathways. 
Importantly, any ‘longer‑term humanitarian measure’ does not in itself  
constitute climate change adaptation. Transforming the conditions, 
relations and processes that cause vulnerability will often require 
changes in the way humanitarian interventions are planned and 
designed. It is how a measure is implemented in terms of  reinforcing 
or challenging inequities and environmental change, and the extent 
to which it opens up space for the voices of  the vulnerable – such as 
their vulnerability understandings and alternative conceptions of  ‘good 
development’ – that determines whether outcomes are transformative or 
not. This implies a need for better understanding of  the processes that 
shape local-level vulnerability patterns and a more holistic financial and 
administrative approach for humanitarian aid that allows organisations 
to address the conditions that entrench vulnerability.
This article describes the development of  a framework to facilitate the 
application of  our accumulated knowledge and best practices within 
climate change adaptation in humanitarian interventions. Every crisis 
is unique and the framework does not pretend to be a blueprint that 
can be applied to every situation. Rather, it proposes a set of  questions, 
or meta guidelines, that have been formulated with the joint purpose 
of: (1) avoiding the risk that humanitarian actions reinforce entrenched 
vulnerability patterns, and (2) identifying opportunities for humanitarian 
actions to contribute to transformative adaptation. Importantly, the 
framework is not a static document, but a contribution to the continuing 
process of  enhancing the ability of  humanitarian action to alleviate 
human suffering in the short as well as in the long term. 
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Notes
1  Department of  International Environment and Development Studies 
(Noragric), Faculty of  Landscape and Society, at the Norwegian 
University of  Life Sciences (NMBU) (sigrid.nagoda@nmbu.no).
2  Department of  International Environment and Development Studies 
(Noragric), Faculty of  Landscape and Society, at the Norwegian 
University of  Life Sciences (NMBU) (siri.eriksen@nmbu.no).
3  Norwegian Red Cross (oivind.hetland@redcross.no).
4  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, Strengthening 
of  the Coordination of  Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of  the United 
Nations.
5  https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/product‑categories/
cluster‑approach.
6  www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/.
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Glossary
ACCC Adaptation to Climate Change in the Caribbean
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADMARC Agricultural Development and Marketing Cooperation 
[Malawi]
ASAL Arid and Semi-Arid Land
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
BRACED Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and 
Disasters
CAP Consolidated Appeals Process
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CASELAP Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and 
Policy [Kenya]
CCA climate change adaptation
CCAFS Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security
CFS Committee on World Food Security [Italy]
CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research 
– Oslo [Norway]
CIIT COMSATS Institute of  Information Technology [Pakistan]
CIRCLE Climate Impacts Research Capacity and Leadership 
Enhancement
CVA Capacities and Vulnerabilities Assessment
DARA Development Assistance Research Associates [Spain]
DDCO District Development Committee Office
DDMU District Disaster Management Unit
DEC Disasters Emergency Committee [UK]
DFID Department for International Development [UK]
DFSN District Food Security Network
DPR Disaster Preparedness and Relief
DRM disaster risk management
DRR disaster risk reduction
EAD Environmental Affairs Department
EC European Commission
EDE Ending Drought Emergencies
ERRA Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority [Pakistan]
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations [Italy]
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FbF Forecast-based Financing
FEWER Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FEWS Famine Early Warning System
FFA Food for Assets programme
FFW Food for Work programme
FGM female genital mutilation
FISP Farm Input Support Programme
FOCAC Forum for China–Africa Cooperation
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GDP gross domestic product
GHAR Global Humanitarian Assistance Report
GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship
GHI Global Hunger Index
GIEWS Global Information and Early Warning System
GLOF glacier lake outburst flood
GRC German Red Cross
ha hectare
HERR Humanitarian Emergency Response Review [UK]
HEWS Humanitarian Early Warning Service
HLPE High Level Panel of  Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
HPC Humanitarian Programme Cycle
HPG Humanitarian Policy Group [UK]
HUMPOL Research on Humanitarian Policy, activity under the 
NORGLOBAL programme of  the Research Council of  Norway
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee [Switzerland]
IDS Institute of  Development Studies
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IFRC International Federation of  Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
[Switzerland]
IHS Integrated Household Survey
IIED International Institute for Environment and Development [UK]
INGO international non-governmental organisation
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  [Switzerland]
IRI International Research Institute for Climate and Society [USA]
IVCA Integrated Vulnerability and Capability Assessment
IVM Institute for Environmental Studies [Amsterdam]
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KFSSG Kenya Food Security Steering Group
KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [Pakistan]
LAPSSET Lamu Port Southern Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor
LSE London School of  Economics and Politics
masl metres above sea level
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MGDS Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
MoAFS Ministry of  Agriculture and Food Security
MOAIWD Ministry of  Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development
MoCC Ministry of  Climate Change [Pakistan]
MDG Millennium Development Goal
Mt metric tonne
NAFM Needs Assessment Framework and Matrix
NAP National Adaptation Plan
NASFAM National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of  Malawi
NDMA National Disaster Risk Management Authority [Pakistan]
NDRM National Disaster Risk Management
NEEDS National Economic and Environmental Development Study 
[Pakistan]
NFC Nepal Food Corporation 
NFD Northern Frontier District [Kenya]
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NIDM National Institute of  Disaster Management [Pakistan]
NMBU Norwegian University of  Life Sciences
Noragric Department of  International Environment and Development 
Studies, Faculty of  Landscape and Society, at the Norwegian University 
of  Life Sciences (NMBU)
NORGLOBAL Norway–Global Partner programme of  the Research 
Council of  Norway
NPC National Planning Commission [Nepal]
NSO National Statistical Office
NTFP non-timber forest product
ODI Overseas Development Institute [UK]
OPM Oxford Policy Management
PDMA Provincial Disaster Management Authority [Pakistan]
PHF Pakistan Humanitarian Forum
PRCS Pakistan Red Crescent Society
PRRO Protracted Relief  and Recovery Operation
PSNP Productive Safety Net Programme
RCCC Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre [Netherlands]
SADC Southern African Development Community
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SDPI Sustainable Development Policy Institute [Pakistan]
SHARE Supporting the Horn of  Africa’s Resilience
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SP social protection
SREX Special Report on Managing the Risks of  Extreme Events and 
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation
TA Transformative Agenda
UC user committee
UNDP United Nations Development Programme [USA]
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[Germany]
UNFCO United Nations Field Coordination Office
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund [USA]
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs [USA]
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
[Switzerland]
UNU-WIDER World Institute for Development Economics Research of  
the United Nations University [Finland]
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank [USA]
WFP World Food Programme [Italy]
WHS World Humanitarian Summit
WMS Welfare Monitoring Survey
WRI World Resources Institute [USA]
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